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A. Summary
1. MEANING, USE, AND TECHNIQUES OF INVESTMENT FORECASTING
TI-IE COMPLEXITY OF THE PRESENT AGE has set new standards for the
decision-making process. What is wanted is a systematic appraisal
of the problem at hand, the developments that can be anticipated,
and the courses of action that may be open for dealing with a con-
tinuously changing situation. The question no longer is, Should one
look ahead? It is rather, What is the most effective and scientific
way of looking ahead? In Canada the federal government's in-
creased participation in economic affairs has emphasized the need
for looking ahead, and this has led to a systematic appraisal of the
economic outlook. Investment forecasting is an integral part of
this endeavor (see sections B 1 and B 2).
The needs for investment forecasts may be summarized as fol-
lows: (a) National economic forecasting will be a haphazard under-
taking indeed unless greater knowledge can be obtained about the
various components of such broad aggregates as gross national
product and gross national expenditure. Capital expenditures have
been one of the most important of these components in terms of
both size and variability. (b) The Canadian government is facing a
number of specific problems which require the formulation of posi-
tive investment and related policies. (c) Business is making its own
commodity-market analyses and general economic appraisals, and
capital expenditure plans provide some of the information required
for intelligent planning of business operations (see section B 1).
One of the first acts of the newly organized Department of Re-
construction late i.n 1944 was to ask the Dominion Bureau of Sta-
.tistics to organize a survey of investment intentions of Canadian
business for 1945. This first survey covered manufacturing, mining,
central electric stations, and telephone companies. From this modest
beginning the survey was extended, so that by 1951 it covered all
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private and public sectors of the Canadian economy, including busi-
ness, housing, and institutional and government investment. Ever
since 1946 the results of investment-intention surveys have been
published annually in the form of White Papers, and since 1947 a
companion document dealing with the outlook for basic and build-
ing materials has appeared (see section B 3).
The primary objective of investment forecasting is to provide a
basis. for improving judgment about current and foreseeable eco-
nomic conditions, It is necessary first to find out what people intend
to do, then to arrive at a judgment of what people in fact will do.
To achieve these objectives one requirement is to obtain through
surveys and other methods an approximation of investment inten-
tions by those who are in a position to make capital expenditures.
The other requirement is to obtain a clear understanding of cur-
rent economic conditions at the time investment surveys are made—
to become aware of the basic forces operative in the economy, in-
cluding prevailing business and government policies that will be
influential in shaping events of the near future, and to weigh all
the available evidence that bears on the possibilities or limitations
of realizing the investment plans obtained from those who formu-
late them (see section B 4).
There are so many reasons—and some of these are examined
later—why the results of capital expenditure surveys may not fully
reflect the likely course of investment that economic policies formu-
lated after a glance at statistical-survey results may be just as hap-
hazard as economic policies based on a personal hunch or on "in-
formed" opinion. Further, the economic significance of capital
expenditures is of such magnitude and complexity that no satisfac-
tory conclusions can be reached without regard to other interrelated
events and influences. The main reason for this is that not oniy do
variations in the volume and composition of capital expenditures
affect levels of employment and income, prices, productivity, and
the competitive position of industry within and outside the nation's
borders, but also the buoyancy or inadequacy of domestic and
foreign demand for a country's output may influence notably the
economic climate in which investment decisions made (see
section B 4).
The most successful investment forecaster is not necessarily the
analyst whose quantitative forecast is most closely matched by actual
capital expenditure. As long as investment forecasting is regarded
as a tool for policy formulation and not as an academic exercise, a
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maj9r criterion of the usefulness of an appraisal of the capital ex-
penditure outlook is whether and to what degree it will assist de-
cision-makers in a modern democracy in formulating business and
public policies that contribute to a maximization of returns to indi-
viduals and to optimum national welfare.. If the implementation of
these decisions contributes to a change in the level or the composi-
tion of the investment program and thus proves the initial invest-
ment forecast "wrong," the purpose for which the forecast was
designed may still have been achieved more effectively than if the
forecast had conformed closely to realization of investment inten-
tions and was "right" simply because neither business nor govern-
ment took the appropriate steps to rectify a situation which appeared
unsatisfactory from a national point of view (see section B 4).
The limitations of investment forecasts arise out of (a)diffi-
culties encountered in organizing surveys of investment intentions
and in conducting them on a continuing basis, including such fac-
tors as the extent, quality, and timing of response from business and
other groups and the need to make estimates for sectors or types
of capital expenditures not covered, and (b) problems deriving
from the interpretation of the results of the surveys and the assess-
ment of conditions and circumstances that may affect the extent to
which investment intentions can be realized. The numerous reasons
why investment intentions may differ from realization are referred
to in the first part of section A 2 (see also section B 5).
Bothinside and outside Parliament the results of investment fore-
casts have been used by government to explain some of the eco-
nomic policies which it is pursuing and which it considers most
appropriate to the changing economic situation. The occasions on
which advance knowledge of investment plans has affected govern-
ment thinking have been numerous. Examples include: the shift
from anti-recession to anti-inflation policies in 1946 and 1947; the
federal government's decision to curtail its. own capital spending
and encourage provincial governments to do the same, beginning
in 1947; the formulation of capital goods import policies following
the imposition of emergency exchange restrictions late in 1947; the
tightening of bank credit early in 1948 in the light of continuing
pressure on materials and labor from an expanding investment pro-
gram; the planning for selected investment projects in areas and
localities where unemployment became significant in 1949; the re-
laxation of bank credit early in 1949 to allow business capital expan-
sion to the full extent of available resources; and in more recent
115INVESTMENT FORECASTING IN CANADA
timesthedecision to embark on a number of fiscal and dfrect-con-
trol policies designed primarily to facilitate in a period of rearma-
ment the carrying out of high-priority types of investment projects
and to encourage the postponement of capital expenditures of lesser
priority (see section B 6).
Business finds three main uses for investment forecasts: (a) Sur-
veys of capital expenditure intentions provide estimates of the di-
mensions and composition of demand for capital goods. The indus-
trial detail and regional and local data also give an indication of
what kind of capital equipment is in demand and where the demand
originates. Thus domestic manufacturers of machinery and equip-
ment and of building materials, as well as foreign sellers of such
items, have at their disposal a ready-made market appraisal. (b) In
deciding on a short- or long-term investment program many com-
panies have found since the end of the war that they have been
underestimating the rate of capital expansion of the country as a
whole or of their particular industries. Reference to industrial in-
vestment totals, past, present, and future, may give businessmen
a lead in assessing realistically the rate of capital expansion that has
taken place or is taking place. (c) By tying in information on antici-
pated investment with other data bearing on the economic outlook,
business executives may be aided in their appraisal of the general
situation as well as of the speèific commodity markets in which they
are interested (see section B 7).
Besides being used by the decision-makers in government and
business, investment forecasts are an essential part of general eco-
nomic forecasts undertaken by the Department of Trade and Com-
merce in cooperation with other departments concerned with eco-
nomic policy problems. Information presented in the form of the
national economic forecast is prepared for government use, and
statements on the outlook are made from time to time
both in and out of Parliament by members of the Cabinet (see
section B 8).
Among the many ways in which estimates of future capital out-
lay can be obtained, four have become especially common in recent
years: surveying intentions of buyers of capital goods, surveying
sales and production expectations of sellers of capital goods, making
estimates based on qualitative reports reflecting economic expecta-
tions in industry and in other sectors, and making estimates based
on the projection of past trends (with allowance for growth and
cyclical factors) or on a study of the interrelationship of different
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economic flows or financial data. In Canada all four methods have
been applied, but most reliance is placed on direct surveys of the
plans of buyers of capital goods (see section B 9).
One intentions survey is undertaken at the end of the year and
reviews the outlook fOr the following year, and the other is taken
'at midyear. The year-end survey is based on as full a coverage as
is practical and economical. This involved in 1951 a canvass of
some 17,000 firms in the business sector, with a response from
11,000. The midyear survey is a sample survey covering about 10
per cent of the firms and about 50 per cent of the dollar totals of
investment intentions. This survey is designed to obtain information
not only on the changes in capital expenditure plans in the preced-
ing six months, but also on the reasons for such changes (see sec-
tion B 10).
In the case of actual spending two surveys, again, are under-
taken, both based on a full coverage similar to that of the year-end
investment-intentions survey. The first actual capital expenditure
survey is taken at the same time as the year-end investment-inten-
tions survey and yields preliminary estimates of capital outlay made
for the current year. It provides a basis from which investment in-
tentions for the subsequent year can be gauged. The second survey
of actual capital expenditures follows early in the year and yields
final totals for the year just past. The results of this survey become
available in the course of the year and are incorporated in the sub-
sequent White Paper on the investment outlook. Thus the 1951
document included revised estimates of actual capital expenditures
made for 1949, preliminary estimates of actual capital expenditures
for 1950, and investment intentions for 1951 (see section B 10).
A number of factors have contributed to the improvement in the
quality and timing of returns: firms canvassed have been told why
surveys are undertaken and to what use the results are being put
and have been assured that replies of individual respondents will
be kept confidential; the Minister of Reconstruction and Supply
(now the Minister of Trade and Commerce) communicated with
individual firms emphasizing the importance and making available
the results of the survey, and asked business organizations to im-
press upon their membership how important it is not only to par-
ticipate in the investment-forecast survey, but also to give their
best judgment as to the likely amount of capital expenditures they
would be making a year hence; follow-up correspondence, tele-
phone calls, and personal visits by officials, and the advice of busi-.
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ness economists have helped to clear up misunderstandings and to
improve the timing of the returns; extensive discussion of invest-
ment White Papers in Parliament, in the press, and at business
conventions has helped to increase public understanding of the
usefulness of anticipatory capital expenditure data; and finally, the
generally friendly and cooperative relations in Canada between
business and government have made it easier to obtain and share
increasing knowledge about business behavior (see section B 11).
In the United States, investment forecasting is based primarily
on quarterly and annual surveys of the capital expenditure inten-
tions of business. The techniques employed are similar to those
used in Canada, with a few exceptions. The United States survey
is based on a small sample and is taken more frequently than its
Canadian counterpart. The Canadian survey covers more business
finns and also covers the residential, institutional, and government
sectors, which are not surveyed in the United States. Also, the
Canadian survey places a great deal more emphasis on detailed in-
dustrial classification and regional and city breakdown than the
American survey. In most European countries estimates of future
capital expenditures are an integral part of the national budget. In
such countries as the United Kingdom, Norway, and the Nether-
lands, where war damage was great, government control of invest-
ment has been far-reaching, and statements about future capital
outlay have represented substantially goals which governments con-
sidered attainable. In countries where war damage was less sub-
stantial and where government control does not go as far, for
example, Belgium and Sweden, statements of future capital ex-
penditures are more akin to inyestment intentions of business as
surveyed on the North American continent. Surveys in non-Euro-
pean countries are similar to those undertaken on this continent.
Among these Australia has made the most notable progress, survey-
ing business investment intentions semiannually (see section B 12).
2. RESULTS OF INVESTMENT FORECASTS
Surveys of annual aggregate business capital expenditure plans
in Canada have in the last five years proved intentions to be close
to the actual amounts reported to have been spent by industry on
capital equipment, differences varying from 2 to 8 per cent. In the
follow-up surveys, usually undertaken in May of the year to which
the investment intentions apply, even closer results have been
achieved, with variations of less than 1 per cent to 6 per cent being
118INVESTMENT FORECASTING IN CANADA
indicated. In the first two years of the operations of the survey,
1945 and 1946, the results were not as close (see sections B 1
and B 2).
In Canada preliminary evidence suggests that investment inten-
tions are more likely to be expressed in future prices in times of
rapid price changes and in current prices when there is relative
price stability. The latter appears to be the case even if finns are
asked to express their capital expenditures in future prices. How-
ever, when price differences are small from year to year, this will
not affect significantly the general usefulness of the results of busi-
ness investment-intentions surveys (see section C 1).
Canadian construction expenditure intentions have on the whole
come a little closer to realization than plans for the purchase of
machinery and equipment. Among the reasons are the need to make
advance plans because of the seasonality of construction in this
country 'and the greater difEculty encountered by Canadians in
estimating machinery and equipment purchases since substantial
quantities of capital equipment are imported from abroad (see
section C 1).
Insofar as surveys of investment intentions can be considered
indicators of ability to anticipate future capital expenditures, manu-
facturing firms appear to be among the best-informed business en-
terprises in Canada. Variations between realization and intentions
of 1 per cent for 1949, 2 per cent for 1948, and about 5 per cent
for 1947 and 1950 are indications of a particularly good record.
Among industries showing fairly wide differences are the railroads
(see section C 3).
In the past five years capital expenditure plans appear to have
come closest to realization in Ontario, Quebec, and British Colum-
bia. This is explained to some extent by the concentration in these
provinces of the larger companies, whose fbrecasting record is bet-
ter than that of small and medium-sized companies. However, even
in these regions substantial over- or understatements may occur
when a change in the economic outlook occurs. The Maritime and
Prairie Provinces have been consistently on the low side in estimat-
ing future capital outlay, because businessmen in both these prov-
inces have a conservative outlook. Although large capital expendi-
tures were projected in the Prairies, plans formulated toward the end
of one year were outdated before the succeeding year was well on its
way because of industrial growth associated with a rapid rate of
resources development (see section C 4).
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Large companies, that is, those with a business of $1 million or
more a year, appear to be able to estimate their future capital out-
lay more closely than medium-sized or small firms. Among the rea-
sons for the better record of large companies are the preparation
of capital budgets; the availability of greater resources for making
careful advance plans; the practice of making blanket capital allow-
ances for exigencies; greater financial resources to see projects
through with less likelihood of failure; and the general smallness
in Canada of new firms, which are those most likely to err in esti-
mating capital expenditures (see section C 5).
Companies undertaking large projects and making outlays of
between three and six times the average of the manufacturing in-
dustry appear to be able to estimate their investment expenditures
a year ahead very closely, in 1950 within a margin of less than 10 per
cent. The advance preparation, planning, and consultation that go
into large projects usually pay off with estimates of expenditures
coming close to actual outlays. There are exceptions to this; for
example, new ventures in which there is little opportunity to draw
on past experience, or periods of supply bottlenecks and rising
prices in which even the greater facilities of large companies may
not prove fully adequate to the task of evaluating new capital un-
dertakings (see section C 5).
In regard to the direction of capital expenditures, of 814 manu-
facturing companies sampled, 695 indicated a change in capital
expenditures for 1950. The overwhelming majority of these com-
panies anticipated correctly the upward or downward direction of
their capital expenditures, although those expecting a decline turned
out to be too pessimistic, and those expecting an increase too op-
timistic (see section C 5).
As for reliability over time, of 814 manufacturing companies
sampled, 819 made estimates that were within 40 per cent of their
actual capital outlay for 1949. But when the forecasting records of
the same companies were checked for 1950, it was found that less
than half of the companies could estimate their capital expendi-
tures as closely as they had done in the preceding year. For ex-
ample, of 217 firms whose investment intentions had come within
20 per cent of realization in 1949, only 92 were able to repeat the
performance in 1950 (see section C 5).
Executives associated with policy formulation and management
proved to be in a better position to anticipate closely capital ex-
penditures than employees further down in the business hierarchy.
120INVESTMENT FORECASTING IN CANADA
Company officers concerned with the financial aspects of business
operations are more likely to underestimate capital expenditures,
while executive officers and management are frequently apt to
overestimate future investment outlay (see section C 6).
Reasons for changes in investment plans are largely governed by
a revision in the business community's appraisal of the current
economic situation and prospects for the future. As economic con-
ditions change, so will the factors explaining variations in capital
expenditure intentions. At mid-1950, for example, changes in the
sales outlook ranked eighth; a year later this was the leading reason
(see section C 6).
At mid-1950, reasons for upward revisions ranked as follows in
terms of number of companies reporting: projects added, 28 per
cent; routine underestimate, 14 per cent; inadequacy of
facilities, 13 per cent; plant and equipment costs, 8 per cent; new
products, 7 per cent; technology, 7percent; firmer estimate, 7 per
cent; sales outlook, 5 per cent; carryover from previous year, 4 per
cent; competitive conditions, 4 per cent; plant and equipment sup-
ply situation, 2 per cent; and miscellaneous, 2 per cent. In terms
of the amounts of capital expenditures involved, the two leading
reasons were competitive conditions and new products (see sec-
tion C 6).
As for reasons for downward revisions, at mid-1950 these ranked
as follows in terms of number of companies reporting: projects
canceled or deferred, 35 per cent; sales outlook, 17 per cent; mis-
cellaneous, 16 per cent; plant and equipment costs, 9 per cent;
plant and equipment supply situation, 7percent; routine over-
estimate, 7 per cent; new products, 3 per cent; carryover from pre-
vious year, 3 per cent; firmer estimate, 3 per cent. In terms of the
amounts of capital expenditures involved, the two leading. reasons
were plant and equipment supply situation and new products (see
section C 6).
Response factors contributing to differences between investment
intentions and realization by business include: adequacy of under-
standing by businessmen of what is wanted from them in surveys
of capital expenditure intentions; the timing of the completion of
the questionnaire (for example, more definite information can be
given after investment plans have been reviewed by the board of.
directors in the case of public companies); the degree to which the
responding officer of a company is familiar with the firm'sopera-
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tions and policies; and the willingness on the part of the business-
man replying to use his best judgment (see section C 7).
Differences between estimates of what might be spent and what
in fact is spent a'so arise from the need to make estimates for cer-
tain capital expenditures, including: those of sectors not covered by
direct-survey technique (agriculture, fishing, individual retail stores,
and residual groups, in the finance and commercial sectors); those
of firms not covered in industries surveyed; capital expenditures
not covered, mainly capital items charged to operating expenses.
Further, the statistical techniques employed may, by emphasizing
regional and industrial totals, introduce substantial errors in smaller
sectors, particularly where only a few firms are involved (see sec-
tion C 7).
Similarities exist in Canadian and United States surveys. After a
period of experimentation the quality of capital-expenditure-inten-
tions surveys has improved in both Canada and the United States.
The American surveys have stood the test of a downturn of busi-
ness investment as a whole, the Canadian surveys the test of a down-
turn in a major sector—manufacturing. Business in the United States
has on the whole been making insufficient allowance for price in-
creases of capital goods in estimating prospective investment outlay.
This experience is shared by the Canadian surveys, particularly in
recent years. In some industries in which there are similarities in
capital expenditure planning, differences between intentions and
realization may also be of similar order, as, for example, in the
case of the railroads. In both countries large companies 'appeared
to be in a better position than medium-sized and small companies
to estimate their capital expenditures .inadvance. Wide differences
between investment intentions and realization are most likely when
small amounts of capital outlay are involved, but such differences
affect aggregate data in only a minor way, with overstatements
largely offset by understatements. In examining the reasons why
individual companies may alter investment plans, surveys in both
countries indicate that these reasons will vary as economic condi-
tions and prospects change. While in one year the sales outlook
may be the principal factor, in another the plant and equipment
supply situation and costs may be of major importance. There are
not at present in either country sufficient observations to establish
'all the reasons which would explain differences between investment
intentions and realization over the various phases of the business
cycle (see section C 8).
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There are also dissimilarities in Canadian and United States sur-
veys. The percentage variations between business investment inten-
tions and realization in the United States are smaller than cor-
responding Canadian variations in some years, with the situation
reversed in other years. Among the reasons in part explaining these
differences might be the preponderance of large firms in the United
States. Both American and Canadian experience shows that large
firms are better equipped than small firms to anticipate capital ex-
penditures. Other reasons might include the fact that United States
reaction to investment opportunities will be in many cases much
quicker than that of Canadian business. Thus a bulking of new
projects in one year in the United States may possibly be experi-
enced in Canada in a subsequent year. Still other reasons might be
the greater volatility in formulating investment decisions in the
United States, and the fact that greater reliance is placed in the
United States than in Canada on sampling techniques in under-
taking investment-intentions surveys.
In Canada estimates of projected construction expenditures seem
to have been more accurate than estimates of machinery and equip-
ment purchases. The shortness of the construction season in Canada
necessitates planning well in advance to permit an early start. In
the United States advance planning is not so urgent, and con-
struction plans may not be so firm at the time the intentions are
stated, with the result that major cancellations or additions at a later
date are more likely. In the United States there are, however, im-
portant differences, depending on the size of construction projects.
In the case of machinery and equipment the intentions of Canadian
businessmen may be less accurate because of their substantial re-
liance on foreign sources; and the assessment of the supply and
price situation of the latter is a• more difficult task than the ap-
praisal of the domestic situation.
Projected capital outlay as reported by business in the United
States is said largely to reflect volume estimates, expressed in cur-
rent prices. In Canada the tentative conclusion is that investment
intentions in periods of rapidly rising prices are expressed in terms
of future prices—although at times the allowance for price rises may
not fully reflect the rise in prices that may take place. In times of
moderate price movement Canadian practice is more akin to United
States practice.
As in the aggregate, so in some of the major industries Canadian in-
vestment-intentions surveys have come closer to actual realization in
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some years, with United States surveys being closer iii other years.
In the, field of manufacturing the reasons for some of the variations
between the two countries might include the greater degree of ex-
perimentation and research carried on in the Unjted States and the
adoption of innovations in that country often as rapidly as these
become available and economically feasible. In Canada, with some
exceptions, manufacturing industries follow the American lead in
technology. Thus Canadian manufacturing industries can frequent-
ly draw on United States experience in appraising the cost of new
projects and in a number of cases make use of American engineer-
ing assistance.
A final dissimilarity lies in the, fact that the Canadian investment-
intentions surveys are conducted on an establishment basis, while
the American data are obtained on a company basis. The United
States method has the advantage of making it possible to relate
profit, asset, and other corporate financial statistics to capital ex-
penditure data. The Canadian method has the advantages of allow-
ing regional and local capital expenditure estimates to be made and
of relating plant expansion to the area where it takes place rather
than to the head othce of the company. This point is• of particular
imp9rtance in Canada, where head offices of companies are con-
centrated largely in two. major centers, Montreal and Toronto.
Further, the Canadian technique facilitates an improved industrial
classification, since in the case of companies conducting a variety of
businesses it becomes possible to classify capital expenditures on the
basis of the purpose of the plant rather than on the basis of the pre-
dominating business of the controlling company (see section C 8).
Direct surveys of capital expenditure plans have been made since
1948 for the institutional and government sectors, and since 1949
for investment intentions by home-builders. In 1948 the margins
between projected and actual capital expenditures were compara-
tively wide, but in 1949 and 1950 they had narrowed down consid-
erably, to 3 and 2 per cent respectively. Substantial offsets occurred
within some of the sectors. For example, a decline in the number
of expected housing completions in 1950 was offset by an unantici-
pated increase in the number of starts and by a rise in costs, which
at the beginning of the year had been expected to remain fairly
stable. The housing pattern of 1950 was also influenced by changes
in housing legislation (see section C 9).
To generalize, survey techniques in Canada have been sufficient-
ly developed over the last seven years so that under foreseeable
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circumstances capital expenditure intentions for all sectors of the
economy can be expected to be within 5 to 10 per cent of the
amounts that will actually be expended. The emphasis is on "fore-
seeable" because there are major economic, political, and natural
events that should be classed as unforeseeable, for example, re-
armament following international disturbances, a major war, wide-
spread drought, and internal strife. The time has been too short to
establish whether surveys will stand the test of a major depression
such as followed 1929, but there is some evidence that the surveys
will be able to indicate a decline in capital outlay that is in part
engendered by and in part augments recessionary influences de-
veloping in the economy or being transmitted from abroad (see
section C 10).
B.Meaning, Use, and Techniques of Investment Forecasting
1. INTRODUCrION
A series of major economic events having world-wide ramifica-
tions has crowded the life of the present generation: a hectic boom,
a serious depression, a global war, a readjustment period of uneasy
peace balancing between the forces of inflation and the fears of
recession, and now a time of rapid rearmament amid local wars and
international tension.
There is little in this rapid sequence of events to imply that the
life of this generation has been a "normal" one, with everyone
knowing where he is going and how to get there. The world-wide
forces of economic change in the last thirty years have been so
overwhelming as to reduce the effectiveness of decisions made by
individuals and by nations and to subject them to influences either
unforeseen or unavoidable. Itis perhaps the most encouraging
feature of the positiveness of human nature that in spite of turmoil,
adversity, and confusion the striving to do better continues, what-
ever the handicaps or odds of international conflict or national mis-
management. Thus economic and political decisions continue to be
made by individuals and governments almost daily. These in turn
may either hasten or delay the next major economic event, which
historians of tomorrow may describe as the logical consequence of
the folly or wisdom of those who participated in bringing it about.
But come what may, and whatever may be the effectiveness of
decisions by individuals and governments, the complexity of this
age has set new standards for the decision-making process. It is no
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longer considered satisfactory to base decisions on haphazard
guesses of what the future situation will be. What is wanted is a
systematic appraisal of the problem at hand, the developments that
can be anticipated, and the courses of action that may be open for
dealing with a continuously changing situation. The 'question is no
longer, Should one look ahead? It is rather, What is the most effec-
tive and scientific way of looking ahead?
This task of looking ahead will have either national or inter-
national objectives. Within the national framework, forecasting will
concern the individual householder, the business firm, the member
of the government, and the parliamentarian. The subjects covered
will range from market prospects for a specific commodity to future
national levels of employment and income. Among the various sec-
tors of economic activity one field has been receiving increasing
attention in the last two decades: investment of capital expendi-
tures by business, individuals, institutions, and governments.
For as long as records have been available capital expenditures
in Canada—as in many other industrial countries—have fluctuated
substantially. The significant changes in the volume of investment
have in part contributed to and in part been affected by changing
levels of employment and income. When Canada's greatest depres-
sion reached its lowest point, in 1933, private investment amounted
to 6 per cent of the gross national product, and private and public
investment together to 9 per cent. But at that time the gross na-
tional product per capita in constant dollars was one-third lower
than it had been in 1929, and the number of unemployed approached
a million, or about one-fifth of Canada's labor force. In periods of
great prosperity such as the late twenties and most of the postwar
years, private and public investment together may absorb as much
as 20 to 25 per cent of the total output of the country' and may ex-
ceed the value of Canadian export trade, although the latter is fre-
quently referred to as the mainstay of Canada's prosperity. The
devotion of such a substantial proportion of Canadian resources and
manpower to the expansion of the country's capital equipment pro-
vides employment and income both directly and indirectly to a
large section of the Canadian population.2
There are two more reasons why the importance of investment
1In1950 private investment involved 16 per cent and public investment
6 per cent of gross national product.
2Forquantitative evidence and a summary appraisal see Department of
Trade arid Commerce, Private and Public investment in Canada, 1926-1951
(November 1951), Section 1.
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expenditures to the economy is quite out of proportion to the actual
amounts involved, whether these be large in periods of prosperity
or small in periods of mass unemployment and low incomes.
The first is the contribution which capital expenditures make to
the development of the economy. The productive capacity of the
nation depends in large measure on the capital equipment avail-
able, and additions to the stock of capital increase that productive
capacity. Further, as new techniques and processes are developed,
their adoption frequently requires large capital expenditures. It is
therefore important to economic advancement that investment be
maintained.
However, a high level of investment may affect the general price
structure of the economy and at times may intensify inflationary
pressures. The relationship of capital expenditures to inflation has
been summarized as follows: "This effect of investment upon prices
is directly related to our willingness to save part of our current in-
come. These savings are only partially made by the same individuals
or business firms that do the investing. In fact, the investment de-
cisions, the decision of an individual to buy a new house or a busi-
ness firm to build a new factory, are often made quite independently
of the decision to save part of current income. Although part of the
investment may be financed out of current savings, a substantial
part may also be paid for by drawing on past savings or by borrow-
ing from the banks or other, financial institutions. This means that
some groups in society are spending more than their current in-
come. Unless other groups save enough to offset this excess, the
country as a whole will be trying to spend more than it is currently
producing. If this occurs, the attempt to make these extra expendi-
tures places an upward pressure on prices. In general, once the
economy is fully employed, if expenditures just balance
the amount of savings which all groups in society are prepared to
make, prices are likely to stay at about the same level. If invest-
ment expenditures are greater than this, an attempt to make these
expenditures will tend to force up the level of prices. On the other
hand, if investment expenditures fall short of the amount of sav-
ings which all groups in the economy are prepared to make, total
expenditures will prove too small to maintain the existing price and
income levels. The result will be a decline in prices or in produc-
tion or in employment or in all
The impact of a large volume of investment on the general price
Report of the Royal Commission on Prices (Ottawa, 1949), Vol. n, p. 116.
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level was of particular importance in the reconstruction and re-
adjustment periods which followed World Wars I and II. The prob-
lem again came to the fore in the period of increased defense
preparations, following a worsening of international relations after
the middle of 1950.
With the importance of investment as a source of both economic
strength and economic predicament now being fairly well estab-
lished in Canada as in other industrially advanced countries, the
question is raised: What is being done to learn more about invest-
ment behavior and to provide sufficient advance knowledge to those
in a position to do something about the problems that may arise out
of rapid changes in capital expenditure flows? In Canada the an-
swer to this question has led to the development of an elaborate sys-
tem of investment forecasting, which in concept and breadth of
approach is second to none in the world.
The purposes of this paper are to describe the investment-fore-
casting process as it has developed over a period of seven years in
Canada and to examine the results so far achieved and the uses
to which investment analysis has been put. The paper is in three
parts. The first is a summary of the findings. The second covers the
objectives, meaning, and techniques of investment forecasting in
Canada and compares the process with the processes adopted in
other countries. The third appraises the effectiveness of investment
forecasts in anticipating economic events and seeks to establish the
reasons why investment plans of individuals, business firms, or the
nation as a whole may be carried out or defeated. A comparison of
the results of Canadian and United States investment-intentions
surveys is also included. Two appendices providing information on
the coverage of Canadian surveys and including copies of survey
forms in use conclude the paper.
2. DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO INVESTMENT FORECASTING IN CANADA
Even before World War II various agencies of the Canadian
government devoted considerable effort to surveying the economic
situation as a means of aiding in government formulation of eco-
nomic policies. Among them were the Department of Finance and
the Bank of Canada, guided by their concern with fiscal and mon-
etary policies; the Department of External Affairs and the Depart-
ment of Trade and Commerce, prompted. by their responsibilities in
the field of foreign economic relations, particularly in matters re-
lating to trade and commercial relations; and the Departments of
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Agriculture, Fisheries, and Mines and Resources, whose principal
interest was the development of markets for Canada's major primary
industries. These efforts were greatly assisted by the collection of
comprehensive economic statistics by a central agency, the Domin-
ion Bureau of Statistics, which among its many tasks developed a
set of national accounts that have become increasingly important
to the national policy-maker and senior administrator.
•With the commencement of World War II, some of this work was
intensified, and new fields were entered. The number of depart-
ments participating increased in the attempt to anticipate and meet
war needs on a broad front. As the war was drawing to a close the
Canadian government, anticipating postwar economic problems,
proceeded to frame broad and integrated economic policies. Some
of this endeavor was reflected in the extensive legislative proposals
submitted to Parliament in the 1944 session. The intent and purpose
of the economic program were brought together in a White Paper
on employment and incOme, placed before Parliament in April 1945,
outlining the government's policies with respect to the maintenance
of high levels of employment and income in the country.4 To im-
plement this objective there was need for a continuing central group
responsible for national economic forecasting, which would provide
the necessary forward-looking information required by the govern-
ment to formulate and administer its policies. This task was en-
trusted to the Department of Reconstruction (and Supply), and
was later continued by the Department of Trade and Commerce,
operating in conjunction with all departments concerned with mat-
ters relating to economic The departments concerned are
members of an informal committee on economic forecasting, and
they participate in formulating the final advice given to the govern-
ment on the economic outlook for the country as a whole and its
various parts.6 The development of investment forecasts was one
Employment and Income, with Special Reference to the Initial Period of
Reconstruction, White Paper presented by the Minister of Reconstruction to
Parliament in April 1945. A restatement of the government's aims for maintain-
ing high and stable levels of employment and income in cooperation with
provincial and municipal governments iscontained in the Proposals of the
Government of Canada to the Federal-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction
(August 1945).
0. J. Firestone, "Government Economic Intelligence in Canada," Public
Affairs (Daihousie University, Halifax), Vol. xii, No. 1 (spring 1949),P. 8.
6 For a summary see "Covernment Forecasting in Canada," by Stewart Bates,
Canadian Journal of and Political Science, Vol. xii, No. 3 (August
1946), pp. 361-378.
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of the results of this attempt to put forward-looking economic analy-
sis in Canada on a systematic basis.
3. OF INVESTMENT FORECASTING
The Canadian government's endeavor to be adequately prepared
to cope with the problems of industrial reconversion and possibly
a recession after the end of World War II is indicated by the intro-
duction of a bill early in 1944 to establish a Department of Recon-
struction. This bill was passed by Parliament by mid-1944,7 and
the new department began operations in November of that year,
as the Minister of Munitions and Supply took over the portfolio of
the Minister of Reconstruction. One of the first acts of the newly
organized Economic Research Branch of the Department of Recon-
struction was, in December 1944, to ask the Dominion Bureau of
Statistics to organize a survey of investment intentions by Canadian
business which would provide a measurement of capital expendi-
tures planned for 1945. While military operations were favorable
to the Allied cause, and victory appeared in sight, great uncer-
tainty prevailed about when the war would end. Nevertheless,
many of the larger companies had been planning the various moves
that would be required to turn again to peacetime pursuits. In fact
some of the companies were already making capital expenditures
in preparation for this contingency, in order to make certain that
the transition from war to peace would be as rapid as possible. To
make sure that the data on investment plans for 1945 included not
only the expenditures contemplated by firms in the ordinary course
of events, but also any outlay associated with reconversion, a spe-
cific question with regard to the latter was included in the survey.
The classification used in the 1945 investment-intentions survey
therefore• covered five categories, with reconversion expenditures
being added to new construction, new machinery and equipment
purchases, repair and maintenance construction, and repair and
maintenance of machinery and equipment.
The following industries were covered in the 1945 survey: manu-
facturing, mining, central electric stations, and telephones. The re-
suits of the survey were for government use and were therefore not
released at that time.
In 1946 the survey was expanded to include woods operations,
banks, broadcasting, steam railways and telegraphs, electric rail-
The Department of Reconstruction Act, 1944, 8 Geo.VI,Chap. 18, assented
to June 30, 1944.
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ways, air and water transportation, and motor carriers.The results
of this survey were made public by the Minister of Reconstruction
and Supply, as were those of all subsequent surveys.8 In the 1946 sur-
vey the question relating to reconversion expenditures wasdropped.
In addition to figures for the groups covered, by direct-survey
method, the investment White Paper included estimates of the
likely amount of residential and institutional capital expenditures
and the investment outlay of business sectors not covered by direct-
survey methods. The latter estimates were based on an appraisalof
the supply of capital goods, a feasible procedure in view of the
persistent demand coming from all sectors of the economy for
capital expansion.
In 1947 the survey of business establishments was expanded to
include the construction industry, warehousing, wholesale establish-
ments, chain and department stores, laundries, dry cleaners, and
theaters. Housing and institutional investment plans and those of
residual business groups continued to be estimated on the basis
of the supply situation. To facilitate the latter type of analysis the
survey work on the supply side covering construction was formal-
ized, and the results appeared in a White Paper on the outlook for
basic and building materials. Similar White Papers were issued in
subsequent years as companion documents to the White Papers on
the investment
In 1948 additional business sectors covered by the direct-survey
method included insurance companies and hotels. Also, for the first
8 Capital, Repair and Maintenance Expenditures of Business Enterprises In
Canada, Forecast 1946 (September 1946); Forecast of 1947 investment by
Canadian Business (March 1947); Private and Public Investment in Canada,
Outlook 1948 (March 1948). These three papers were prepared by the Depart-
ment of Reconstruction and Supply. Private and Public Investment in Canada,
Outlook 1949 (February 1949); Private and Public Investment in Canada,
Outlook 1950 (March1950);Private and Public Investment in Canada, Outlook
1951 (March 1951). These three papers were issued by the Department of
Trade and Commerce. To assist the periodic appraisal of the investment outlook
the Department of Trade and Commerce released its progress report of research
done in the field of investment analysis, Investment and Inflation, With Special
Reference to the immediate Post-war Period, Canada, 1945-1948 (February
1949).
9Production of Basic and Building Materials in Canada, Outlook 1947
(March 1947); Production of Basic and Building Materials in Canada, Outlook
1948 (March 1948). Both papers were prepared by the Department of Recon-
struction and Supply. Supply' of Building Materials in Canada, Outlook 1949
(February 1949); Supply of Building Materials in Canada, Outlook 1950
(February 1950); Supply of Basic and Building Materials in Canada, Outlook
1951 (February 1951). These three documents were prepared by the Depart-
ment of Trade and Commerce.
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time anticipatory capital expenditure data were obtained from in-
stitutions and governments by means of a direct survey. Only the
expenditures of housing and residual business groups continued to
be estimated on the basis of suppiy information and other data be-
coming available. Another innovation in the 1948 report was the
inclusion of an allowance for capital items charged to operating
expenses for manufacturing, utilities, and trade.
In-1949, with the addition of grain elevators and the automotive
trade to the business sector and a newly instituted forecast survey
of housing starts and completions, the initial development phase of
the survey of capital expenditure intentions had been completed.
By that time all major sectors in which it was considered feasible
to make a direct survey of the buyers of capital equipment had been
subjected to a regular canvass. Thus the need to make estimates of
investment intentions based on less direct information had been
reduced to a minimum, with agriculture the only major sector so
covered (for further details see sections B 9 and 10 and Appendix
A).
In 1950 and 1951 the surveys were continued on substantially the
same basis as in 1949 except for the addition of two minor sectors,
oil pipelines and municipal waterworks, the latter because they
were considered to be more akin to utility operations than to govern-
ment operations. One other change occurred in 1951 with the ex-
clusion of government expenditures on military equipment from
the investment-outlook appraisal. This was done because most items
of military equipment may in periods of war or increasing military
preparedness be looked upon as expendable or as additions to an
inventory type of stock (for example, guns not currently used for
training or operations), and therefore a case can be made for not
including such expenditures as investment in durable physical assets.
4. OBjEcrivEs OF INVESTMENT FORECASTING
The primary objective of investment forecasting is to provide a
basis for improving judgment about current and foreseeable eco-
nomic conditions. Since past experience shows that economic con-
ditions and national development may be significantly affected by
changes in the level, composition, and distribution of capital ex-
penditures made in a country, investment forecasts in Canada are
part of the larger task of increasing knowledge about the working
of the economy. This knowledge in turn will assist the policy-maker
in business, government, or elsewhere when he has to make decisions
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affecting a given economic situation. The problem for the executive
is not only to set out alternative policies which he may pursue, but
also to choose a realistic policy applicable to a situation he is fac-
ing or may be facing in the near or distant future. A policy, brilliant
as it might have been when applicable to a situation of the past, may
quickly become obsolete as conditions change. There is, then, a
premium on anticipating economic changes as closely as can be done
with the imperfect tools at the disposal of the economist. It is this
requirement for forward-looking information on the course of capital
expenditures by business and other groups that has determined the
processes of investment forecasting in Canada.
Investment forecasting involves the application of judgment to
measurement. It represents the synthesis of two distinct though
closely related phases of economic assessment: the first aim is to
find out what people intend to do; the second involves arriving at a
judgment of what people in fact will do.
One objective, then, is to obtain through surveys and other meth-
ods an approximation of investment intentions by those who are in a
position to make capital expenditures. Another objective is to ob-
tain a clear understanding of curreiit economic conditions at the
time investment surveys are made—to beëome aware of the basic
forces operative in the economy, including prevailing business and
government policies that will be influential in shaping the events of
the near future, and to weigh all the available evidence that bears
on the possibilities or limitations of realizing the investment plans
obtained from those who formulate them.
With this knowledge, which is partly quantitative in character
but is perhaps even more affected by qualitative considerations and
insight into the functioning of the economic system, the Canadian
analyst has tools to arrive at an informed assessment of the fore-
seeable investment situation. The investment intentions provide him
with an approximation of potential domestic demand for capital
goods for a period ahead.. Supplementing this knowledge, informa-
tion from other sources on the supply side of the economy and on
competing demand for supplies will enable the analyst to balance
the various claims that may be made on the country's resources
and the effects that these claims may have on economic activity and
prices. He may conclude that, given conditions of limitations of
supply in the country as a whole, which individual forecasters of
capital expenditures have taken into account only inadequately,
investment intentions will not be fully realized and therefore what
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people actually spend on capital goods and related services will be
less than they stated. This, for example, was the situation in Canada
in 1945 and 1946. Or he may find that buoyant economic conditions
make it likely that those intending to make capital expenditures will
spend all they propose or perhaps more than they initially intended
—the Canadian experience since 1947. Or he may find that, given
certain stringencies arising out of external conditions—for example,
the Canadian exchange diThculties of 1948 and 1949—or out of do-
mestic circumstances—for example, the rearmament program and
expansion of defense and defense-supporting industries following
the Korean incident in mid-1950—there will be a signfficant shift
in the composition of the investment program, with certain indus-
tries doing perhaps better than they expected and other industries
barely accomplishing or actually falling behind their anticipations.
Given these conditions, all that the careful Canadian investment
forecaster may feel justified in saying is this: The people in a po-
sition to make capital expenditures intend to spend $x million.
Given the capacity of the economy and the competing demands, for
its resources, current price treuds, prevailing external relations, and
known government economic policies, actual capital expenditures
made may in the aggregate be somewhat below x, come close to it,
or exceed it. And he may point to some of the variations in the
distribution of investment intentions between regions and sectors
of the economy without stressing with numerical precision the actual
amounts that will be spent in each industry or region. The emphasis,
then, is on major trends becoming apparent that are either of na-
tional importance or of significance for particular areas or sectors
of the economy,, rather than on an attempt to pinpoint with any
claim to precision the actual capital spending that will be taking
place.
This is not to suggest that the Canadian investment forecaster is
happy if he finds that the application of judgment to survey results
shows great disparities between investment intentions and estimates
of actual capital spending. But he is—or at least should, be—aware
of the limitations of the whole investment-forecasting process and
its objectives. To state what the actual amount of capital outlay
will be in a given period, say a year ahead, presumes complete fore-
sight into economic and political events, which no human being
possesses. Who on the North American continent, for example,
could have foreseen aggression in Korea, not only its occurrence,
but also its timing, and the effect that the 'events following this mci-
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dent would have on capital expansion plans by business and gov-
ernments?
The Canadian investment forecaster must also be aware that the
very fact of making available information on investment intentions
and the assessment of the economic impact of these plans may bring
into being government policies and business decisions which will
prevent the realization of aggregate investment intentions and alter
the composition of the capital expenditure program. The economic
forecaster does not predict, and in fact may not feel qualified to pre-
dict, the human and political reactions of those who formulate de-
cisions subsequent to the release, and in the light, of information on
the near-term investment outlook. But what he can do is advise
government on the effects which alternative economic policies may
have on investment intentions and their possible realization. If, then,
the administration—or legislature as the case may be—makes de-
cisions affecting investment, and the attitude of those making capital
expenditures becomes known, the analyst is frequently in a position
to indicate the slowness or speed with which the newly initiated
policies appear to be bringing about a change in trend or in the
composition of capital expenditure plans.
The objective of the investment forecast, it must be remembered,
is to provide a basis for intelligent economic decisions by both gov-
ernment and business. Such decisions can be made on the basis
of what the current outlook appears to be in approximate terms. As
long as government knows that the investment intentions are up-
ward and are likely to exceed available capacity, it does not matter
for the purpose of framing appropriate policies in the first instance
whether the intentions may exceed available capacity by 10 per
cent or 15 per cent. What is important for the government to know
is that this development is likely to contribute to physical bottle-
necks and rising prices in capital goods industries, and that, in an
economy already operating at a high level, the inflationary tenden-
cies in a major sector may permeate the economic system as keen
competitive bidding for the limited resourcçs effects—in the absence
of government controls—a transfer of resources to the highest bidder.
In the light of this information the government may decide that
remedial measures are indicated. If one set of such policies turns
out to be not fully effective or acceptable to the public, other poli-
cies may be formulated in the light of the changing situation.
In another period it may be found that prospective investment de-
mand is considerably below available resources. This was experi-
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enced in Canada during the postwar period in selected areas or
industries, but not in the aggregate because of the offsetting effect
of expansion in other regions or sectors. In such a situation the
government in deciding on appropriate action may find it sufficient
to be informed of, say, the current level of unemployment in capital
goods industries in the localities affected and of the fact that invest-
ment intentions suggest a continuation or deterioration of the situ-
ation. Whether this deterioration 'may be 10 per cent, 15 per cent,
or perhaps even more is not as important as the fact that a worsen-
ing of economic conditions and a drop in capital expenditures is in
sight for the locality. In fact when this situation is compared with
continuing expansion occurring in other parts of the country, the
disparities may be of such order as to counsel remedial action be-
fore the situation in the locality causes real hardship or becomes
instrumental in spreading recessionary influences to other parts of
the country. Or in the case of declining investment activity in a
whole sector, as, for example, in Canadian manufacturing in 1949,
the important considerations influencing a government decision on
what action to take are not whether the prospective decline in in-
vestment is 10 per cent or 15 per cent, but the fact that a notable
decline is in sight, why this drop in investment is taking place,
what it will do to the competitive position of the industry vis-à-vis
importers, and whether declining capital expenditures in some
sectors will be offset by increases in others.
A decline in investment in certai.n sectors may on occasion be a
desirable objective from a national point of view and the result of
specific government and business polIcies. In such cases the decline
in the volume of investment may be an indication of the success
of public and private policies which in the first instance might have
been framed to reduce the demand for capital goods coming from
unessential industries so that sufficient capital goods could be made
available to high-priority sectors of the economy. An example of
this type of development is to be found in the years following ag-
gression in Korea, when a number of economic policies were formu-
lated in Canada specifically to achieve a redirection of the invest-
ment program, with the intention that this objective would be
reached in some measure through government-industry coopera-
tion.9a
oaSee,for example, Mitchell W. Sharp, Depreciation—A Canadian
Anti-Inflationary Measure," The Journal of Finance, Vol. vu, No. 2 (May 1952),
pp. 331-346.
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These considerations of what is involved in investment fore-
casting suggest two important conclusions.
First, investment forecasting applies the artist's touch to the
statistician's skill. There are so many reasons—and some of these
are examined later—why the results of capital expenditure surveys
may not fully reflect the likely course of investment, particularly in
regard to certain areas, sectors, or companies, that economic poli-
cies formulated after a glance at the statistical-survey results may
be just as haphazard as economic policies based upon a personal
hunch or on "informed" opinion of what the situation will be in a
future period. Further, the economic significance of capital expendi-
tures is of such magnitude and complexity that no satisfactory con-
clusion can be reached without regard to other interlocking events
and influences. For it must be remembered not only that variations
in the volume and composition of capital expenditures may affect
levels of employment and income, prices, productivity, and the
competitive position of industry within and outside a nation's bor-
ders, but also that the buoyanáy or inadequacy of domestic and
foreign demand for a country's output may influence notably the
economic climate in which investment decisions are made.
Secondly, an appraisal of the investment outlook is a judgment
in quantitative terms of what will be taking place in the investment
field in the near future, usually in the next quarter or full year. The
purpose 'of this appraisal is to assist in the formulation of business
and government decisions which supposedly, in the case of indi-
viduals or firms, are made to maximize returns or, in the case of
governments, are made to arrive at some national or social objective.
The usefulness of an investment forecast to the decision-maker can
be observed from the influence that the forecast has on the adoption
of certain measures which in the end may materially alter the in-
vestment outlook. The government, for example, may in a period in
which demand for capital goods exceeds supply take a variety of
measures to reduce anticipated demand, through direct action—e.g.,
allocation controls or reduction of its own capital spending—or in-
direct measures—e.g., increased taxation, stricter credit provisions,
or higher interest rates. In a similar situation some business enter-
prises may, in anticipation of construction bottlenecks, rising prices,
and delivery delays on machinery and equipment, review their
capital expenditure programs and decide on the postponement of
some projects of lesser priority. Other industries may, in anticipation
of increased general demand for goods and services associated with
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an investment boom, decide on further expansion of capital facili-
ties, thus adding to an already tight supply situation. In turn in-
dustries producing capital goods may, in the light of strong markets,
program for a larger output than they would otherwise have under-
taken, thus making possible an increased realization of investment,
although frequently at the price of rising costs to the purchasers of
capital goods.
In another period, when there are indications of a decline of
private capital expenditures large enough to alarm a government
committed to trying to avoid "too" substantial fluctuations of eco-
nomic activity, fiscal and other economic policies may be decided
upon to encourage an increase in private capital outlay beyond what
is currently contemplated by business and individuals. Steps to
encourage private enterprise, such as tax concessions, loans, guar-
antees, subsidies, and lower interest rates, may be supplemented by
the expansion of direct public investment outlay. Thus in the end,
partly as a result of such policies and partly because of the confi-
dence that a hesitant business community may regain, the actual
volume of investment may be larger than was indicated by earlier
surveys of capital expenditure plans.
Such consequences lead to the apparently paradoxical conclusion
that the most successful investment forecaster is not necessarily the
analyst whose quantitative forecast is most closely matched by actual
capital expenditures. As long as investment forecasting is regarded
as a tool for policy formulation and not as an academic exercise, a
major critçrion of the usefulness of an appraisal of the capital ex-
penditure outlook is whether and to what degree it will assist de-
cision-makers in a modern democracy in formulating business and
public policies .that contribute to a maximization of returns to indi-
viduals and to optimum national welfare. If the implementation of
these decisions contributes to a change in the level or the composi-
tion of the investment program and thus proves the initial invest-
ment forecast "wrong," the purpose for which the investment fore-
cast was designed will still have been achieved more effectively
than if the forecast had conformed closely to realization of invest-
ment intentions, and were therefore regarded as "right" simply
because neither business nor government took the appropriate steps
to rectify a situation which appeared unsatisfactory from a national
point of view. In essence, then, the statistically correct investment
forecaster is not necessarily the most successful forecaster—although
the very fact of being right or nearly right may be a source of pro-
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fessional satisfaction. Perhaps more important are the relationship
of the economic forecaster to the decision-maker, the use to which
the forecast is put, and the contribution which the investment fore-
cast itself may make to general public enlightenment on contro-
versial economic issues.
5. Lmn'rATIoNs OF INVESTMENT FORECASTING
Limitations of investment forecasting arise out of two sets of
conditions: (1) difficulties encountered in organizing the surveys of
investment intentions and in conducting them on. a continuing basis,
including such factors as the extent, quality, and timing of response
from business and other groups and the need to make estimates for
sectors or types of capital expenditures not covered; (2) problems
deriving from the interpretation of the results of surveys and an
assessment of the conditions and circumstances affecting the extent
to which investment intentions may be realized.
The first problem, then, is 'organizing intentions surveys simply
and realistically enough to be understood by firms and individuals
canvassed so as to permit a speedy response. The surveys have to
be conceived broadly and flexibly enough to take care of the various
ways in which business firms and other groups plan and record their
capital expenditures. The surveys must, also be adaptable to the
continuously changing economic situation, industrial structure, com-
position of the business community (new firms being established
and existing firms going out of business), and the division between
private and public spheres of activity'.
To cope with these various requirements techniques of investment
forecasting developed gradually in Canada over the last seven years
have been changed, revised, and extended as experience has been
gained. Methods employed in preparing investment forecasts and
cooperation obtained from' respondents are summarized in sections
B 9-11, and supplementary evidence is examined in section C 7.
The second type of problem is mainly analytical. It requires a
thorough understanding of how investment decisions are formu-
lated by businessmen and others, why decisions are made, how real-
istic they are under varying economic circumstances, and what their
effect is likely to be on the economy as a whole, on specific indus-
tries, on a particular region or locality, or on the firm, individual,
institution, or government agency involved. The limitations of in-
vestment forecasting based on surveys of capital expenditure in-
tentions and the careful attention that must be given to the forces
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and factors that may be instrumental in either defeating or changing
investment plans were stated in the following terms in the first
investment White Paper published. Even though some five years
have elapsed since these observations appeared,. they have sub-
stantially stood the test of subsequent experience:
"In interpreting the intentions of business enterprises, account has
to be taken of the structural, dynamic and behavioristic conditions
in the economic system at the time. Some illustrations of the com-
plexities follow: A firm's intention to make a certain investment in a
given year depends on its outlook as to the future of business in
general (perhaps for some years ahead if the investment is large),
the prospects in its own industry, and its own particular competitive
position within that industry. Two competitive firms may have simi-
lar assumptions as to the future of trade generally and of their own
industry, although they may each react differently and would plan
differently. In most instances, however, their information or fore-
sight will not be similar, so that their assumptions about the future
will not be homogeneous. This creates some logical difficulty about
adding together intentions so differently reached. The better in-
formed the firms are about trends, the more homogeneous will be
their basic assumptions, and the less serious the logical difficulty.
But it follows that the investment intentions of industries character-
ized by well-informed managements mean something different from
those stated by industries whose managements are short or narrow
in views. Likewise, industries that are highly integrated, that can
'mechanize' the introduction of new processes derived from research,
etc., are able to state intentions more firmly than industries of small
firms, or industries that are going through either rapid development
or decline. A slight change in business generally is likely to create
in the latter type of industries wider discrepancies between the Janu-
ary intentions and the realized acts by December. In the former,
highly integrated type of industry with only a few firms, while their
views may be longer and the investment more 'mechanized' in ap-,
plication, the actions of one firm can so greatly affect a secdnd that
both intentions and actions have to be modified according to, not
only general trade conditions, but also the unfolding actions of the
competition.
"In a more general way, as in recession times and in periods of
industrial strife, general conditions can emerge to alter intentions
(and actions) in the course of the year. If conditions are reasonably
•stable, the forecast- (or sum-total of intentions) may approximate the
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actual fulfilment, except where there has been general over- or
underestimation of prospects. Or again the costs of the actual con-
struction and machinery, etc. may during the year, prove to be
different from the estimates as shown in the original intentions, by
reason of errors in costing, changes in prices, etc. Changes in the
basic conditions can of course change intentions or disrupt actions,
probably unequally as between industries, and also in total. Civen
any such changes in general conditions, especially sudden changes,
the intentions may not be realized before the year-end; in depres-
sions, errors of forecast may appear in a large proportion of the in-
dustries; in minor recessions, they may appear mainly in the indus-
tries immediately affected by the changed situation. Likewise in
prosperity conditions, the intentions may .understate the investment
likely to be undertaken, particularly if the prosperity is associated
with the emergence of new firms that have been missed in the
survey. To overcome such difficulties, special allowances have to
be made to include investment outlay of this kind."10
The macro- and micro-economic influences that have affected the
realization of capital expenditure plans in Canada over the last seven
years and the reasons for the differences between intentions and
realization are examined in sections C 1-6.
6. INVESTMENT FORECASTING AND GOVERNMENT POLICY
One of the major objectives of investment forecasting has been
described as providing background information to the policy-maker
in the legislative and executive branches as well as to senior ad-
ministrative heads concerned with the implementation of economic
policies. Advance knowledge of the course and distribution of the
investment program will be helpful if a choice has to be made be-
tween alternative policies. Such policies may be called for because
a rise or a decline or a change in the composition of the investment
program which is not in consonance with national objectives ap-
pears to be in sight.
The need for government to have access to forward-looking eco-
nomic analysis, of which investment forecasting is an integral part,
has been stressed earlier. Perhaps the importance which the Cana-
dian government has attached to this type of analysis is indicated
by the fact that White Papers on the investment outlook, together
10Departmentof Reconstruction and Supply, Capital, Repair and Main-
tenance Expenditures of Business EnterprLses in Canada, Forecast 1946, pp.
10-11.
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with appraisals of the basic and building material outlook, have been
considered by Parliament each year commencing in 1947." Further,
in discussing the economic situation in Parliament, frequently in
conjunction with the Debate from the Throne, numerous references
to the meaning of the anticipated investment and its impact on
economic activity, industrial development, prices, and foreign ex-
change have been made by a number of members of the Canadian
•Cabinet and members of Parliament on both the Government and
the Opposition side.'2 Also, since the end of the war, in bringing
down his annual budget the Minister of Finance has found it neces-
sary on a number of occasions to refer to the economic impact of
the anticipated volume of investment and to explain the kind of
fiscal and monetary policies that the Government considers to be
most appropriate in this situation.'3
Theresults of the first investment-intentions survey in 1945 were kept
confidential because of the experimental nature of the undertaking. A summary
of the 1946 survey was released by the Minister of Reconstruction and Supply
on June 26, 1946, and this was followed by the publication of a White Paper
in September 1946. Shortly after the results of the 1946 survey were made
public the policy implications of whether business investment as forecast was
sufficient to take up the slack arising out of the discontinuation of military
expenditures were raised in Parliament by a member of one of the opposing
parties (House of Commons Debates, July 8, 1946, pp. 3230-3231). The subse-
quent White Papers on the investment and basic and building material outlooks
were presented in the House of Commons as follows: March 27, 1947 (Journals
of the House of Commons of Canada, No. 41, p. 252; in discussing the White
Papers the Minister of Reconstruction and Supply observed that he believed
them to be "a very important document" [House of Commons Debates,
March 27, 1947, p. 1777]); March 22, 1948 (Journals of the House of Com-
mons of Canada, No. 52, p. 273); March 1, 1949 (ibid., No. 25, p. 134); April
21, 1950 (ibid., No. 40, p. 261); advance statement offered by the Minister of
Trade and Commerce on February 8, 1951 (House of Commons Debates, pp.
186-187); White Papers presented on April 3, 1951 (Votes and Proceedings of
the House of Commons of Canada, No. 39, p. 236).
12Statementby the Prime Minister, House of Commons Debates, February
20, 1950, pp. 55-56. (In this address the Prime Minister drew the attention of
the House of Commons to the review "Canada at the Half-way Mark of the
Twentieth Century," which had been circulated among members of Parliament.
This review included pertinent data on past and anticipated capital expendi-
tures. See Supplement to the February 1950 issue of Canadian Statistical
Review, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, pp. 14-15.) Statements by the Minister
of Reconstruction and Supply, later the Minister of Trade and Commerce:
House of Commons Debates, February 23, 1948, pp. 1492 and 1495; ibid.,
June 25, 1948, p. 5845; ibid., March 1, 1949, p. 1014; ibid., March 31, 1950,
p. 1431; ibid., September 8,1950, p. 445; ibid., February 8, 1951, p. 184;
ibid., June 28, 1951, p. 4817. References by opposition members include:
'Ibid., June 27, 1946, p. 3230; ibid., May 6, 1947, p. 2811; ibid., February 23,
1948, p. 1495; ibid., June 25, 1948, p. 5847; ibid., March 22, 1950, p. 1003.
1946Budget (House of Commons Debates, June 27, 1946, pp. 2902-2903);
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The occasions where advance knowledge of investment plans has
affected government thinking are too numerous to be listed in de-
tail. The following few examples, however, may illustrate the uses
which government has been able to make of the results of invest-
ment-forecasting work.
As the White Paper on employment and income to which refer-
ence has been made indicates, the Canadian government was much
concerned with the problems of adjustment and adaptation of the
economy that would follow the end of World War IL There was a
prominent school of thought in Canada, and this school apparently
had followers in most Allied countries including the United States,
which believed that the reconversion might bring in its wake a sharp
recession somewhat akin to the experience after World War I. In
fact many of the policies proposed were of a type that might assist
in coping with such a situation should it arise. But by early 1946
it became apparent that there were many sectors in Canada, of
which capital expenditures were one, in which forces of expansion
appeared to be stronger than forces of contraction. Investment fore-
casts in particular indicated an increasing volume of business capi-
tal expansion in this country that would in large part offset declining
military expenditures. As reports of rising actual capital expenditures
and the mounting pressure on the capital goods market with its
associated inflationary tendencies made it apparent that a period
of expansion was ahead, the government was able to shift from its
earlier emphasis, on possible anti-recession policies to economic
policies designed to cope with physical bottlenecks, manpower ad-
justment, and rising prices.'4
1947 Budget (ibid., April 29, 1947, p. 2543); 1948 Budget (ibid., May 18,
1948, p. 4056); 1949 Budget (ibid., March 22, 1949, p. 1789—in this statement
the Minister of Finance referred to the "informative facts and forecasts
relating particularly to the prospects for capital expenditure and the supplies
available for construction"); 1950 Budget (ibid., March 28, 1950, pp. 1289-
1290); 1951 Budget (ibid., April 10, 1951, p. 1802 and p. 13 of the budget
paper dealing with economic indicators).. In the 1950 and 1951 Budgets the
results of investment-intention surveys were shown in summary tabular form
in an appendix.
14Anumber of fiscal and economic policies were introduced in 1944 and
1945 to provide for and encourage peacetime industrial expansion. For a sum-
mary see Department of Reconstruction and Supply, Encow'agement to In-
dustrial Expansion in Canada (1948), pp. 17-18. But as the dimensions of
business capital expansion became apparent, in the spring of 1946 the Minister
of Reconstruction and Supply found it necessary to report to Parliament: "For
a time I was pleased with the rate of expansion. Today I am rather alarmed
by it.It seems to me that the expansion is coming too rapidly and that we
shall face an insoluble problem of shortages of material as well as shortages
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By the end of 1947, with most of the bottlenecks arising out of
postwar reconversion eliminated, a major problem facing Canada
was the severe shortage of United States dollars arising in part out
of heavy loans and gifts to overseas countries, in part out of the
inability to convert soft currencies earned into dollars, and in part
out of a substantial increase in imports from the United States
which was not accompanied by a corresponding increase in exports.
Emergency exchange restrictions followed, covering the import of
both consumer and capital goods. The continuing large volume of
investment, as indicated by surveys of capital expenditure inten-
tions, suggested the need for an extension of import restrictions in
the capital goods field, even though Canadians appeared anxious
to continue with rapid capital expansion.15
The following extract from a letter sent to 13,000 business firms
by the Minister of Reconstruction and Supply (later the Minister
of Trade and Commerce), who was responsible for the administra-
tion of controls of capital goods imports, indicates one of the uses
to which investment-intentions surveys were put: "The outstanding
result of the survey is the fact that Canada is experiencing the great-
of manpower when the program now under way comes into full production."
House of Commons Debates, March 20, 1946, p. 115. In the summer of 1946
the Minister of Reconstruction, in reviewing the need for changing the Gov-
ernment's policy toward encouraging industrial expansion through the granting
of double depreciation rates, explained: "The need for housing is so great
that it is desirable that industrial projects should be limited to those which are
urgent from the point of view of employment. The action referred to removes
the possibility that industrial projects will be rushed forward to qualify for the
double depreciation privilege. It is hoped that this will permit the postpone-
ment of some projects which involve extensive construction until the supply
situation is less acute." HOuse of Commons Debates, July 22, 1946, p. 8674.
See also Encouragement to Industrial Expansion in Canada, pp. 30-32.
"Theneed for this is underlined by the magnitude of new capital invest-
ment intentions in 1948. On top of an investment boom in 1947 in which the
all-time record, in peace or war, of $2.4 billion was spent on new construction,
machinery and equipment in Canada, an increase of 17 per cent, or $400 mil-
lion, is planned for 1948. For the purposes of this discussion it is the United
States dollar aspect of this really staggering amount—$2.8 billion—which con-
cerns us. But I would like in passing also to draw attention to the disturbing
inflationary possibilities inherent in such a program. Some postponement of the
less essential expenditures in this program will be far from harmful. It will not
cause any unemployment in the construction or capital goods industries. In fact
our capacity in a number of key instances, such as steel supply, will be strained
to the limit to provide for essential construction. Additional demand in the
market will simply bid up prices, intensify shortages, interrupt necessary work
and generally add to costs. On the other hand, projects postponed now will
prove useful in maintaining employment and income in the future." Statement
by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, House of Commons Debates, February
23, 1948, pp. 1492-1498.
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est investment boom in her history. Total private and public invest-
ment contemplated for 1948 is likely to amount to some $2.8 billion,
exceeding the 1947 peak of $2.4 billion, thus contributing further to
inflationary pressures. While the value increase over last year is
expected to be 17 per cent, in terms of volume it will probably be
less than 5 per cent. Such a large investment program, however,
means a heavy drain on our limited United States dollar holdings.
Out of every dollar spent on investment in Canada, some thirty cents
go to the United States. As you know, the government has embarked
on a United States dollar conservation program, and to this end is
soliciting the cooperation of business and all other groups in Canada.
It is recognized that circumstances will vary widely, but where
a construction project or the purchase of machinery and equipment
can be postponed without affecting essential operations and produc-
tion it will be helpful in our United States dollar conservation pro-
gram. If you believe that it is necessary to carry out your construc-
tion project or purchase machinery and equipment this year, you
might find it useful to ascertain whether any of the materials, ma-
chinery and equipment to be imported from abroad fall under
Schedule III of the Emergency Exchange Conservation Bill, pres-
ently before Parliament. If the purchases which you contemplate
either directly by yourself or through a dealer come from abroad,
you are advised to write to the Director of the Capital Coods Im-
port Permits Division and obtain assurance that import of the items
which you require will be permitted."6
Other government policies, formulated as soon as expanded invest-
ment plans of business for 1948 became known, included a tighten-
ing of credit, as is indicated by the following extract from the Bank
of Canada Annual Report: "Early in 1948 it became apparent that
business intended to make even larger capital expenditures and that
this might mean increased pressure on available labour and materials.
Accordingly, the bank in February 1948 suggested to the chartered
banks that conditions prevailing at that time made it undesirable
for capital expenditures to be financed through expansion of bank
credit."17
Another concern of the Canadian government at that time was
the need to keep public capital outlay to a minimum so that it
would compete as little as possible with private investment under-
16Letterby the Minister of Reconstruction and Supply, March 22, 1948.
17AnnualReport of theBankof Canada to the Minister of Finance for the
Year 1948 (February 11, 1949), p. 7.
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takings, thus reducing the pressure on rising prices.18 Extracts from
two letters written by the Minister of Reconstruction and Supply to
Provincial Premiers in connection with the 1947 and 1948 surveys of
capital expenditure intentions are illuminating on this point. On
March 26, 1947, the Minister wrote: "You will note that Canadian
business intends to spend some 50 per cent more in 1947 on capital
projects than it did in 1946. While an improvement in the supply
situation of basic and building materials is expected, varying for
most items between 10 and 80 per cent, the available supplies are
not likely to meet all the demands that housing construction and
private business are likely to make. This information is brought to
your attention so that your government may be in a position to re-
view the provincial and municipal capital expenditures with which
you may wish to proceed during 1947." On March 19, 1948, the
Minister wrote: "This report indicates for 1948 a capital program
of $2.8 billion, or 17 per cent higher than the $2.4 billion spent in
1947. This rise is mainly due to increases of capital expendituresby
business, institutions and for housing. Direct government capital
expenditures show only an increase of 8 per cent, mainly due to
increased investment outlay by municipalities. It is gratifying to note
that provincial governments as a whole are pursuing a similar policy
to that of the Dominion Government by keeping their capital ex-
penditures at moderate levels and postponing a number of projects,
the execution of which may be very useful at a later date."
Changes in the economic situation in 1949 brought different prob-
lems to the fore. Although Canada did not experience a business
recession in that year, as did the United States, developments in
the latter country as well as the weakening of overseas export mar-
kets were not without impact on Canada'9 (see also section C 1).
The main development was that the economy did not fully absorb
new entrants to the labor force, and local unemployment pockets oc-
18 "This government has, of course, been deliberately restricting its own
expenditures on construction. and equipment during the last two years, partly
because of the high cost of such work under current conditions but more
fundamentally because of its desire to keep excessive national expenditure
within bounds and to defer wherever possible the construction of useful prof-
ects until the time when private expenditure will be lower and additional
government work will help to maintain employment and income." Budget
Address by the Minister of Finance, House of Commons Debates, May 18,
1948, p. 405g.
19 For a summaiy of the changing influences upon the domestic economy see
"Canadian Economic Developments 1949-50," Canada Year Book, 1950, p.
xxxiii.
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curred even though national levels of employment and income con-
tinued to rise. As a result the pressure for government action in-
creased, with opposition parties in Parliament and many groups
outside Parliament proposing the greater use of public investment
projects to cope with local unemployment.20
In summarizing the Canadian government's attitude to these re-
quests the Minister of Finance pointed out the willingness of federal
authorities to cooperate with provincial and municipal governments
in meeting local problems of unemployment.21 In fact, in planning
its own construction program for 1949 and 1950, while continuing
the general policy of not raising significantly the overall program in
spite of mounting pressures,22 the government applied less rigorous
yardsticks for investment projects in areas or localities where a high
proportion of construction workers were unemployed and invest-
ment-intentions surveys and other sources indicated a falling off of
private capital spending.23
20 For example, see statement by the Leader of the Opposition, House of
Commons Debates, February 20, 1950, p. 45.
21wantto make it clear, however, that the central government cannot and
should not attempt to assume responsibility for all these regional problems.
In my mind the proper role of the central government in our federal state is
fourfold. First, through its fiscal and general policies it should endeavour to
create a favourable climate for healthy economic expansion and development.
Second, it should have careful regard in planning its own operations for the
best timing and the best placing of its capital and developmental expenditures.
Third,itshould recognize a special responsibility for the promotion and
development of our basic primary industries and other industries of a national
significance. Fourth, it should be ready to cooperate actively with provIncial
governments, and through the provincial governments with municipalities, in
meeting regional problems that threaten nation-wide economic repercussions."
Statement by the Minister of Finance in his Budget Address, House of Coin-
mons Debates, March 28, 1950, p. 1210.
22 "J continue to believe that all construction work under the control of the
government which it is practicable to postpone should be postponed, except in
those few areas where there may be some local unemployment. That has been
the approach of the government in the formulation of its expenditure program
for the year. I must say that it gets progressively, more difficult to apply this
policy from year to year, as really important requirements for construction of
all kinds keep accumulating—some of them repeatedly deferred since long
before the war. Other needs, too, are constantly arising—some of them from the
necessary expansion in the defence program, others from more constructive
developments, such as the need to provide improved airport runways and
related equipment to accommodate the bigger and better planes now available."
Statement by the Minister of Finance in his Budget Address, House of Corn-
mons Debates, March 22, 1949, p. 1789.
28 "With particular reference to the current situation I should remind the
house that in preparing our estimates for constructiOn projects we have deliber-
ately been severe in cutting down requests for new construction because in
most parts of Canada building labour is fully employed on private projects.
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In the field of private investment, steps taken a year earlier to
tighten credit were withdrawn to allow business capital expansion
to the full extent of available resources. "Indications are that the
extreme pressures which were generally present in the business
capital investment field may abate somewhat in 1949. The Bank of
Canada therefore feels that the suggestion [to restrict bank credit
for capital expansionj which it made a year ago is no longer neces-
sary or appropriate."24
In 1951 the outlook for increased capital outlay by business,
in addition to large military expenditures necessitated by events
following aggression in Korea, led the government to embark on. a
number of fiscal and direct-control policies designed primarily to
facilitate the carrying out of high-priority types of investment proj-
ects and to encourage the postponement of capital expenditures of
lesser priority.25
The above examples are a selection of the many occasions when
the availability of forward-looking information on capital expendi-
tures (and other economic flows) has been found helpful by the
Canadian government. Thus investment forecasts have gradually be-
come one of the accepted means of providing government with back-
ground knowledge about current and foreseeable economic develop-
ments, which are taken into account when economic policies are
formulated.
7. INVESTMENT FORECASTING AND BUSINESS POLICY
One of the most remarkable developments in Canada over the last
decade, as far as formulation of business policies of major corpora-
tions is concerned, is the growing realization of the close relation-
ship between the success of an individual enterprise and general
prosperity in the country. Thus businessmen have become increas-
ingly conscious of the need for appraising the strengths and weak-
nesses not only of the market for the specific commodities they may
be producing and/or selling, but also of the Canadian market as a
But where we have evidence that building labour will be we have
applied less severe tests to departmental requests for new construction." State-
ment by the Minister of Finance in his Budget Address, House of Commons
Debates, March 28, 1950, p. 1210.
24 Statement issued by the Governor of the Bank of Canada at a press confer-
ence, February 14, 1949.
•25 For a summary of policies pursued see the Budget Address by the Minister
of Finance, House of Commons Debates, April 10, 1951, pp. 1800ff.
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whole and the markets of those other countries with which they
trade.
In this decade business executives in Canada and their counter-
parts in the United States have acquired much greater knowledge
of the working of the economy and have become familiar with some
of the aggregate concepts economists are using. Such terms as gross
national product or gross national expenditure, national income, in-
vestment, and balance of payments can frequently be heard at direc-
tors' meetings, in businessmen's clubs, and at annual conventions of
business organizations. Similarly, trade-unions and farm organizations
have come to use regularly macro-economic concepts to support
their various demands, ranging from wage increases based on a
productivity rise to floor prices for agricultural products.
As a result the demand for forward-looking economic information
has come also from sectors other than government. These demands
have been met in various ways, one of which is the publication over
a period of years of the results of the investment-intentions surveys.
Some of the uses to which business has been able to put these sur-
veys are summarized below.
Surveys of capital expenditure intentions provide estimates of the
dimensions and composition of demand for capital goods. The in-
dustrial detail and regional and local data also give an indication of
what kind of capital equipment is in demand and where the demand
originates. Thus in periods when demand is the guiding principle in
planning production, domestic manufacturers of machinery and
equipment and of building materials have at their disposal a readily
available market appraisal. Foreign sellers of machinery and equip-
ment, particularly those coming from western European countries
which were seeking a return to or a new entry into the Canadian
capital goods market after World War II, turned to investment-in-
tentions surveys as a source of information, and used them in plan-
fling export drives. In construction many of the large companies are
able to ascertain, by comparing their volume in a region or city with
total construction carried out in these areas, whether their share
of business is declining, remaining the same, or increasing. This
knowledge in turn may influence their organizational and pricing
policies. Similarly, organizations producing and selling large ma-
chinery and equipment in Canada can their relative position
in the market and formulate plans accordingly.
Besides the material and capital-goods-supplying industries, some
of the industries have found it possible to put the results of
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investment-intentions surveys to good use. For example, a firm of
insurance brokers embarked on an advertising campaign early in
1951 to encourage increased business insurance coverage. It pointed
in its advertisements to a 14 per cent increase in anticipated capital
expenditures in 1951 over 1950, and it posed the question whether
many business firms had raised their insurance coverage in line
with the expansion in plant facilities that might take place.26
In deciding on a short- or long-term investment program since the
end of the war many companies have found that they have been
underestimating the rate of expansion in the country as a whole or
in their particular industries. Increasing attention is now being paid
to long-term growth factors as well as to the capital expansion that is
being undertaken by competitors in the field. Reference to industrial
investment totals, past, present, and future, may give businessmen a
lead in assessing realistically the rate of capital expansion that has
taken place or is taking place.
By tying in information on anticipated investment with other rele-
vant data, business executives may be aided in their appraisal of the
general economic outlook as well as of the specific commodity mar-
kets in which they are interested. They are assisted in their en-
deavors by business economists in their employ and the various
market research organizations or economic consultants whose serv-
ices they use from time to time. These professional groups in turn
have become users of anticipatory data collected by government and
are thus equipped to. interpret such information to the business
community.
Although the interchange of economic information between the
government and the business community has, been increasing and
improving in quality, requests are received from time to time for
more forward-looking information than is currently released by the
government.21 The reply usually given is that the results of forward-
looking economic surveys, when these are based on information ob-
tained from the business community, are made public regularly.
Furthermore, general statements about the economic outlook are
made from time to time by members of the Cabinet in Parliament
and on other occasions. Also, a number of annual reports by govern-
26 See, for example, advertisement in Time (Canadian edition), September
17, 1951, P. 78.
21 For example, a resolution of the Chatham (Ontario) Board of Trade sug-
gested that the Canadian government publish reports similar to those issued in
the United States by the Council of Economic Advisers. "Finance at Large,"
The Globe and Mail, Toronto, March 2, 1949.
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ment departments and agencies contain forward-looking economic
appraisals. The question of whether the Canadian government
should issue reports on the economic situation in a form similar to
the President's reports to Congress in the United States (together
with the report of the Council of Economic Advisers) or to the
economic surveys of the United Kingdom government has remained
open.
•8. Tm-IN WITH OTHER ECONOMIC FORECASTING
It has been stressed several times in this paper that investment
forecasting is not a process carried on in isolation. Investment fore-
casting in Canada is conceived as one of the means contributing to
an overall appraisal of economic conditions and prospects in the
country.
Since the end of World War II forward-looking economic analyses
have been prepared in a central unit of government on a regular
basis. This appraisal has taken the form of the national economic
forecast, which is a statement on the economic outlook, presented
within the framework of the national accounts and showing sep-
arately the various components of the gross national product and
gross national expenditure. The national forecast is arrived at to a
large extent by direct-survey methods. On the demand side such
direct surveys cover canvasses of capital expenditure plans and of
export prospects, the latter based largely on returns of Canadian
Trade Commissioners abroad and on informed business opinion in
Canada. On the supply side, surveys include the anticipated produc-
tion, exports, and imports of basic and building materials, and gen-
eral imports covering broad commodity groups. A great deal of the
information is obtained directly from industry and supplemented by
•the specialized knowledge of commodity officers of the Department
of Trade and Commerce. A large amount of information is collected
from sources both inside and outside the government on such items
as the labor force, immigration and emigration, strikes, government
expenditures, invisible exports and imports (tourism, shipping, and
so forth), saving habits, productivity changes, consumer behavior,
inventory changes, profits, floating of securities, and last but not
least the "mood" of the business community. Since this information
comes from sources of varying degrees of reliability, the material is
surveyed and weighed carefully in the process of fitting it into the
familiar concept of the national accounts. Components arrived at
by the direct-survey method are supplemented by derived estimates
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for other components, for example, consumer expenditures, wages,
salaries, and supplementary labor income. The national forecast is
then supported and checked by two supplementary forecasts, one
regional and the other industrial. The regional forecast examines the
national forecast in terms of what it would mean for the five major
economic regions in Canada and whether these five regions have
the resources and can count on the demand to make their contribu-
tions to the gross national product foreseen for the coming year. A
similar job is done for the major types of industry in Canada, cover-
ing wood and paper products, mining and mineral products, iron
and steel and their products, construction materials, fuel and power,
and consumer goods. Because of the importance of primary com-
modities for the Canadian economy, special attention is also paid
to agriculture and fisheries.28
National economic forecasts are prepared in draft form in the De-
partment of Trade and Commerce, drawing on the best knowledge
available within and outside the government. They are usually pre-
pared twice a year—at the beginning and in the middle of the year.
Intermediate changes are also kept under review. Information pre-
sented in the form of the national economic forecast is prepared for
government use, and statements on the economic outlook in general
are made from time to time by the Prime Minister and other mem-
bers of his For example, in the debate on the Speech
from the Throne early in 1950, the Prime Minister made the follow-
ing general statement which summarized the government's attitude
toward the economic forecasting work carried on by its officials:
"The economic outlook for 1950 is one of continuing general buoy-
ancy, but with an increasing number of special industrial and as-
sociated area problems. Forecasts of the economic outlook are made
by the economic research and development branch of the Depart-
ment of Trade and Commerce for the use of the government. They
provide us with a scientific and complete economic appraisal of the
foreign trade and domestic business outlook, and of the trends of
28 Firestone, op.cit.,p. 9.
29 Other examples include: statement by the Prime Minister, House of Com-
mons Debates, January 28, 1949, P. 63; statements by the Minister of Finance
included in his Budget Addresses, e.g., ibid., April 29, 1947, p. 2545, and
ibid., April 10, 1951, p. 1798; and statements by the Minister of Trade and
Commerce, ibid., March 1, 1949, p. 1014, ibid., March 31, 1950, p. 1430, and
ibid., February 8, 1951, p. 183. For an example of questions raised by the
leader of one of the opposing parties in Parliament about observations made
by the Prime Minister on the economic outlook see ibid., February 23, 1949,
p. 817.
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other significant factors, which is helpful to us in formation of policy.
They are not made for publicity purposes, but are made to advise
us what we have to expect, so that we may attempt to shape our
policies accordingly."3°
9. TECHNIQUES OF INVESTMENT FORECASTING
The techniques of investment forecasting cover the collection of
data and qualitative information and the weighing of the evidence.
Among the many ways in which estimates of future capital out-
lays can be obtained, four have become especially common in recent
years: (1) surveying intentions of buyers of capital goods, (2) sur-
veying sales and production expectations of sellers of capital equip-
ment, (3) making estimates based on qualitative reports reflecting
economic expectations in industry and in other sectors, and (4)
making estimates based on the projection of past trends (with allow-
ance for growth and cyclical factors) or a study of the interrelation-
ship of different economic flows or financial data—profits, deprecia-
tion reserves, borrowing, and so forth.
All four methods have been tried in Canada. The most satisfactory
results have been achieved by use of the direct surveys of purchase
intentions of buyers of capital equipment. However, where informa-
tion has not been obtainable in this way or where additional data
have been required as a test of or check on capital expenditure in-
tentions as reported, the other three techniques have been used.
The most direct method is simply asking people who are in a
position to make capital expenditures what they are likely to spend
in a given period. This is done in Canada by means of annual in-
vestment-intentions, or capital expenditure anticipation, surveys cov-
ering the business sector, institutions, and governments. These sur-
veys are then followed by others to determine capital expenditures
actually made, and the resulting differences yield an indication 'of
the closeness with which business, institutions, and governments
have been able to approximate in aggregate their future capital out-
lay. These capital expenditure surveys, which form the substance of
Canadian data on investment intentions, are discussed in more de-
tail in section B 10.
The second type of survey consists of asking the people who
supply capital goods whether they expect changes in production and
sales for the coming year and if so what they expect. This approach
shifts the burden of assessing the strength of the capital goods mar-
3°ibid.,February20,1950, p. 55.
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ket onto the shoulders of the supplier. A justification for doing this
is the intimate understanding of the operations of the market which
producers and sellers of capital equipment must have if they are to
succeed in business. Businessmen are assisted in making their own
appraisals in two ways. First, they can gauge the short-term situa-
tion fairly well from the rate at which forward orders are being
placed. Secondly, they are constantly reappraising the market pros-
pects in the light of direct contact with buyers. Thus their judgment
is frequently based on first-hand knowledge that enables themto
detect new opportunities or warning signals of market weaknesses.
This is not to say that businessmen do not make mistakes or on
Occasion substantially misjudge the situation. But the penalty for
errors is great, frequenfly business failure, so that on the whole the
business community can be relied upon to be fair judges of their
own spheres of activity. But since specific fields of business ac-
tivity may be significantly affected by major economic events or gov-
ernment policies, sellers of capital goods cannot always be relied
upon as investment forecasters. However, there will be special cir-
cumstances where they are in a good position to anticipate sales.
An example of this is a period when demand presses heavily on
supply, and prices are rising, with the producer being fairly sure
that he can sell almost everything he is likely to turn out even at
higher prices. At such a time adequate knowledge of the availa-
bility of supplies (materials, labor, and equipment) may assist in
coming reasonably close to the amount of capital goods the nation
or an industry will acquire in a future period.
From the end of the war until about 1948 supply problems sig-
ni.ficantly affected the formulation and realization of capital ex-
penditure plans, and they have done so again since mid-1950. Dur-
ing the whole period the availability of basic and building materials
has been continuously reviewed in this country, with the results
published in the form of White Papers since 1947. These documents
have been accompanying the White Papers on private and public
investment prospects discussed annually in the Canadian Parliament.
Papers on the basic and building material outlook provide infor-
mation on production, sales, inventories, exports, and imports of a
number of commodities, including where possible an estimate of the
supply situation for a year ahead. For 1951 the following principal
basic and building materials were covered: iron and steel products,
lumber, cement and cement products, clay products, mineral wool
products, gypsum products, roofing products, and a number of mis-
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cellaneous commodities, including paints, pigments, varnishes, in-
sulating board, and nonmetallic sheathed cable. The survey covered
a total of thirty-two items.31 This information is obtained partly
through a questionnaire survey conducted by the Dominion Bureau
of Statistics and partly through personal interviews by commodity
officers of the Department of Tradeand Commerce (for a time also
by officials of the Department of Defense Production in such fields
as steel and steel products). Both departments also keep under sur-
veillance the supply situation of the more important machinery and
equipment items going into domestic investment.
There are two other sectors in Canada in which estimates of
prospective capital expenditures are based on a survey of production
and sales targets of sellers: agriculture and home-building.
In agriculture it is mainly the Canadian farmmachinery pro-
ducers who are canvassed by field interview methods. The returns
are then reviewed in the light of information on farm income, pros-
pects for prices and markets for agricultural produce, stock of avail-
able equipment, the rate of obsolescence, and so forth. While esti-
mates of suppliers of farm machinery and equipment are not
necessarily fully accepted, because of the impact of some of the
• other influences mentioned, their judgment represents a fairly im-
portant factor in arriving at the final estimate of future capital
by farmers. Such estimates are also checked with other
organizations which keep in close touch with agricultural conditions
in Canada, such as the Federal Department of Agriculture.
Housing is the other field in which considerable effort is expended
to arrive at estimates of likely capital expenditures through surveys
of the supply side. Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, the
national housing agency of the Canadian government, annually
ducts surveys of the number of houses likely to be started, com-
pleted, and under construction for a year ahead in all cities and
towns with a population of 5,000 or more. This involves a canvass
by branch and other field staff members in over 130 communities.
These officers consult local officials, builders, contractors, architects,
supply firms, mortgage-lending companies, and other individuals
and firms concerned with the building of houses in each community.
Using the information obtained from these sources and their
knowledge, representatives of Central Mortgage and Housing Corpo-
ration prepare estimates of the likely volume of house-building in
31 Department of Trade and Commerce, Supply of Basic and Building Ma.
terials in Canada, Outlook 1951, p. 16.
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each of the localities surveyed. In 1950 about three-quarters of total
new residential construction was undertaken in these cities and
towns. Estimates by the field staff are then checked separately for
each locality by the five regional offices of Central Mortgage and
Housing Corporation, using information at the disposal of regional
offices that might not have been available in the localities, for ex-
ample, information on the future building material supply situation
and availability of credit. Where the judgment of regional officers
differs from the findings of field representatives, the reasons for the
differences are given when the local returns are forwarded to the
Head Office. The suppiy of and demand for housing are reviewed
regional officers in smaller communities with a population of less
than 5,000, and without any claim to numerical precision a rough
indication is given whether the volume of house-building in these
localities as a whole is likely to continue at the current level, rise
above it, or fall below it.
Regional officers also prepare estimates of prospective changes in
construction costs—separately for building materials and construc-
tion wage rates—based on discussions with builders, contractors,
supply houses, and construction trade-unions. Field reports, regional
comments on the volume of local and regional house-building ac-
tivity, and estimates of construction cost trends are then reviewed by
the Head Office of Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation.
This office also prepares estimates of the likely volume of publicly
built housing based on the government's .proposed program. Esti-
mates of the number of starts and completions and carryover are
then translated into dollar totals by means of estimates of average
construction cost per house (varying for nonfarm, farm, and con-
verted units), and allowance is made for changes in building costs
as indicated by the cost survey. Separate allowances are also made
for major improvements and alterations, and finally there results
an estimate of the total amount of new residential construction work
likely to be carried out in the following year.
The technique of making estimates in fields not covered by sur-
veys, involving the use of general information about conditions in
the industry, is employed in Canada in four comparatively small
sectors—fishing, individual retailers, and the residual groups in fi-
nance and commercial services.
These three methods yield the totals of what is covered in this
country as capital expenditure intentions by all private and public
sectors. Estimates of anticipated investment as defined in the na-
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tional accounts are also made, based mainly on a study of the inter-
relationship of economic stocks and flows. This is part of the econo-
metric research work undertaken in Canada.32
In appraising the data, field reports, and general. comments thus
collected, several points are borne in mind. Although investment
decisions are largely endogenous in character, there are many gen-
eral economic, political; and international circumstances that may
affect them, for to a substantial extent business capital expenditure
plansconditioned by the climate in which they are formulated.
It is therefore necessary, in arriving at a judgment of what the
likely volume of will be in a subsequent year, to take
account of the resources available in the country, the different de-
mands that are made on these resources, the competitive strengths
of the various sectors endeavoring to carry out their plans,33 and the
effect of public policies and changing international
on proposed capital projects. This balancing of the various claims on
the resources of a country in times of full employment throws light
on the question of whether investment intentions as stated can be
realized. Different problems would be faced in times of generally
declining economic conditions.35 The kinds of questions that would
come to the fore then would be cancellations of investment inten-
tions, the possibility of alternative programs, and the dimensions
of resources likely to be unused and their possible transfer to other
tasks.
Another important point which the investment forecaster must
bear in mind arises out of recognition of the principle that close-
ness of investment intentions to realization does not necessarily come
about because everybody's report turned out to be right. Although
32 For a report on the progress of this work see the paper on "Canadian
Experience in Forecasting from Econometric Models," by T. M. Brown, pre-
sented at the Econometric Society meeting in Boston, December 28, 1951. See
also T. M. Brown, "Habit Persistence and Lags in Consumer Behaviour,"
Econometrica, Vol. 20, No. 3 (July 1952), pp. 355-371.
For example, when available construction resources are insufficient to
meet all the demands, industrial construction usually is in a position to secure
a larger share than economically weaker sectors, e.g. residential construction.
See Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, Annual Report for the Year
1950 (1951), pp. 5-8.
84 This is a particularly important factor for Canada, where the degree of
prosperity and a rise in the standard of living are greatly affected by levels
and terms of trade. In 1950, for example, exports of goods and services
amounted to $4.2 billion, or 23 per cent of the gross national product of $18 -
billion.
Not experienced in Canada between the end of World War ii and the out-
break of the war in Korea.
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the analyst welcomes having at his disposal a reliable estimate of
investment for the coming year as a tool for an appraisal of national
aggregates, he must recognize that the plans of business may change
or be frustrated for many reasons. Modification of the general busi-
ness outlook, changing price trends, shortages of some materials and
skilled labor may result in postponement or other changes in invest-
ment plans. Individual businesses have different planning periods,
and in some, changes in plans are kept flexible as a matter of policy.
But on the whole, as the evidence in section C suggests, there are
likely to become apparent definite upward or downward trends, as
the case may be, in major sectors, with many of the variatipns in
each sector, either up or down, being cancelled out. Although dif-
ferences between intentions and realization as reported by individual
companies or groups of firms may often be great (see section C 5),
the overall resultsthe intentions surveys may be close enough to
be of assistance to the decision-making process of either business or
government.
The collection of data for the two annual White Papers on the
investment outlook and the basic and building material outlook is
to a large extent iii the hands of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics.
Only in such cases as housing and provincial and municipal govern-
ment investment are the data largely collected by other agencies,
such as Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation and provincial
authorities.Qualitative information from thefieldisobtained
through personal interviews by representatives of a number of ad-
ministering federal departments, and the information is collated
when the analysis of the investment outlook and the basic and build-
ing material outlook is made. These two papers are prepared by the
Department of Trade and Commerce jointly with the Dominion
Bureau of Statistics.
10. CAPITAL EXPENDITURE SURVEYS
Currently, four types of capital expenditure surveys are under-
taken annually in Canada. Two of these are intentions surveys, the
other two aim at measuring actual capital outlay.
An intentions survey is conducted at the end of the year for the
year ahead, the results being summarized and released early in the
new year. This year-end survey is made with as full a coverage as
appears feasible and economical. Subsequenfly, in May of the year
to which investment intentions apply. a follow-up survey based on a
sampling technique is used to detect any changes that might have
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taken place in capital expenditure intentions in the intervening six
months and to establish the reasons for such changes.86
The year-end survey of capital expenditure intentions is accom-
panied by a survey of preliminary estimates of actual capital ex-
penditures in the current year. In the 1950 and 1951 surveys one
form was used to elicit both types of data (see Appendix B).
This survey yields preliminary estimates of capital expenditures
made37 and provides the basis for gauging investment intentions for
the subsequent year. There are two advantages in this approach.
First, the most recent estimates by business of actual capital ex-
penditures become available when investment intentions are re-
viewed. Secondly, figures reported for both years come from the
same firms, and, with no change in estimating technique, percentage
variations by firms, industries, regions, and in the aggregate for all
establishments reporting, can be obtained.
Another capital expenditure survey, designed to yield final totals
of actual outlay, follows early in the year, covering the year just
past. The results of this survey become available in the course of
the year and are incorporated in the subsequent White Paper on
the investment outlook. Thus the 1951 document included revised
estimates of actual capital expenditures made for 1949, preliminary
estimates of actual capital expenditures for 1950, and investment in-
tentions for 1951. All three sets of data are shown in the detailed
tables contained in the White Paper.88
Information on capital expenditures is obtained separately for new
building and other structures and the purchase of new machinery
and equipment. The following instruction is provided for new con-
struction in the schedule: "Show expenditures on all new construc-
tion, including buildings of all types, mine shafts, tracks, roads,
transmission lines, blast furnaces, docks, aerial towers, etc. Exclude
the value of land purchased but include the cost of land improve-
ments. Exclude expenditures for the purchase of previously existing
buildings and other structures." For machinery and equipment the
following instructions are given: "Sh2w the installed cost of all new
machinery and the delivered cost of movable equipment such as
new motor cars, trucks, railway rolling stock, office furniture, and
36 The first midyear survey was undertaken in 1947.
The data are preliminary' because they are generally obtained before the
end of the current year and involve the respondents' estimating expenditures
still to be made.
38 Department of Trade and Commerce, Private and Public Invesinient in
Canada, Outlook 1951, pp. 10-36.
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appliances, etc., whether for your use or for rent to others.
Exclude expenditures on used machinery and equipment" (see Ap-
pendix B). The capital expenditure schedule also asks for informa-
tion on repair and maintenance ouflay for buildings and other struc-
tures and for machinery and equipment. The results of the last two
questions are tabulated, and estimates of total repair and mainte-
nance outlay are included in the White Papers on the investment
outlook. Repair and maintenance data, however, have been omitted
from the review in this paper, which is concerned with new invest-
ment oniy.
The direct-survey technique of collecting capital expenditure data,
in regard to both plans and realization, is used in Canada for busi-
ness, institutions, and governments. There are some minor variations,
which are summarized below.
•Capital expenditure intentions of business are surveyed on an
establishment basis covering in general all enterprises with an an-
nual gross value of production (or its equivalent) of $100,000 or
more. A 3 per cent sample is taken of the smaller companies where
this is considered advisable; for example, in manufacturing a 3 per
cent sample is used. Some variation in this technique occurs in five
of the sectors surveyed.
In wholesale trade, establishments with sales of $1 million or over
are fully canvassed, and a sample survey is conducted for the re-
mainder. In the Canadian automotive trade, where no sales data are
available, finns with fifteen or more employees are surveyed. In
the case of theaters all chain theaters are covered, and that includes
theaters having three or more outlets. For hotels all enterprises with
100 rooms or more are canvassed, and a sample of the remainder
is taken. Allowance for nonreporting or noncoverage is made on
the basis of the gross value of production (or its equivalent). Where
such data are not available, adjustments are made on the basis
of supplementary information, for example, employment in the
automotive trade and the number of rooms in hotels. As the data
in Appendix A show, the coverage of and response to surveys of
capital expenditures are high, 81 per cent in 1951 for all business
groups surveyed, although there are significant variations among
sectors. In terms of numbers of firms, questionnaires were mailed
to about 17,000 business establishments in connection with the 1951
investment-intentions survey and approximately 11,000 replies were
received by the cut-off date at the middle of January 1951.
The midyear investment survey is a sample survey which covers
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about 10 per cent of the firms canvassed in the year-end survey and
about 50 per cent of the capital expenditures planned (see section
C2).
The end-of-year preliminary survey of capital expenditures made
follows the same approach and has substantially the same coverage
as the year-end survey covering investment intentions for the follow-
ing year.89
The second capital expenditure survey asking for revised data for
the year past also follows broadly the techniques of the year-end
investment-intentions surveys. However, there is not the same ur-
gency for early publication of results of this survey, and it is possible
to conduct a much more intensive follow-up procedure. As a result,
the proportion of those reporting to those canvassed is usually some-
what higher than in the other surveys.
Capital expenditure intentions by institutions cover four major
groups: churches, hospitals, universities, and schools.
The individual dioceses of three major churches are covered in
Canada by means of direct surveys. These are the Roman Catholic,
Anglican, and United churches, whose adherents comprise about 80
per cent of the Canadian population with religion stated. For dio-
ceses not reporting, allowances are made on the basis of revenues
collected and the number of adherents. For churches not covered,
estimates are made on a population basis.
All private and publicly owned hospitals with 100 or more beds
are canvassed. For the small hospitals a sample is selected on a
provincial basis designed to yield a fairly representative coverage.
Hospital bed capacity, that is, the rated ability of hospitals to ac-
commodate patients (and not necessarily the number of beds actu-
ally placed in the hospital), is used to make allowances for non-
reporting or to blow up sample returns.
All universities in Canada are canvassed with respect to their
capital expenditures. An allowance for nonrespondents is made on
the basis of the numberof students enrolled.
All schools, including day and night schools and technical and
commercial institutions, are covered. Reports are obtained mainly
through the provincial departments of education, which in turn
canvass individual establishments and use other information avail-
89 There will be some differences between the results of intentions as stated
and preliminary reports of actual expenditures covering the same year because
the response varies a little from year to year. Also, new companies are added
each year, and some firms go out of business.
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able regionally. Where reports are incomplete, estimates are made
on the basis of supplementary data, for example, school debentures
approved by provincial authorities.
Capital expenditure intentions by governments cover three levels
in Canada: .federal, provincial, and municipal governments. Since
publicly owned enterprises and institutions are covered by the
business and institutional surveys, the data listed under govern-
ments substantially cover capital expenditures made by government
departments operating under a vote system. Since the information
on capital expenditure intentions and actual outlay is obtained
separately for private and publicly owned business establishments,
for institutions, and for the housing sector, it is possible in Canada
to separate investment intentions into those made by private indi-
viduals, firms, and agencies and those made by all public authorities.
The breakdown is shown in the investment-outloOk documents in
addition to the customaiy classification of business and other sectors.
This information is of particular importance at a time when invest-
ment decisions of private groups and public authorities may show a
different trend. To illustrate the quantitative significance of the
difference between government and total public investment, in 1950
investment by governments (mainly departments operating under
the vote system) comprised 13 per cent of total private and public
investment of $3.8 billion, but public investment (including also
public business enterprises, institutions, and housing) comprised 26
per cent.4°
In the case of the federal government, information on capital
expenditure plans and actual outlay is obtained from departmental
submissions, estimates as approved by Parliament, and Treasury
records of the Department of Finance.
For provincial governments the information is obtained in some
provinces from one government department which acts as the cen-
tral collecting agency for that government; in other provinces the
arrangement is for the Dominion Bureau of Statistics to send sep-
arate questionnaires to individual government departments most
likely to make capital expenditures, for example, departments of
public works, highways, and agriculture.
For municipal governments and other local bodies capital ex-
penditure data are obtained in most instances through provincial
departments of municipal affairs or corresponding provincial agen-
cies. In some cases, at the request of the provincial government
4°ibid.,p.5.
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separate questionnaires are mailed directly by the Dominion Bureau
of Statistics, and the corresponding estimates are then prepared in
Ottawa rather than in the provincial capitals.
11. C00PEIIKU0N OF RESPONDENTS
Obtaining cooperation from business and other sectors canvassed
by means of direct surveys of capital expenditure intentions has been
a gradual process spread over a period of seven years. Eight factors
which have contributed to an improvement in the quality and timing
of returns received are listed below. There has been little need to
increase coverage in terms of numbers, for the response has con-
tinued to be high over the whole period. In fact, in recent years it
was found desirable to reduce somewhat the number of finns sur-
veyed by using a sample of small firms.
1. In approaching business firms for information on their invest-
ment intentions, great stress has been laid on explaining to them
why the surveys are being undertaken and to what use the results
are being put by government.
2. Each participating firm has been assured that the information
would be kept confidential and that only group totals would be
published, so that the plans or records of any one company would
not become known to competitors.
3. On several occasions the Minister of Reconstruction and Supply
(now the Minister of Trade and Commerce) communicated with
all firms participating in the investment-intentions survey, thanking
them for their cooperation and sending them a summary of the re-
suits of the survey. He advised participating firms that those wishing
to receive copies of the investment-outlook White Papers, which
provided more detail, could obtain these free of charge by writing
to his department. Many firms asked for their copies and continue
to receive them.
4. The Minister also approached a number of business organiza-
tions, such as the Canadian Manufacturers' Association and Canadian
Chamber of Commerce, asking them to impress upon their mem-
bership how important it was not only to participate in the invest-
ment-forecast surveys, but also to use their best judgment concern-
ing the likely amount of capital expenditures they would be making
a year hence. This was considered important in order to reduce the
filling out of questionnaires by junior officers of the largercorpora-
tions who might not be sufficiently familiar with top-management
decisions and general business policies.
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5. Follow-up correspondence, telephone calls, and personal visits
by government officials—the latter perhaps not as frequent as might
be desirable—have helped business firms overcome some difficulties
arising out of the differences in definition of capital expenditures
as used in the intentions questionnaire and those available in the
firms' own records. Other problems came from the timing of the
survey, because many companies had not fully formulated their
capital expenditure plans when the survey was undertaken. In such
cases it was emphasized that what was wanted was the "best esti-
mate" at this time rather than information on a more definitive
program available at a later date. (The latter would in many cases
be covered in the midyear review of investment intentions.)
6. A group of some two dozen business economists associated
with large corporations, including firms in primary and secondary
industries, finance, and trade, are meeting two or three times a
year with government officials concerned with the appraisal of the
economic outlook. At such meetings the results of the investment-
intentions surveys are generally discussed, and the advice of busi-
ness economists is sought on such questions as the likely realization
of the intentions as stated and qualitative considerations that bear
on survey results. Business economists are also being consulted on
questions relating to improvement of investment-forecasting. meth-
ods and reporting by the business community. Business economists
in turn have been educating their own firms and many other corn-,
panies with which they are in contact about what these investment
forecasts mean, how business can, use them to its advantage, and
how important itis for businessmen to cooperate to obtain the
best possible information on the subject.
7. As indicated earlier, the investment forecasts have been pre-
sented in the House of Commons as White Papers, to emphasize the
importance which the government attaches to the information as an
aid in appraising the economic outlook and formulating economic
policies. As a result a great deal of publicity has been given to this
material. Newspapermen have been reporting widely the results of
the investment forecasts. In fact some of them have become so in-
terested in the material that they have on occasion sought informa-
tion in advance of publication of the document. From time to time
guesses appear in some of the papers. The publicity given to in-
vestment forecasts has aroused general. interest and greater aware-
ness of the usefulness of the data.
8. Perhaps the two most important. factors contributing to an
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improvement in the quality of anticipatory capital expenditure data
as reported by business have been the growing public understanding
of the impact of investment on the economy as a whole and on in-
dustry in particular, and the generally friendly and cooperative re-
lations in Canada between business and government, which make it
easier to obtain and share increasing knowledge about business
behavior.41
Similar techniques have been employed in the capital expenditure
surveys, which cover sectors other than business, for example, in-
stitutions and governments. Cood results have been obtained by de-
centralizing the data-collection process where this has appeared
practical. This is the case with regard to data on provincial and
municipal government investment, which for the most part are col-
lected by the respective provincial agencies and then transmitted to
the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, the Canadian government data-
collecting agency.
12. INVESTMENT FORECASTING IN OTHER COUNThIES
In the United States, investment forecasting is based primarily on
surveys of capital expenditure intentions by businesses canvassed
quarterly and annually. The techniques employed are similar to
those used in Canada, with a few exceptions. The United States
survey is based on a small sample and is taken more frequently than
its Canadian counterpart. The Canadian survey covers more busi-
ness firms and also covers the residential, institutional, and govern-
ment sectors, not surveyed in the United States. Also, the Canadian
survey places a great deal more emphasis on detailed industrial
classification and regional and city breakdowns than does the Amen-
can survey (see section C 8).
A number of other countries have recognized the importance of
assessing in advance the dimensions and the composition of the in-
vestment program that might be desirable or that could be irnple-
mented in the light of available resources and foreign exchange re-
serves and earnings. The preparation of such material has been given
added importance by the requirements of such international organi-
41Thecooperative attitude of business has been emphasized by the Minister
of Trade arid Commerce on a number of occasions. For example: "It [the
survey of capital expenditure intentions] is a type of survey that has been made
for the past several years which has proven to be remarkably accurate. Its
importance has been recognized by business, and each year we are getting
better cooperation from business in working out that survey." House of Com-
mons Debates, March 1, 1949, p. 1014.
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zations as the Organization for European Economic
It was recommended that all countries participating in OEEC "study
all methods of coordinating their investment plans and programmes
by mutual consultation for the purpose of encouraging additional
investment which would contribute towards European viability,
and of discouraging unnecessary expenditures in other fields."48
Carrying out this recommendation required the preparation of some
type of investment forecast in the countries concerned.
The way in. which investment forecasts are presented and the
technique by which they are prepared vary from country to country,
depending upon the purpose for which the material is destined and
on available sources of information. In most western European coun-
tries the estimate of future capital expenditures is an integral part of
the national budget. As such it is an estimate of how much invest-
ment is likely to take place. In most of the European countries which
experienced heavy war damage the volume of capital outlay is con-
ditioned more by government policies than by businessmen's inten-
lions, for governments are making every effort to restore and improve
the countries' productive facilities. In countries in which war damage
was of less importance the investment outlook may depend more
on businessmen's intentions, and overall investment plans may be
more like the type formulated in the United States and Canada. To
illustrate the differences a brief summary is given below of the meth-
ods employed in estimating future investment in six countries.
The United Kingdom, Norway, and the Netherlands are repre-
sentative of countries which, in to restore their productive
facilities, maintained fairly extensive controls over the extent and di-
rection of investment expenditures in the immediate postwar period.
In these countries the investment forecast has represented a statement
of the amount of investment that is likely to take place, as con-
ditioned by government planning.
42Cf.also discussions of the United Nations Economic and Social Council
on the subject of full employment, particularly at its 11th Session in Geneva,
July 3 to August 16, 1950, which had before it a report prepared by a group
of experts on "National and International Measures for Full Employment"
(United Nations, New York, December 22, 1949, E/1584).Thefollowin
quotation is an example of the emphasis which this report placed on the nee
for forward-looking investment surveys: "This [policy to influence the timing
of private investment] would require that the government obtain information
on the investment plans of the individual firms for a sufficient time ahead to
be able to exert an influence on the actual timing of their execution" (p. 34).
EuropeanRecovery Programme, Second Report of the O.E.E.C. (1950),
p. 236.
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In the United Kingdom a forecast of investment is prepared cov-
ering all parts of the economy, including both the private and the
public sector. The forecast for the private sector is apparently pre-
pared after consultation with large industrial organizations. It is
based on information obtained from business finns, the value of
building that the government is prepared to authorize, the likely
production in the building materials and producers' durable goods
industries, the trade outlook, and a blending of resources allocated
to investment with those allocated for other purposes.44 Similar
techniques are used in Norway45 and the These two
countries are more heavily dependent than the United Kingdom
upon imports of machinery and equipment. Thus the fact that
governments in these two countries control imports makes it possible
for them to determine how much foreign exchange will be made
available for the purchase of machinery and equipment. Variations.
between forecasts and realization in these countries may result not
only from unforeseen changes in the price and supply situation,
particularly in North America, but also from changes in the govern-
ment's investment policies during the year; for example, a strong
popular demand for housing may influence the government to
divert resources from the industrial to the housing sector, or defense
demands may necessitate a cutback in certain civilian programs.
In and Sweden the capital stock was little affected by
ravages of war. Investment expenditures in these countries represent
a modernization and expansion of the productive facilities. Here the
investment forecasts are based largely on businessmen's intentions.
In Sweden an annual survey of investment intentions is taken, cover-
ing about 4,000 industrial enterprises.48 In that country, however,
foreign exchange difficulties have been a more serious problem in
recent years, and the government has attempted to control the vol- -
urneof investment through a building-permit policy.
In countries outside Europe investment forecasting follows more
along the Canadian and American lines, with published statements
See Economic Survey, an annual report presented to the British Parliament
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (H.M. Stationery Office).
See The Norwegian National Budget, an annual report prepared by the
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Commerce.
40EconomicCooperation Administration, European Recovery Program, The
Netherlands Country Study (February 1949).
See Economic Cooperation Administration, European Recovery Program:
Belgium and Luxembourg Country Study (February 1949).
48SeeSwedish-International Press Bureau, Latest Economic News from
Sweden, March 21, 1949.
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on the value of investment intentions of business. Australia has made
considerable progress in this regard, making public reports on busi-
ness investment intentions semiannually. These reports are based on
a survey of approximately 30 per cent (in terms of salaries and
wages paid) of Australian business enterprises.49
C. Results of Investment Forecasts
1. AGGREGATE BUSINESS INVESTMENTINTENTIONSAND REALIZATION
Surveys of annual business50 investment intentions in' Canada have
in the last five years proven to be remarkably close to the amounts
reported spent by industry on capital equipment, differences varying
from 2 to 8 per cent. In the follow-up surveys, usually undertaken in
May of the year to which the investment intentions apply, even
closer results have been achieved, with variations of less than 1 per
cent to 6 per cent being indicated. In the first two years of opera-
tion of the survey, 1945 and 1946, the results were less
Capital expenditure intentions and realization by business for the
years 1945 to 1951 are summarized in table 1. Several sets of data
are used and their different meanings should be kept in mind in
proceeding with the appraisal.
A distinction is made between the series described as "varying
coverage" and the series called "full coverage." The sets of data
shown under varying coverage are fully comparable with one an-
other for any one year. They are not comparable with data for
other years because of increases in coverage. The series under full
coverage are comparable over the period shown.
Varying coverage refers to changes in coverage of groups of in-
dustries surveyed as the scope of the capital expenditure intentions
survey expanded from year to year. For example, in 1945 the sur-
vey covered manufacturing, mining, central electric stations, and
telephones. In 1946 woods operations, broadcasting, steam railways
and telegraphs, electric railways, air and water transportation, and
motor carriers were added. By 1951 all industrial sectors for which
the direct-survey method appeared practical and economical were
being covered in this way.5'
See Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Quarterly Business
Survey.
In1950, capital expenditures made by business comprised three-fifths of
total private and public new investment in Canada; the remaining two-fifths
represented residential, institutional, and government investment0
Asthe data in Appendix A indicate, 79 'per cent of the total estimated



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.INVESTMENT FORECASTING IN CANADA
Under varying coverage three sets of data are included: (1) In-
vestment intentions which indicate amounts of anticipated capital
expenditures as reported by business. (2) Preliminary estimates of
realization of investment intentions, that is, actual capital expendi-
tures made, based in large part on preliminary returns of capital
expenditures reported by industry toward the end of the year to
which the estimates apply. In some cases the data shown in table 1
differ from those published annually in the Canadian government
White Papers on ,the investment outlook because of adjustments
made to facilitate comparability for this appraisal, such adjustments
involving use of exactly the same estimating methods in arriving at
the preliminary data of actual expenditures as had been used in
compiling the data on investment intentions. By this process differ-
ences between investment intentions and realization which are due
solely to changes in estimating techniques have been eliminated.
For example, in 1947, investment intentions as published include
no allowance for capital items charged to operating expenses, while
the published figures on preliminary estimates of actual expendi-
tures included such an allowance. (3) Revised estimates of actual
capital expenditures based usually on the final capital schedules
completed by business firms early in the following year. Revised
estimates include any changes in estimating techniques that were
developed subsequent to making estimates of investment intentions.
If a comparison is wanted between planned business capital ex-
penditures as they became known to' the decision-makers and actual
investment expenditures as they are now estimated, the series under
(1) and (3) should be used. If, on the other hand, the appraisal is
concerned with the ability of the business community to anticipate
the extent of capital expenditures a year ahead, the use of the series
under (1) and (2) appears to be more appropriate. Since this paper
is concerned with an assessment of the second problem, the series
of revised estimates of actual expenditure is omitted from subse-
quent tables except tables 21 and 22.
•The full-coverage series includes realization of invest-
ment in current and constant dollars to reflect both value and vol-
ume changes of business investment actually carried out.52 It also
• shows changes in the prices of capital goods in Canada between
1945 and 1951.
There are many factors that bear on the differences between in-
52Departmentof Trade and Commerce, Private and Public investment In
Canada, 1926-1951 (November 1951).
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vestment intentions and realization. Some concern reporting and
statistical problems (see section C 7). Others involve differences
between industries, regions, and firms (see sections C 3-5). Still
others, and these are most important for aggregate economic analy-
sis, involve the reaction of the business community as a• whole to
certain technological and market conditions as well as to supply
and price problems. This last phase of business investment inten-
tions and realization is reviewed in the paragraphs that follow.
In 1945 and 1946, surveys of business investment intentions and
preliminary estimates of realization show differences of 36 per cent
and 23 per cent respectively (see chart 1). The newness of the
survey presented a number of difficulties to respondents, not all of
Chart 1. Volume of Business Investment and Percentage Difference between
Business Investment Realization and Intentions, Canada, 1945-1951
which were consistently solved. However, the basic problems that
industry was facing in the two years were the need to reconvert
business facilities to peacetime uses as rapidly as possible, the
desiremodernize and reequip 'plants (involving many undertak-
ings postponed during the depressed thirties and the war years),
and the need to erect business premises and to purchase equip-
171





Volume of business investment













1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951INVESTMENT FORECASTING IN CANADA
ment for turning out new products and employing newly developed
processes and production techniques. All this business expansion
was facilitated by greatly increased managerial competence as a
result of extensive experience gained during the war years, and by
ample financial resources.
in attempting to expand their productive facilities rapidly, Cana-
dian businessmen were• faced with a number of difficulties peculiar
to the immediate postwar years. The domestic producers of both
construction materials and machinery and equipment found that
increased production must await the expansion of their own produc-
tive facilities. Competing demands from other sectors of the econ-
omy for materials, particularly steel and coal, and for labor accen-
tuated the supply problem. The demands of the export industries,
which were faced with heavy orders from war-devastated countries
for raw materials and manufactured products, were of particular
importance. The existence of a set of wartime controls of allocation
and prices, the relaxation and removal of which took several years,
and the time required to demobilize men returning from overseas
and to reorient war workers seeking jobs further added
to the difficulties. Superimposed on these conditions was the dis-
ruption in production that followed in the wake of a large number
of strikes when organized labor was again able to resort to this
means of improving its bargaining position.
Thus business investment intentions in 1945 and 1946 as gathered
from these surveys largely reflected what industry hoped it could
achieve. But as the rush of orders for capital equipment led to sup-
ply bottlenecks, only a portion of what business had hoped for
could be realized. That this was the situation appeared to be quite
clear at the time the results of the investment-intentions surveys
were analyzed. For example, in 1946: "But not all of these invest-
ment plans are likely to be realized this year. Although a number
of industrial bottlenecks have been overcome, manpower and ma-
terial shortages, particularly coal, steel and building materials, and
strikes hold back a full realization of these intentions of industry,
business and Taking account of these supply diffi-
-culties,the conclusion was then reached that total anticipated capi-
tal expenditures were likely to fall short by about 16 per cent of
what appeared to be the investment intentions of business, institu-
tions, and home owners.54 Even though the difference between
Department of Reconstruction and Supply, Capital, Repair and Main-
tenance Expenditures of Business Enterpri.ses in Canada, Forecast 1946, p. 14.
ibid.
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business investment realization and intentions was of the order of
23 per cent, estimates based on an analysis of the physical limitations
came within 7percent of the actual capital expenditures made
in 1946.
This need for matching supply of and demand for capital goods
in connection with the appraisal of investment intentions, particu-
larly in periods when demand is pressing heavily on supply, led in
Canada to surveys of the likely output and domestic disappearance
of basic and building materials, the results of which have been pub-
lished regularly since 1947 in companion documents to the White
Papers on investment outlook.
For 1947 the suppiy appraisal indicated substantial increases in
the availability of basic and building materials, suggesting that a
considerably larger investment program was possible.55 This is in
fact what happened. As the data in table 1 show, the largest volume
increase in new investment in the postwar period occurred. in 1947.
In that year business came within about 2 per cent of realizing its
capital expenditure intentions, perhaps an even better performance
than had been expected at the beginning of the year.58 However,
since prices of capital goods rose rapidly during this year (see
table 1), "higher prices than expected meant that a slightly smaller
volume of capital expansion than planned was
In 1948 a further improvement in the supply situation appeared
in prospect, while the rate of capital expansion was slackening (see
table 1). In appraising both the supply and the demand outlook it
was therefore possible to say, for the first time since the end of the
war, "that it is reasonable to expect virtually full realization of the
investment program contemplated."58 In November 1947 the gov-
ernment announced a number of exchange restrictions to cope with
the decrease in Canada's foreign exchange reserves.59 The major
impact of these provisions was to affect the composition of the in-
vestment program and to delay the execution of some parts of it,
Department of Reconstruction and Supply, Forecast of 1947 Investment by
Canadian Business, P. 6.
5°"Inspite of promised improvements in the supply of building materials,
business is likely to experience in 1947, as in the previous year, some difficulties
in carrying out its investment plans." ibid., p. 1.
Department of Reconstruction and Supply, Private and Public Investment
in Canada, Outlook 1948, p. 2.
58ibid.
Forthe impact of these provisions on capital goods imports, see the state-
ment by the Rt. Hon. C. D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce, House. of
Commons Debates, February 2S, 1948, pp. 1492-1494.
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but they had little effect on capital expenditures in the aggregate.6°
Thus business was in a position to carry out most of its plans for
expansion, and actual capital expenditures in 1948 exceeded in-
vestment intentions by S per cent.
By 1949 the supply and demand situation had become fairly well
balanced.61 Again business investment came very close to estimates
of anticipated capital expenditures, with realization exceeding in-
tentions by about 3 per cent. In appraising the investment outlook
for 1949 the point was made that "with increased availability of
supplies in prospect, it is possible that larger programmes may be
achieved in some economic sectors than anticipated."62 Recessionary
influences in the United States, declining overseas markets for
Canadian produce because of exchange difficulties, and the comple-
tion of large expansion programs since the end of the war brought
these words of caution for 1949: "Less firmness should be attached
tothe present forecast than in any previous post-war year....Back-
logs of investment requirements though still in existence have been
narrowed to fewer fields....Underthese circumstances the invest-
ment programme, particularly in some business segments, appears
more vulnerable than has been the case in, recent years when the
major uncertainties related almost entirely to questions of supply."63
While the record' of the business community in estimating its
prospective capital outlay had been particularly good from 1947 to
1949, with differences of 2 and 3 per eent being too small to matter
for the present purpose, industry faced a more difficult task 1n
1950 and 1951.
When investment intentions for 1950 were surveyed, the eco-
nomic situation in the United States was improving. Increasing
quantities of basic materials were being exported to that country,
creating some material shortages in Canada (particularly of lum-
ber). Doubt about the strength of the United States recovery con-
60 "The primary effect of this policy appears more likely to concern the
composition of the investment programme than its size." Department of Re-
construction and Supply, Private and Public Investment in Canada, Outlook
1948, p. 2.
61 "With respect to likely realization of intentions in 1949, physical limita-
tions to the achievement of the investment programme 'should be of lesser
importance... .Furthermore,the general business outlook does not suggest
the likelihood of any widespread cancellation of intentions. These considerations
suggest that it is reasonable to expect full realization of the investment pro-
gramme contemplated." Department of Trade and Commerce, Private and
Public Investment in Canada, Outlook 1949, p. 2.
62 ibid.
63ibid., p. 2.
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tinued to be widely debated in the States, and this discussion was
not without influence on Canadian thinking. The outlook for ex-
ports to overseas markets continued dim, domestic production in
a number of fields either had leveled off or was declining,and the
economy was not taking up fully the additions to its laborforce.°4
International relations continued to be strained, but there were few
signs that war in Korea was in prospect. In this situation the
moderate increases in business investment expenditures in Canada
anticipated for the year appeared reasonable and in fact, in view
of the many national and international uncertainties, proved re-
assuring to the government, which was faced with a barrage of
criticism for not taking sufficiently comprehensive measures in cop-
ing with local pockets of unemployment. In appraising the invest-
ment outlook the 1950 White Paper observed: "In general, the
domestic market for 1950 appears firm and, as a large part of the
investment programme is related to domestic needs, particularly
those segments where increased outlays are indicated, it follows
that a large proportion of the .programme is to some extent in-
sulated from outside influences. In addition, the difficulties which
exist in overseas markets were apparent at the time when most
firms made their forecast for and it seems probable that these
were taken into account. However, for that part of the programme
related to United States demand it should be kept in mind that the
forecasts were made during a period when business was on the
up-swing in the United States and any significant change in this
trend would undoubtedly have some effect on the investment pro-
gramme. It should also be kept in mind that with a large part of
the post-war backlog made up there is less likelihood this year of
substitute programmes taking the place of those that might be can-
celled or deferred."65
In May 1950—thatbefore the Korean incident—investment in-
tentions for the year were reviewed, and a further firming of busi-
ness capital expenditure intentions was indicated. The midyear
survey suggested an increase in business investment of 5 per cent
above what had been anticipated some six months earlier. What is
perhaps even more notable is the fact that surveys of capitalex-
penditure intentiOns appear to be able to take in their stride such
See the statement of the economic situation in 1949 and 1950 by the Rt.
Hon. C. D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce, House of Commons De-
bates, March 31, 1950, pp.1427ff.
Departmentof Trade and Commerce, Private and Public Investment in
Canada, Outlook 1950,p.11.
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major events as aggression in Korea. Although such an occurrence
may bring a great deal of reorientation in national thinking as to
the type and magnitude of defense and defense-supporting expan-
sion, the immediate influence of this reorientation may, as far as
new investment is concerned, turn out to be of comparatively minor
importance. This is indicated by the Canadian experience in 1950.
Year-end (1949) investment intentions were a little over 8 per cent
lower, while the succeeding midyear survey was 4 per cent lower
than a preliminary estimate of capital expenditures based on re-
ports of business firms for 1950. Apparently—and this is also borne
out by experiences during World War 11—it takes time to reach
agreement on the extent and type of military expansion most urgent-
ly required, to draw up plans and specifications, to place orders
for equipment, to convert existing capacity, and to build new plants
where existing facilities are either not available or not fitted for the
purpose required. Therefore, months may pass before ideas are
translated into brick and mortar or complicated machinery and
equipment. In the interim, capital expenditures are rising gradually,
not abruptly.
When the investment intentions of business for 1951 were sur-
veyed at the end of 1950, the countiy's need to devote increasing
efforts to defense production and military preparedness .had become
apparent, although the overall magnitude of defense expenditures
contemplated for the next few years was not as yet known. There
were many unanswered questions. In what fields would defense
expansion concentrate? Canada, it was felt, could make a greater
contribution to the cause of the United Nations by concentrating on
the production of indigenous strategic materials and selected types
of military equipment than by endeavoring, like the United States,
to expand on all fronts simultaneously. Canada's small population
and limited production facilities would have made the second course
largely uneconomic. Other uncertainties existed. What would be
the allocation of essential materials? What type of civilian activity
would be either reduced or prohibited? What would be the taxa-
tion, credit, and monetary policies of the government in its effort
to cope with the economic adjustments the country would have to
make in order to devote an increasing proportion of its resources to
defense efforts? How far would direct controls go?
It was in this economic and political climate that business firms
were asked for their capital expenditure intentions for 1951. They
reported plans for large increases over 1950. This rise reflected in
176INVESTMENT FORECASTING IN CANADA
part further increases in prices of capital goods, which had been
going up notably in the second half of 1950, in part an increase in
the volume of planned capital expenditures. Accompanying this
growing demand for capital goods, basic and building material in-
dustries anticipated an expansion in output.
The feasibility of realizing, investment intentions for 1951 was
appraised in these terms: "In aggregate, supply of both materials
and labour should be somewhat greater in 1951 than in the year
previous. Howeyer, in addition to the increased demands being
made on these supplies by the investment programme, additional
demands will be made by a defence programme expected to be
more than twice that of last year. Requirements for defence equip-
ment, which are not included in the data on investment intentions,
may be three to four times those of 1950 and in value terms will
represent about one-third of the total of such purchases for civilian
purposes in that year. However, defence equipment will be in part
imported and that produced domestically may require less steel
than will an equivalent value of machinery used for civilian pur-
poses. Thus, defence demands on the available supply of materials
may not be as great as the dollar figures might indicate. Neverthe-.
less, the demands of the defence programme will serve to limit
both the materials and labour available for other purposes. On bal-
ance, it would appear that the investment programme planned for
1950 will put a considerable strain on the available supply of
labour and materials."66
The conclusion reached for 1951 was that in spite of expanded
demands for materials and manpower from the defense sector it
should be possible for the economy to repeat the record volume of
investment of 1950, and that this volume would involve increased
dollar expenditures on new investment because of rising prices of
capital goods. The following point was stressed: "Significant changes
from the stated intentions will take place in individual sectors of
the programme. The statement of investment intentions was made at
a time when the extent of the defence requirements were un-
known and before government attitude towards controls had been
announced. The degree to which individual projects will be realized
will probably depend to a large extent on how important they are
considered in relation to the national well-being. As more defence
contracts are let requiring increased productive facilities and as
66Departmentof Trade and Commerce, Prioate and Public investment in
•Canada, Outlook 1951, p. 8.
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plans for improved facilities for other essential purposes are ex-
panded, more of the available resources will be channelled to these
projects and less will be available for other types of investment.
Already the use of steel for many types of construction has been
placed under permit. This will mean that many plans for construc-
tion projects in the trade, finance and commercial services group
and in such manufacturing industries as beverages and printing and
publishing will be cut back, enabling programmes in other sectors
to be expanded."oT This is, in fact, what has been happening, if the
mid-1951 survey can be taken as an indication.
So far the appraisal has been related to the economic situation
and the conditions which have governed business investment in-
tentions and the possibility of their realization. There are two other
related aspects. Capital expenditures by business, as defined in this
paper, include outlay on new construction and the purchase of new
machinery and equipment. They exclude the acquisition of existing
property, the payment for which represents a transfer transaction
to other persons or firms and therefore does not have the same
economic impact as outlay on new capital goods. One question is:
Have construction expenditures been anticipated more closely than
machinery and equipment purchases? The other is: What has been
the effect of price changes on investment intentions?
The seasonality of construction has previously been mentioned
as one of the factors aiding the business community in making
TABLE 2






Year (millions of dollars) and Intentions
1945 114 117 —2.6
1946 290 220 +31.8
1947 365 404 —9.7
1948 620 639 —3.0
1949 695 750 —7.3
1950 892 909 —1.9
1951 1,059 1,106a —4.2
a Midyearsurvey.
Source: Canadian government data.
For coverage see table 1, footnote a.
67 thld.
178INVESTMENT FORECASTING IN CANADA
reasonably firm estimates of construction intentions a year ahead.
Greater difficulties are encountered in making estimates of ma-
chinery and equipment purchases. One of the. reasons for this is
that Canadian firms rely heavily on imports of machinery and equip-
ment from abroad, particularly from the United States. Thus the
task of Canadian businessmen includes sizing up the market and
price trends for machinery and equipment both at home and abroad,
with judgment of the foreign situation likely to be subject to
greater
The evidence assembled in tables 2 and S suggests that construc-
tion expenditure intentions have on the whole been a little closer
to subsequent realization than plans for the purchase of machinery
and equipment. In the seven annual surveys made, construction
intentions show a smaller margin of difference between anticipation
and execution in four years, little or no difference in one year, and
a greater margin in the remaining two years (see chart 2)
TABLE3
Machinery and Equipment Purchase Intentions of Business






Year (millions of dollars) and Intentions
1945 210 122 +72.1
1946 388 332 +16.9
1947 669 606 + 10.4
1948 1,111 1,147 —3.1
1949 1,208 1,210 —0.2
1950 1,134 1,303 —13.0
1951 1,576 1,749a —9.9
a Midyearsurvey.
Source: Canadian government data.
For coverage see table 1, footnote a.
When businessmen are asked what amounts they will spend in
the forthcoming year on plant and equipment, the presumption is
that the estimates are expressed in the prices of the year to which
68Thisexperience differs from that reported for the United States. "The
anticipations as to expenditure for plant are definitely less accurate than for
equipment in spite of the fact that construction requires relatively firm com-
mitments for a considerable period in advance of expenditure." Irwin Friend
and Jean Bronfenbrenner, "Business Investment Programs and Their Realiza-
lion," Survey of Current Business (U.S. Department of Commerce), December
1950, p. 16.
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the intentions apply. This means that a businessman has to decide
not only what projects he will be embarking upon in the forthcom-
ing year, what portion of the program is likely to be accomplished




Chart 2. Percentage Difference between Realization and Intentions for New
Business Construction and for Business Machinery and Equipment, Canada,
1945-1951
what equipment will be purchased, and what these undertakings
might cost in current prices, but also what might happen to prices
of capital goods. Thus his investment intentions involve both a
tentative decision as to the volume of work he intends to proceed
with and his "best" estimate of price trends.
Pricing some types of capital undertakings is not very difficult.
When there is a firm contract price for the construction of a plant,
the problem is to estimate the work that is likely to be
When equipment is ordered without an escalator clause, delivery
and payment estimates are needed, and few problems of pricing
arise. But when cost-plus construction contracts are frequent and
escalator clauses become common for long-term orders of machinery
and equipment, when costs of capital goods are rising rapidly and
allowances have to be made for contingencies, or when there is





1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951
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little basis for estimating the final cost for nonstandard structures
or machinery and equipment, the businessman's judgment on prices
is important.
In examining business capital expenditures anticipated in the
United States, the observation has been made, based mainly on
quarterly surveys, that "businessmen fairly consistently overesti-
mated their outlays during the few periods in which prices declined
and generally underestimated their outlays in other periods. It is
quite possible, therefore, that anticipated outlays to a considerable
extent reflect a planned physical volume of investment valued at
prevailing prices, and hence do not sufficiently take account of
price factors
InCanada, prices of capital goods have risen almost continuous-
ly in the postwar period although at times leveling off and at other
times recording substantial increases. Prices rose most in 1947—19.1
per cent—and least in 1945 and 1949—1.8 per cent and 4.4 per cent
respectively (see table 1). While it is not possible to test the above
observation about declining capital-cost prices against the Canadian
experience, Canadian data do allow an examination of the point
that businessmen usually express their investment intentions in
current prices rather than in future prices.
One way of testing this explanation statistically is to assume that
businessmen have expressed their capital expenditure plans in prices
prevailing at the time they were formulating their programs (taken
as the last quarter of the year), and then to inflate the intentions
by the price increases that took place between the average of the
last quarter and the average for the succeeding year. Preliminary
estimates of realization have been deducted from business invest-
ment intentions thus adjusted, and the percentage differences be-
tween realization and intentions are summarized in table 4.
From 1945 to 1948 the margin between anticipation and execu-
tion increased, while during 1949 and 1950 it decreased if com-
pared with unadjusted data (see chart 8). One possible explanation
is that in the early years, when supply bottlenecks were the rule
and escalator clauses and cost-plus contracts were frequent, business-
men made allowances for price increases and therefore substan-
tially expressed their capital expenditure intentions in future rather
than in current prices. In more recent years, particularly when the
investment intentions for 1949 and 1950 were formulated, the busi-
ness community as a whole appears to have assumed fairly stable
Friendand Bronfenbrenner, op.cit., p. 13.
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TABLE 4
Percentage Differences between Business Investment Realization and

















1948 +3.8 +4.7 +4.4
1949 —6.0 +0.2 —2.2
1950 +5.5 —10.1 —3.7
1951a +6.0 —4.1 —0.2
a Onthe assumption of an annual average increase of
capital goods in 1951.
Source: Canadian government data.
For coverage see table 1, footnote a. Current prices are taken as the average
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Chart 8. Percentage Differences between Business Investment Realization and
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prices and, encouraged by firmconstructioncontracts and delivery
quotations of machinery and equipment, appears to have made little
or no allowance for price increases. As the data in table 1 show,
however, prices of capital goods rose moderately during these two
years. The 1951 business investment intentions appear to have been
guided by price considerations not unlike those prevailing in the
earlier postwar years, with supply bottlenecks,. particularly for
steel, and substantial price increases again in sight.
The tentative nature of the conclusions based on this test should
be emphasized. Even though the majority of businessmen probably
have made allowances for price increases in the early postwar
years and again more recently, it cannot be said definitely whether
these allowances have been adequate)" But the Canadian experi-
ence implies that in times of rapidly rising prices the business com-
munity as a whole may be making allowances for increases, while
in periods of little price change it may not. Or putting it in statis-
tical terms, investment intentions appear more likely to .beex-
pressed in future prices in times of rapid price movements and in
current. prices when there is relative, price stability. In the latter
case there appears to be little harm done, since price differences
from year to year will be small enough not to affect significantly
the general usefulness of the results of business investment-inten-
tions surveys.
The variety of explanations offered above of why in some 'years
capital expenditure plans of business have come closer to realiza-
tion than in others suggests caution in making categorical state-
ments about the continuing ability of businessmen to anticipate
their capital outlay correctly regardless of circumstances. The Cana-
dian experience 'so far suggests that under foreseeable conditions
businessmen can be expected to estimate their future capital ex-
penditures reasonably closely.
The reasons why business investment intentions close to
realization will vary from time to time. For example, in 1947, in-
vestment intentions appear to have come close to realization not
so much because business was able to complete the volume of work
that it anticipated, but because rising prices may have made up for
deficiencies in volume. Similarly, the reasons why investment in-
tentions may understate realization will vary over time. For example,
in 1948 and 1949, investment intentions were moderately below actual
capital expenditures apparently because insufficient allowances had
Ithas been suggested that in 1947 they may have been inadequate.
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been made for price increases of capital goods. In 1950 and 1951 a
somewhat wider margin is explained to an important extent by the
effect of the rearmament program, which turned out to be greater
than anticipated.
2. YEAB-END AND MIDYEAB BUSINESS INVESTMENTINTENTIONS
Since 1947, investment intentions of business have been reviewed
at midyear, reflecting usually the situation in May of the year, and
the results made public in the form of departmental releases in
June.72 To obtain speedy results the midyear investment review is
based on a sample survey.73
The midyear review of capital expenditures is undertaken for two
reasons: first, to verify investment intentions at a time when work
is well under way. and management is in a much better position to
make firm estimates; secondly, to establish whether a change in the
trend of investment intentions is taking place either in the aggre-
gate or in the composition of the program, and if so to discover the
reasons for this change.
Annual forecasts are useful to the policy-maker because they
may give him a warning of things to come and enable him to take
appropriate and timely action. As an annual statement the outlook
appraisal can take account of changes anticipated later in the year
by the respondent, but it does not allow for alterations in plans
that take place during the year for reasons which the respondent
could not or did not anticipate. In Canada, where, as distinct from
the United States, no quarterly surveys of capital expenditure in-
tentions are undertaken, the midyear investment survey is designed
to detect in broad outline changes that may be taking place in in-
vestment intentions. This check-up on the year-end invest-
ment forecast is supplemented throughout the year by reviewing
current quarterly information on investment realization.74
72See,for example, Department of Trade and Commerce, Private and Public
Investment in Canada, Mid-year Survey 1951, Release No. 20/51 (June22,
1951).
The sample used in the midyear survey is a random sample chosen from
all firms reporting in the year-end survey and stratified by industry according
to the amounts of anticipated capital expenditures. The sampling ratio used is
greater in the strata involving larger investment outlays. This sample gives a
coverage of approximately 10 per cent in terms of number of establishments and
50 per cent in terms of total investment intentions.
Quarterly data are provided for investment in construction, in machinery
and equipment, and in the aggregate. Monthly data are provided for certain
sectors. See Department of Trade and Commerce Release No. 49/50 (November
22, 1950), containing quarterly investment figures for 1949 and 1950, including
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In Canada this technique has been éonsidered preferable to the
institution of quarterly investment-forecast surveys for a number of
reasons. Construction, which is responsible for a large proportion
of total capital expenditures, is subject to substantial seasonal fluc-
tuations in Canada, where cold. winters and wet springs restrict out-
door work, on occasion very substantially. Further, business firms
trying to forecast quarterly investment expenditures frequently run
into difficulties in estimating, with the accounting system to which
they are accustomed, actual work put in place. Payments for con-
struction work put in place or machinery and equipment delivered
are frequently not made until toward the end of the year.75
The midyear investment survey enables business enterprises to
make firmer estimates because, first, they are able to include an
allowance for actual capital expenditures made during the early
part of the year; secondly, most cancellations or additions of proj-
ects, particularly of a construction type, are well established by
that time; and thirdly, the respondent is in a much better position
to size up the state of the capital goods market. In the postwar
years this market has been somewhat volatile, and significant changes
have taken place within the course of a year. For example, in the
first half of 1951, prices of capital goods rose rapidly, frequently
necessitating an upward revision of investment intentions without
involving any change in volume.76 In addition a number of new
projects were initiated, mainly in defense and defense-supporting
industries."
an estimate of anticipated realization for the fourth quarter of 1950. For addi-
tional quarterly and monthly data see Central Mortgage and Housing Corpora-
tion, Housing in Canada, Second Quarter 1951, pp. 34 and 38.
"The inaccuracies involved in the quarterly anticipations...areprob-
ably to a considerable extent due to the difficulties in programming the de-
liveries of, and consequently the outlays on, capital goods already on order.
There is one systematic quarterly discrepancy between actual and anticipated
expenditures which is worthy of note. Actual expenditures as reported for the
fourth quarter were regularly higher than anticipated outlays, apparently
reflecting the concentration of certain charges to capital accounts in the end-
of-year statements." Friend and Bronfenbrenner, op.cit.,p. 13.
"The new figure of total capital expenditure for 1951 is 20 per cent above
that for last year. However, at least half of this increase may be attributed to
higher prices." Department of Trade a.nd Commerce, Private and Public In-
vestment in Canada, Mid-year Survey 1951, p. 1.
""Manyof the changes in the revised estimate for 1951 are due to the initia-
tion of entirely new projects on which information was not available when the
first estimate was made. ... Theupward revision in the overall program has
talcen place concurrent with the implementation of government measures to
discourage the use of resources for non-essential investment. Reduction in out-
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The results of the midyear investment surveys for the years 1947
to 1951 are summarized in table 5, together with a comparison of
investment intentions as canvassed at the end of the preceding
TABLE 5
Midyear and Year-End Business Investment Intentions














1947 1,004 —2.9 —0.6
1948 1,887 +9.0 +5.7
1949 1,976 +3.8 +0.8
1950 2,121 +4.7 —4.1
1951 2,855 +8.3 a
a Notavailable..
Source: Canadian government data.
For coverage see table 1, footnote a.
year and preliminary estimates of realization. In all years except
one (1948) the midyear surveys yielded improved results over the
corresponding previous year-end surveys (see also table 1).
In two years, 1947 and 1949, the differences between the pre-
liminary estimates of realization and the midyear surveys were less
than 1 per cent (see chart 4). While capital expansion in Canada
continued its upward trend in 1949,78 in spite of the presence of
recessionary influences in the United States,79 the recovery that set
in in the United States in the summer of the year8° provided further
lays for relatively less essential purposes have been more than offset by the
expanding program of industries which are essentially defence-supporting in
nature. On the whole, the changing pattern of investment plans indicates a
redirection of productive resources toward a broadening of Canada's industrial
base and a strengthening of the nation's defence potential." ibid., pp. 2 and 8.
78 With declines in some sectors, e.g. manufacturing, being offset by increases
in other sectors, e.g. primary industries and utilities (see table 6).
" In spite of recessionary movements in the United States in 1949, com-
modity exports from Canada to the United States remained about the same
as in 1948, around $1.5 billion, or about one-half of total Canadian sales
abroad. This was of particular importance for the continuation of a feeling of
business confidence in Canada, since at the same time exports of nondollar
countries declined somewhat.
80 The Federal Reserve Board Index (seasonally adjusted) declined from
195 in October 1948 to 161 in July 1949, a drop of 17 per cent, turned upward
in the following months, and reached 199 in June 1950, when the Korean
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incentives for Canadian industry to expand, in part to cater to the
expected increase in demand for Canadian products in the United
in part because of a feeling of buoyancy associated with
—10
Chart 4. Percentage Difference between Busipess Investment Realization and
Midyear and Year-End Intentions, Canada, 1945-1951
American expansion. In 1950, even though the midyear survey had
been undertaken before the Korean incident, increased capital ex-
penditures by business were indicated for the year, mainly the
result of further expansion in mining, logging, and manufacturing.
In 1951 the midyear survey showed substantial increases in the
capital expenditure plans of primary and manufacturing industries.
This reflected to some extent the addition of new projects of a de-
fense-supporting nature that had become necessary as the full ex-
tent and the rate of expansion of the rearmament program became
known.
Only in 1948 did the midyear investment survey yield results of
incident occurred. This was a recovery of 24 per cent and exceeded the postwar
peak of October 1948. See also "Production and Prices in the Latter Part of
1949," Federal Reserve Bulletin, January 1950,pp. 1-13.
81.Canadianexports to the United States amounted to $905 million in the first
half of 1950, or 81 per cent in value terms above the Erst half of 1949. The
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a somewhat different order. The survey of investment intentions at
the end of 1947 indicated capital expenditure plans for the follow-
ing year of $1,731 million, or 8.1. per cent below the preliminary
estimate of realization of $1,786 million. The midyear survey yield-
ed an estimated $1,887 million, or 5.7 per cent above the amount
realized. It will be recalled that from 1945 to 1947 investment-inten-
tions surveys had consistently overstated capital expenditures which
industry had found it possible to make, mainly because supply
bottlenecks made full realization of plans difficult. In response to
persistent demands, production and supply of capital goods rose
rapidly in the immediate postwar years, making possible an increas-
ing realization of investment plans. By the supply situa-
tion had improved sufficiently to make a number of firms, particu-
larly those in some primary industries, utilities, and commercial,
finance, and service enterprises, believe that an expansion beyond
what they had planned six months earlier was feasible.82 As it turned
out, the supply situation did improve during 1948,83 even though
it fell short: of what industry had expected. Nevertheless, business
investment plans at mid-1948 pointed to the fact that a somewhat
larger program could be realized than had been anticipated six
months
The reasons for discrepancies between investment intentions and
realization vary significantly between companies, and these are re-
viewed later (see section C 6).
To conclude, in considering percentage differences between the
82"Themajority of business enterprises participating in the mid-year survey
reported increases in returns: (a) that construction costs and purchase prices
of machinery and equipment were higher than anticipated; (b) that building
materials, machinery, and in some instances labour, were in better supply, mak-
ing it possible to proceed with projects which had hitherto been in a doubtful
category; and (c) that plans of projects and estimates of cost had become
firmer, making it possible to make a more definite statement as to the likely
volume of capital expenditures." Department of Reconstruction and Supply,
Release No. 112 (June 80, 1948).
83Between1947 and 1948 the index of the volume of domestic disappearance
of building materials in Canada rose by 14 per cent, and the number of persons
employed in the construction industry rose by 15 per cent. Central Mortgage
and Housing Corporation, Housing in Canada, Second Quarter 1951, pp. 64
and 83.
84Theworking of the Canadian government's capital goods import policies
probably contributed to an improvement in the balance between supply of and
demand for capital goods. New regulations made it necessary for industry to
obtain import permits for a variety of capital goods. Permits were granted
where the necessity for the imported item could be established and no satis-
factory domestic source existed. This procedure slowed down, for a time,
the rate at which business was able to acquire equipment.
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results of midyear investment surveys, year-end investment-inten-
tions surveys, and actual capital expenditure surveys, it must be
remembered that the first are sample surveys while the second and
third are made on as full an industrial coverage as is considered
practical and economical. Therefore, small variations between the
surveys may be due to a sampling error associated with the mid-
year surveys. It is believed that this error may be as much as 5per
cent in either direction.
3. INVESTMENT INTENTIONS OF INDUSTRY
Theeffect of changes in the volume of investment on the level
of economic activity has been emphasized in section B. In this con-
nection one of the crucial tests of the usefulness of• surveys of
capital expenditure intentions as tools for forward-looking economic
analysis is their reliability in indicating, a change in trend. In other
words, is there any evidence as yet in Canada that investment in-
tentions of business indicate possible turning points in the economic
situation, either the turning down after a high point has been
reached or the recovery after a decline?
Since capital expenditures in Canada have risen continuously
since the end of World War II, the surveys of business investment
intentions have so far not been subjected to the full test of whether
they will continue to yield as close results as they have in the past
when the present phase of continuing expansion is followed by a
period of contraction. However, there are some preliminary indi-
cations on an industry basis that business firms can anticipate a
change in trend not only in timing but also in approximate extent.
Capital expenditure intentions and preliminary estimates of
alization are summarized for industiy groups in table 6. In Canada
as in the United States the standard industrial classification is em-
ployed in tabulating the results of capital expenditure surveys, al-
though the broad groups published regularly in Canada differ
somewhat from those released in the United States by the Securities
Exchange Commission and the Department of Commerce. In the fol-
lowing table, industries have been rearranged to conform as closely
as possible to the grouping used in the United States.
The Canadian industry that called a turning point in the trend
of capital expenditures from 1948 to 1949 was manufacturing. Pre-
liminary estimates of realization in 1948 put capital expenditures
at $564millionand investment intentions for 1949 at $522 million, a
decline of 7 per cent. Preliminary estimates of realization in 1949
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TABLE6
Business Investment Intentions and Realization,








Year and Industrya (millionsof dollars) and Intentions
1945Manufacturing 244 167 +46.1
Mining S 19 16 +18.8
Railroads
Other transportation ... ...
Electricand gas utilities 36 31 + 16.1
Commercial and
miscellaneousb 25 25 0.0
Subtotaic 324 239 +85.6
Other primary industries4
Total 324 239 +35.6
1946Manufacturing 360 300 +20.0
Mining 25 14 +78.6
Railroads 71 48 +47.9
Other transportation 76 66 ±15.2
Electric and gas utilities 83 57 +45.6
Commercial and
miscellaneousb 54 46 + 17.4
Subtotale 669 531 +26.0
Other primary industries4 9 21 —57,1
Total 678 552 +22.8
1947Manufacturing 443 467 —5.1
Mining 47 50 —6.0
Railroads 147 76 +98.4
Other transportation 79 80 —1.2
Electric and gas utilities 124 127 —2.4
Commercial and
miscellaneousb 177 187 —5.3
Subtotaic 1,017 987 +3.0
Other primary industries4 17 23 —26.1
Total 1,034 1,010 +2.4
1948Manufacturing 554 564 —1.8
Mining 77 79 —2.5
Railroads 112 135 —17.0
Other transportation 70 70 0.0
Electric and gas utilities 182 200 —9.0
Commercial and
miscellaneousb 401 406 —1,2
Subtotaic 1,396 1,454 . —4.0
Other primary industries4 335 332 +0.9
Total 1,731 1,786 —8.1












Year and Industrya (millionsof dollars) and Intentions
1949Manufacturing 522 515 +1.4
Mining 121 124 —2.4
Railroads 164 135 +21.5
Other transportation 69 69 0.0
Electric and gas utilities 254 291 —12.7
Commercial and
miscellaneousli 409 429 —4.7
Subtotaic 1,539 1,563 —1.5
Other primaiy industries4 364 897 —8.3
Total . .1,960 —2.9
1950Manufacturing 496 519 —4.4
Mining 142 134 +6.0
Raiioads 150 121 +24.0
Other transportation 55 67 —17.9
Electric and gas utilities 305 345 —11.6
Commercial and
miscellaneousb 513 561 —8.6
Subtotaic 1,661 1,747 —4.9
Other primary industries4 365 465 —21.5
Total 2,026 2,212 —8.4
1951Manufacturing -716 847e —15.5
Mining 164 176e —6.8
Railroads 205 172e + 19.2
Other transportation 85 95e —10.5
Electric and gas utilities 388 404e —4.0
Commercial and
miscellaneousb 628 —4.6
Subtotaic 2,181 2,347e —7.1
Other primary industries4 454 508e —10.8
'total 2,635 2,855e
aGroupingof industries rearranged to conform as closely as possible to
industry classification used in surveys of anticipated capital expenditures on
plant and equipment undertaken in the United States by the Securities, and
Exchange COmmission and the Department of Commerce.
b Includes trade, service, communications, construction, and finance.
Roughly comparable to totals shown in SEC and Department of Commerce
Surveys.
d Covers agriculture, fishing, and woods operations.
Midyear survey.
Source: Canadian government data.
For coverage see table 1, footnote a.
191INVESTMENT FORECASTING IN CANADA
put capital expenditures made at $515 million, or close to what had
been anticipated. Among the reasons for this decline were: the end-
ing of reconversion of plant facilities following World War II; the
fact that many projects for industrial modernization, postponed
during the thirties and the war years, had been completed between
1946 and 1948; and the outlook for the lower sales abroad for manu-
factured products, particularly in nondollar areas where Canada
had well established markets. This was mainly because of import
restrictions .imposedby a large number of countries as a result of
foreign exchange difficulties.
By turning down in 1949, manufacturing investment in Canada
followed a course similar to that of capital expenditures by the
manufacturing sector in the United States. But the basic difference
between the trends of capital expenditures in the two countries in
these two years was that in Canada a decline in investment by
manufacturing firms was largely offset by increased capital expendi-
tures associated with the continuing resources-development and
utility-expansion program, while in the United States the rally of
some industries was insufficient to make up for a decline in other
industries, particularly manufacturing. One of the reasons for this is
that manufacturing enterprises in the United States spend propor-
tionately larger sums on plant and equipment than are spent in
Canada.85
Having called the turn in 1949, end-of-the-year (1949) invest-
ment intentions suggested a continuation of this trend in 1950. How-
ever, by mid-1950, with greater buoyancy prevailing,
enterprises revised their earlier intentions and indicated capital
expenditures for the year as a whole would be above those of 1949.
The speed-up of industrialization as increased rearmament orders
began to make their appearance in the second half of 1950 was an-
other reason why plant and equipment expenditures by Canadian
manufacturing in 1950 exceeded those made in 1949.
While it cannot be said with any assurance from the limited
Canadian experience that business firms can forecast their invest-
ment intentions sufficiently accurately to call a turn in economic
events, it is reassuring to know that in the case of Canada's most
important industry86 business firms have been able to indicate a
85 In 1949, for example, investment by manufacturing contributed 40 per
cent to total business expenditures on plant and equipment in the United States,
as compared with 33 per cent in Canada.
86 Manufacturing is Canada's most important single field of employment and
income. It provided jobs for 26 per cent of all persons in civilian employment
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turning point in the trend of investment at a time when the eco-
nomic outlook was in considerable doubt, and when conflicting
trends were becoming apparent both at home and abroad.
Another point of interest to the policy-maker is the assessment of
the effectiveness of broad economic policies designed either to en-
courage or to discourage investment in a particular sector. For ex-
ample, late in 1950 and continuing into early 1951 a number of
restrictive measures were adopted in Canada to induce industry to
postpone capital projects of low priority. The effectiveness of such
measures—to which reference has been made earlier—was indicated
by the changing composition of investment plans revealed by the
mid-1951 survey. Declines of capital outlay varying from S to over
20 per cent were indicated for wholesale trade, commercial services,
finance, insurance and real estate, and the construction industry.
Since prices of capital goods in 1951 exceeded by over 10 per cent
those of 1950, an even larger decline in the volume of investment
undertaken by these industries was indicated. At the same time
capital expenditures in other inìdustries and on defense construction
rose, suggesting that the government's economic policies aimed at
a redirection of the investment program were meeting with some
measure of success.
Insofar as surveys of investment intentions can be considered indi-
cators of the ability to anticipate future capital expenditures, the
data in table 6 suggest that manufacturing enterprises are among
the best informed in Canada. In every year since 1945, except 1947,
manufacturing firms came closer to estimating their prospective out-
lay in plant, machinery, and equipment than did the business com-
munity as a whole (see chart 5). Variations of about 1 per cent for
1949, 2 per cent for 1948, and about 4 per for 1950 are indi-
cations of a particularly good record. Midyear investment intentions
for 1951 suggest that manufacturing industries substantially under-
stated their capital plans for the year, probably because they may
have taken inadequate account of expansion necessitated by the
growing defense program. However, since full results for 1951 are
not available as this paper is being .prepared, it is too early to say
whether the forecasting record of manufacturing enterprises will
continue to be as good as that for the business community as a
whole.
in June 1950, and it contributed 31 per cent to total national income for the
year as a whole. In contrast, the corresponding proportions for agriculture are
21 and 11 per cent.
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The railroads are among the sectors showing fairly wide differ-
ences between investment intentions and realization. One reason for
this has beenrailroads' practice of describing as their investment
intentions the capital expenditure target some of the companies have
set. In practice, targets have been found difficult to realize fully.
This was the case in the early postwar years because of supply
bottlenecks. In more recent years it appeared easier to set a mone-
* Covers manufacturing, mining, railroads, other transportation, electric and gas utilities,
commercial, and miscellaneous.
Chart5. Percentage Difference between Business Investment Realization and
Intentions, by Industry, Canada, 1945-1951
tary target than to overcome the engineering and organizational
problems involved jn realizing the objective. A of the
difference between investment intentions and realization could pre-.
sumably be achieved if instead of using only data on the maximum
amounts that the railroads may be spending on capital equipment,
investment intentions were to take account also of some of the
nical and other difficulties faced by the industry.
In practice, understatement of proposed capital outlays by some
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the variations between investment intentions and realization are
larger for individual industries than for business. expenditures on
plant, machinery, and equipment taken as a whole. However, it
should not be assumed that the degree of accuracy attained in sur-
veys of business investment intentions is purely fortuitous in this
respect. In periods when the demand for capital goods exceeds the
supply, as in the early postwar years, the possible realization of in-
vestment intentions must be premised on a given supply situation.
If the supply situation eases because of reduction in capital spending
by some sectors, this will enable other sectors to increase their out-
lay. In 1949, when the supply and demand situation was reasonably
in balance, variations among industries were not as pronounced as
in years. But even in years in which the divergencies among
industries are more substantial, the resulting error may not preclude
the use of industrial information. As indicated earlier, broad trends
rather than pinpoint precision are required in formulating policies
to deal with a particular problem affecting one industry or group
of industries.
4. BUSINESS INVESTMENT INTENTIONS BY REGION
Since industries report their capital expenditure plans with vary-
ing degrees of accuracy, this itself affects regional data on projected
investment outlay; for industries are widely dispersed in Canada,
and the industrial bases of the regions vary greatly.
Manufacturing is most heavily concentrated in Ontario and Que-
bec, while primary industries are relatively more important in the
other regions. But in the last decade these other areas have been
making great strides toward industrialization and diversification, so
that some of the differences that existed before the war have been
reduced.
Another factor accentuating the differences that arise from con-
centration of manufacturing in particular regions is the great varia-
tion in the types of manufacturing. The very large steel, textile, and
chemical companies are concentrated in Ontario and Quebec. In the
Maritimes small-scale fish processing and milling of lumber are of
particular importance. Manufacturing in the Prairie Provinces has
consisted in the past largely of enterprises engaged in processing
agricultural products—in flour-milling, meat-packing, etc. In recent
years oil-refining has assumed considerable importance. In British
Columbia the processing of forest products both in large-scale saw-
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mills and in pulp and paper plants is, along with fish-processing, the
major manufacturing activity.
Some indications of the differences that may exist regionally be-
tween investment intentions and realization may be obtained by
using reports covering the following industries, which have been sur-
veyed continuously since 1945: manufacturing, mining, primary
woods operations, and central electric stations and gas This
group of industries is responsible for close to one-half of total busi-
ness investment and over one-quarter of total private and public
investment made in Canada. As table 7 indicates, manufacturing
investment is a major factor in Quebec and Ontario, with British
Columbia third. In the Maritimes and the Prairie Provinces, capital
outlay by manufacturing firms is less important (see chart 6).





Per cent of total populotton
Per cent of total manufacturing investment
Per cent
Chart 6. Manufacturing Investment and Population, by Region, Canada, 1950
Investment intentions and realization for the selected industry
groups mentioned earlier are summarized in table 8. In the past
five years capital expenditure plans appear to have come closest to
realization in Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia. This may be
87Exceptwoods operations, where surveys commenced in 1946.
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.INVESTMENT FORECASTING IN CANADA
explained to some extent by the concentration of large companies in
these provinces; such firms, as has been mentioned earlier, have a
TABLE 8
Business Investment Intentions and Realization,
by Region, Canada, 1945-1951
Percentage
Preliminary Difference
Year-End Estimate of between
Intentions Realization Realization
Year and Region (millions of dollars) and Intentions
1945Maritimes 9.8 +35.7
Quebec 87.5 61.7 +41.8
Ontario 143.5 100.6 +42.6
Prairies 28.5 22.0 +29.5
British Columbia 27.0 20.0 +35.0
Totala 299.8 214.1 ±40.0
1946Maritimes 23.4 15.8 +48.1
Quebec 137.9 120.5 +14.4
Ontario 232.0 185.6 +25.0
Prairies 38.2 23.7 +61.2
British Columbia 48.0 45.8
. +4.8
Totala 4795 391.4 +22.5
1947Maritimes 28.1 34.1 —17.6
Quebec 175.6 204.5 —14.1
Ontario 310.7 314.0 —1.1
Prairies 43.7 39.9 +9.5
British Columbia 72.7 75.1 —3.2
Totala 630.8 667.6 —5.5
1948Maritimes 34.8 46.5 —25.2
Quebec . 239.0 221.8 +7.9
Ontario 444.6 421.0 +5.6
Prairies 49.6 80.9 —38.7
British Columbia 70.2 102.8 .—31.7
Totals 838.2 872.8 —4.0
1949Maritimes 36.9 .40.4 —8.7
Quebec 232.6 229.7 +1.3
Ontario 432.1 441.3 —2.1
Prairies 104.8 128.4 —17.1
British Columbia 110.5 111.2 —0.6
Total 916.9 949.0 —3.4
1950Maritimes 43.3 47.5 —8.8
Quebec .224.0 240.4 —8.8
Ontario 470.3 466.1 +0.9
Prairies 122.2 183.9 —25.4
British Columbia 95.5 103.5 —7.7
Total 955.3 1,021.4 —6.5




Year-End Egtimate of between
Intentions Realization Realization
Year and Region . (millions of dollars) and Intentions
1951Maritimes 72.6 82.4b —11.9
Quebec 292.0 332.8b —12.3
Ontario 656.5 745.lb —11.9
Prairies 181.8 200.8b 92
British Columbia 99.1 114.5b —13.4
Total 1,302.0 1,475.P' —11.7
a Thesetotals for the years 1945 to 1948 differ slightly from the national
totals shown in the White Papers on the investment outlook because the latter
were arrived at by blowing up the Canada total for noncoverage rather than by
deriving the Canada total by summation of regional totals. Since 1949 national
totals have been the sum of regional totals.
b Midyear intentions.
Source: Canadian government data.
These figures cover manufacturing, mining, woods operations, and central
electric stations and gas works for all years except 1945, when woods operations
were not surveyed.
better record in estimating future capital outlay. However, where
a region depends substantially on a few types of industry, a change
through the year in the outlook for any one of these industries may
result in large differences between intentions and realization for that
region. This is illustrated by the unusually large variation shown for
British Columbia in 1948, when the demand for lumber rose sub-
stantially through the year because of a greatly increased domestic
housing program.88
The Maritime Provinces appear to have been consistently on the
conservative side, underestimating their capital outlay in every
year from 1947 to 1951. In addition to the fact that smaller com-
panies, which are numerous in this region, are usually less accurate
in their estimates, a psychological factor probably also exists. In
comparison with the rest of Canada the Maritime economy has be.en
growing more slowly. This tends to give the businessman a more
conservative outlook than in more rapidly developing regions.
•The largest differences between intentions and realizationappear
for the Prairie Provinces and are principally on the pessimistic side.
This cannot be ascribed entirely to errors in judgment made by
88 Starts of all types in Canada rose from 74,300 in 1947 to 90,200 in 1948,
or by 21 per cent. Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, Housing in
Canada, Second Quarter 1951,p. 34.
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businessmen in formulating and reporting their intentions. In this
area industrial development, particularly in the fields of oil and
natural gas, has proceeded at a rapid rate in. recent years. This has
involved the establishment of many new companies, some of which,
in each year, came into existence after the survey of intentions was
made. While allowance for new entrants was made in the published
estimates, these do not appear to have taken full account of the
rapid development in this region. However, a fuller coverage would
be reflected in the preliminary estimates of realization, thus adding
to the differences that show up. In this environment the business-
man, too, faced difficulties in planning his capital expansion. While
large increases in capital expenditures were .projected, it was fre-
quently found that plans made toward the end of one year proved
to be inadequate before the succeeding year was well on its way
(see chart 7).
Within regions greater variations between intentions and realiza-
tion are indicated for large cities than for smaller communities. In
1950, for example, investment intentions by manufacturing enter-
prises differed from the actual amounts spent by 9 per cent in thir-
teen metropolitan cities and by only 2 per cent in the rest of the
country (see table 9). One possible explanation for this is the greater
volatility of decision-making in large urban centers and the greater
possibility of projects being canceled and of new ventures being
initiated.
Among the cities the two largest, Montreal and Toronto, came
closer to foreseeing the capital outlay to be made by manufacturing
firms than all other cities except Windsor, whose forecasting record
was about as good as that of Montreal (see chart 8). The fact that
differences between intentions and realization are much larger in
the smaller metropolitan centers than in the larger ones does not
necessarily mean that all businessmen in the big cities are better
forecasters. It does mean, however, that there is less likelihood in
the smaller places that overstatements will be canceled out by under-
statements. Also, as pointed out in section C 7, the estimating tech-
nique deteriorates in effectiveness as it is applied to either industries
or areas involving only a small number of firms.
5. INDIVIDUAL COMPANY POBECASTS: SIZE AND OTHER CHABACrERISTIGS
This section is concerned with five questions: Are large companies
in a better position to estimate in advance their capital expenditures
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Per cent
Chart 7. Percentage Difference between Business Investment Realization and
Intentions, by Region, Canada, 1945-1951
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TABLE 9
Manufacturing Investment Intentions and Realization,














Montreal. 1,505 73.1 66.5 +9.9
Toronto 1,064 57.1 53.9 +5.9

















Windsor 159 13.6 12.4 +9.7
Halifax 134 1.7 2.6 —34.6
London 118 7.7 19.0 —59.5
Victoria 109 1.5 1.3 +15.4









Rest of Canada 8,986 300.2 305.6 —1.8
Total 13,845 495.6 519.4 —4.6
Source: government data.
investment involving substantial expenditures more accurate than
estimates involving smaller outlays?8° How successful can one expect
individual firms to be in forecasting the direction of future capital
expenditures, even though they may Over- or underestimate signifi-
cantly the absolute amounts involved? Can companies which have a
reasonably good record in estimating their future capital outlay in
one year be relied upon to be good forecasters the next year? What
are some of the differences in the accuracy of anticipated investment
plans as reported by company officers at various levels in the business
hierarchy?
To throw light on these questions a sample of 814 virtually identi-
cal companies reporting investment intentions and realization in 1949
and 1950 was chosen. The size of the sample for each of the five size
groups selected is shown in table 10.
Large companies, that is, those with a gross value of business of
$1 million or more annually, appear to be able to anticipate their
capital outlay more closely than medium-sized or small companies.
89Itshould be remembered that not every large company makes large
capital expenditures each year.
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Chart 8. Percentage Difference between Manufacturing Investment
and Intentions, and Population, Metropolitan Cities, Canada, 1950
Realization
In 1949, finns in the $1,000,000 to $4,999,999 group came closest to
estimating their actual investment outlay; in 1950 it was the $5,000,-
cent. In 1950 it
showed most marked variation, with actual expenditures exceeding
anticipated capital outlay by 96 per cent (see chart 9).
The finding that large firms can approximate their future expendi-
tures on plant and equipment more closely than and medium-
sized firms also holds for the United States. Some of the reasons for
this have been thus stated for the United States surveys, and they
are in substance also applicable to Canadian surveys:
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zINVESTMENT FORECASTING IN CANADA
ber of separate projects. To the extent that the discrepancies be-
tween expenditures and anticipations for these individual projects
are random in nature there will already be cancellation of positive












Chart9. Percentage Difference between Investment Intentions and Realiza-
tion of a Sample of Manufacturing Firms, by Gross Value of Production, Canada,
1949 and 1950
certain expenditures which occur from time to time but which can-
not be specffically foreseen in advance—for example, the unexpected
breakdown of a piece of machinery. The large firm will experience a
number of such incidents in any given year and will be in a position
to make some blanket allowance for them in advance, although Un-
Thisis also true for Canada in terms of the amount of capital expenditures
made by finns. But since in this country establishments rather than companies
are surveyed, cancellations on an establishment basis will not be offset to the
same extent by additions, particularly as far as new projects are concerned.
The Canadian procedure therefore causes greater variations in terms of numbers
between investment intentions and realization for establishments operated by
multiplant companies than for firms operating a single establishment or for
comparable data in the United States, which treat all the plants operated by
one company as one unit.
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able to predict what the individual items of expenditure will be. The
small firm, which experiences few such expenditures in a single year,
will frequently not attempt to allow for them in advance, giving rise
to a definite bias in the direction of underestimation. ...Third,a
large organization must make its plans further in advance than
would be necessary for a smaller firm. The decision-making process
is more formalized; a capital budget is more likely to exist. The
number of administrative levels which must give approval is larger.
These factors contribute not only to the making of decisions well
in advance of actual expenditure but also to the inflexibility of plans
when made; and the effect is to reduce the likelthood of large dis-
crepancies from anticipations."91
Other reasons include the following: Large companies with
greater financial resources at their disposal have better facilities to
plan new projects and they can usually complete their undertakings.
Small companies with inadequate financial backing may have greater
difficulty. They are more likely to find themselves in the position of
not being able to complete some of their projects as planned, or
they may find it necessary to spread them over a longer period,
cancel them, or go out of business in the case of failure. Further,
most new companies starting in business in Canada are small or
medium-sized enterprises. Many of these companies, being new in
the field, are likely to err substantially in estimating their initial
capital outlay. Also, in times of suppiy difficulties the well-estab-
lished firm is likely to be better able to get supplies than the new-
comer in the industry.
There are two secondary aspects apparent from table 10 that may
be worth noting. First, serious as the understatements and over-
statements of capital expenditures for certain size groups are, their
importance for the estimate of investment intentions by an industry
as a whole diminishes considerably because most of the pluses are
offset by minuses.
Secondly, by use of sampling techniques and after weighting the
results by size groups, investment intentions for manufacturing as a
whole in 1950 come within 14.3 per cent of realization estimated on
the same basis.°2 The use, of the more complete coverage of the
91 Friend and Bronfenbrenner, op.cit., pp. 15-16.
92 The percentage data of differences shown in tables 10 to 12. relate to the
difference between intentions and realization. In all other tables the percentage
differences are between realization and intentions. This has been done in order
to ensure comparability between table 11 in this, paper and table 2 in Friend
and Bronfenbrenner, op.cit., covering the United States surveys. Difference
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investment-intentions survey, as shown in table 6, indicates a dif-
ference of 4.4 per cent. For 1949 the corresponding percentages are
6.8 and 1.4 per cent. These variations illustrate some of the differ-
ences associated with the use of sampling techniques.
In table 11 (see also chart 10) the data for the same sample of
manufacturing establishments were rearranged to obtain a frequency
distribution of the variations between investment intentions and
realization. In both years the largest number of companies is to be
found in the group reporting underestimates of actual capital outlay
by 200 per cent or more, and the second largest number in the
group in which statements of intentions and realization were the
same. These two groups comprise over one-third of the total number
of firms in 1949 and over two-fifths in 1950. But on examination it
appears that neither the gross understatement nor the perfect score
has much impact on the accuracy of the investment-intentions sur-
veys, for the group with the largest percentage differences between
intentions and realization recorded the smallest expenditures per
company, with one exception. In 1949 the average investment inten-
tions per company for this group comprised only 8 per cent of the
average for all groups, and in 1950 the proportion continued to be
small (13 per cent). The "perfect score" group was composed
mainly of firms that said they would make no capital expenditures
and included a few that indicated they would make very small
outlays.
What does matter, however, is the performance of companies
which indicated large capital expenditures. The data show that it
is precisely these firm's which had the best record in reporting their
investment plans. Companies undertaking large projects and mak-
ing outlays of between three and six times the average of the manu-
facturing industry were able to estimate their 'investment expepdi-
tures a year ahead within a margin of less than 10 per cent (see
table 11). This suggests that not only are large companies likely to
be able to estimate their future capital outlay more closely than
small or medium-sized companies, but the advance preparation,
planning, and consultation that go into large projects usually pay
off, with the estimates of costs coming close to actual costs. Of
course, there may be projects of a nonstandard type in which wide
differences are more likely, or there may be of supply bót-
tienecks and rising prices in which even the greater facilities of
figures for table 10 comparable with those in table 6 in this paper are given


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1INVESTMENT FORECASTING IN CANADA
large companies may not prove fully adequate to the task of pric-
ing new ventures.
The question arises: How successful can one expect individual
firms to be in forecasting the direction of capital expenditureseven
'though there may be significant differences in absolute terms be-








Chart 10. Frequency Distribution of Percentage Difference between Invest-
ment Intentions and Realization of a Sample of Manufacturing Finns, Canada,
1949 and 1950
this question the returns of the 814 sample manufacturing companies
were arranged into three groups: those expecting a decline of capital
expenditures in 1950 from 1949, those expecting no change, and
those expecting an increase. The first and the third groups, cover-
ing firms expecting a change, were then each divided into four
sectors depending on the percentage differences between realization
in 1949 and intentions reported for 1950.
It is noteworthy that firms in seven out of the eight sectors cor-
rectly anticipated a decline or an increase in their capital expendi-
ture, the only exception being the. 9.9 per cent and under sector.
These firms had expected to increase their investment outlay by
5 per cent, but in fact spent 6 per cent less than in the preceding
year (see table 12).
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.INVESTMENT FORECASTING IN CANADA
Having anticipated fairly well the direction of capital expendi-
tures, those that had forecast a decline turned out to be too pessi-
mistic and those that had forecast an increase turned out to be too
optimistic. Companies 'with declining capital expenditures antici-
pated a drop of 52 per cent, but it turned out to be only 43 per
cent. Companies making larger investment outlays had counted on
increasing their capital expenditures over 1949 by 126 per cent, but
actual realization was up somewhat below th.at figure, 103 per cent.
The "no change" group showed a substantial percentage difference
between realization and intentions, but in practice this had little
significance for total investment plans and actual expenditures be-
cause of the small absolute amounts involved.
We turn now to a test of the reliability of individual companies
as investment forecasters. Of the 814 manufacturing companies
sampled 319 were chosen because their statements of investment
intentions and realization showed differences of 40 per cent or less
in 1949. The forecasting record of these companies was checked for
1950. Of 119 companies that had a perfect score in 1949, 61 re-
peated it in 1950. Of 46 companies recording a difference of less
than 10 per cent in 1949 (either up or down) only 8 could make
similarly close estimates in 1950, Of 52 firms estimating actual capi-
tal expenditures within a range of 10 to 19.9 per cent in 1949, 23
were able to do as well in 1950 (see table 13).
A related question concerns the accuracy of capital expenditure
plans 'as reported by company officers at various levels in the busi-
ness hierarchy. Table 14 summarizes percentage differences between
investment intentions and realization for the 814 sample manufac-
turing companies in 1950 by status of the respondent.
Apparently, reports by owners and secretaries of companies about
future capital expenditures were much closer to actual realization
than reports by any other group of company officers reporting. The
data suggest that company employees far removed from policy
formulation' and management are apt to make the least accurate
estimates. For example, as table 14 shows, bookkeepers and clerical
staff members entrusted in some of the smaller firms with the corn-
pletiQn of capital-forecast questionnaires reported investment plans
which turned out to differ from actual expenditures by 50 per cent
or more.
Another noteworthy feature suggested by the data is the greater






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.INVESTMENT FORECASTING IN CANADA
pects of business operations. Executive officers and management,
on the other hand, are frequently apt to overstate capital outlay.
This brief review of the hazards of the individual business fore-
caster implies that making a successful company investment fore-
cast means hard work, full knowledge of the projects involved and
of the supply situation and price trends in the capital goods market,
and an adequate understanding of the various contingencies which
may cause projects to be canceled, deferred, reduced, or expanded,
or new undertakings to be initiated. The accuracy with which any
given firm assesses all these factors may vary greatly from one year
to the next depending upon the size and type of its investment pro-
gram and the effect that a changing economic climate may have on
a particular industry. Thus the fact that a company or a group of
firms was successful in any one year in estimating its capital outlay
closely does not necessarily mean that it will be similarly successful
in the next year.
6. INDIVIDUAL COMPANY FORECASTS: REASONS FOR VARIATIONS
In conjunction with the midyear review of investment intentions,
companies reporting a change in their intentions are asked to give
the major reasons for this change. A special tabulation of the rea-
sons given by manufacturing firms has been made for 1950, and the
reasons are summarized in tables 15 to 17.
The year 1950 was chosen because by May of that year the sup-
ply situation was reasonably well in balance and prices were mov-
ing only slowly. Many of the special circumstances prevailing in the
earlier postwar period had passed, and the new strain to be im-
posed by a speed-up in armaments had not, as yet, affected business
thinking. Thus the months preceding mid-1950 perhaps come as
close to a "normal" peacetime period of moderate business optimism
and the working of open-market forces as can be found in Canada
since the end of the war. To indicate the change in the factors in-
fluencing the possible realization of planned capital outlay, similar
data on reasons for changes in investment intentions as given at
mid-1951 are summarized in abbreviated form in table 18.
Of a total of 773 manufacturing firms reporting in the mid-1950
survey 451 indicated variations between their midyear and year-end
investment intentions, and the remaining 322 stated "no change."
Of those reporting a change about half93 explained why they found
9SInthe United States a follow-up technique brought a higher response,
84 per cent, Friend and Bronfenbrenner, op.cit., p. 17. Since Canadian industry
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it necessary by May to revise their earlier intentions (see table
Since some of the companies gave more than one reason, 218
finns presented a total of 236 replies. Of these replies, 167 were
reasons why firms had revised their investment intentions upward
and 69 were reasons why they had adjusted them downward. Com-
panies giving reasons were most numerous in cases where the per-
centage change between the two estimates was 20 per cent or more
TABLE 15
Midyear Survey of Manufacturing Firms Changing Their Year-End Investment
















—20 and under 55 81 136 5.45 0.29
—19.9 to —10 7 17 24 13.56 0.84
—9.9 to 0 6 10 16 25.04 1.93
0 to 9.9 8 11 19 0.50
10 to 19.9 19 22 41
• 8.77 0.59
20 and over 123 92 215 7.03 0.16
Total 218 233 451 7.86 0.35
Source: Canadian government data.
(up or down). But again the amounts involved were much smaller
than those reported by companies indicating changes of less than
20 per cent (see table 15).
Before reviewing the frequency with which the reasons for chang-
ing investment intentions were given by manufacturing firms at
mid-1950, a brief statement of what the various reasons mean may
•be helpful. The reasons given have been arranged in twelve groups
for upward adjustments and into nine groups for downward re-
visions. Where possible the reasons have been grouped in a manner
has been very cooperative in participating in capital expenditure surveys, one
explanation for this variation in the percentage response might possibly be the
difference in techniques. The special follow-up used in the United States
appears to be a more effective method of achieving replies from respondents
than an apparently routine question attached to a general-purpose questionnaire.
Also, the fact that the United States survey used a check list of reasons in
addition to an invitation for supplementary comments, while the Canadian
survey only posed an open question, is likely to have had some influence on
the degree of response.
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similar to that shown in table 6 in the United States appraisal of
business capital expenditure surveys.94 The first seven reasons for
the upward revisions as given in table 16 and the first five reasons
for the downward revisions as given in table 17 are identical with
TABLE '16
Midyear Survey of Reasons Given by Manufacturing Firms for Upward




. tion per per
Companies Company in Company in
Each Group Each Group
(millions of dollars) Reason NumberPer Cent
1.Sales outlook 9 5.4 4.99 0.28
2.Plant and equipment supply
situation 3 1.8 1.63 0.12
3.
4.
Plant and equipment costs 13 7.8
Competitive conditions 6 3.6
2.88 0.16
8.84 2.41




Routine underestimate 24 14.3
4.60 0.18
4.83 0.15




Carryover from previous year7 4.2
Projects added 47 28.1




12.Miscellaneousa 4 2.4 5.46 0.13
Total 167b 100.0 8.88 0.29
a Fordescription see p. 220.
bTotalnumber of companies giving reasons in tables 16 and 17 is higher than
that shown in table 15 because some firms gave more than one reason.
Source: Canadian government data.
the American classification. Some of the reasons given in the United
States survey (covering 1949) were not applicable to Canadian con-
ditions (as they prevailed in May 1950), for example, "availability
of labor and Other reasOns differed in substance; for
example, a boxcar shortage in Canada necessitated the expansion
of storage facilities by a number of firms which had not foreseen
the need for this. To list the reasons:96
Ibid., p. 19.
95Thisfactor, however, was mentioned in similar surveys undertaken in
Canada in 1949 and 1951.
96Seealso check list of reasons and other explanatory factors as given in
Friend and Bronfenbrenner, op. cit., pp. 17 and 18.
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1. Sales outlook. When this reason is given it reflects mainly a
change in market prospects for the commodities for the production
of which new capital expenditures were planned. In the case of
upward adjustments it may have been the judgment of the firms
TABLE 17
Midyear Survey of Reasons Given by Manufacturing Firms for Downward








Company in Company in
Each Group Each Group
(millions of dollars)
1.Sales outlook 12 17.4 2.09 0.17
2.Plant and equipment supply
situation 5 7.2 45.43 2.03
3.Plant and equipment costs 6 8.7 1.92 0.20
4. New products 2 2.9 2.45 0.81
5.Routine overestimate 5 7.2 18.90 0.76
6.Carryover from preceding year2 2.9
7.Projects canceled or deferred24 34.8
12.70 0.38
10.28 0.70
8.Firmer estimate 2 2.9 2.67 0.36
9.Miscellaneousa H 16.0 8.22 0.33
Total 69b 100.0 10.67 0.59
a For description see p. 220.
bTotalnumber of companies giving reasons in tables 16 and 17 is higher than
that shown in table 15 because some firms gave more than one reason.
Source: Canadian government data.
either that long-term prospects were more favorable than had been
anticipated or that a special opportunity existed which would war-
rant making the expenditures now and writing off the capital out-
lay in a comparatively short period. Excluded from this grouping,
even though the reasons have some bearing on market prospects,
are changes in competitive conditions, the introduction of new prod-
ucts, or a change in the distribution of the production schedule of
different commodities. These reasons are listed separately under
4 and 5.
2. Plant and equipment supply situation. This reason covers two
types of cases. Where upward adjustments were involved, they were
facilitated by easier supply conditions than had been expected.
These new projects or the expansion of existing projects might have
been decided upon, or added machinery and equipment orders might
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have been made, in order to take advantage of favorable delivery
dates. Where downward adjustments were indicated, they fre-
quently involved delays in delivery of or a lengthening
of the period of construction beyond that anticipated.
3. Plant and equipment costs. Several types of cases are covered.
First, rising capital costs applied to the same volume of work were
responsible for larger dollar expenditures. This would cover cases
where no allowance or only insufficient allowance had been made for
price rises. Secondly, higher anticipated costs led to cancellations
of projected èapital oulay. Thirdly, lower anticipated costs encour-
aged making additional expenditures. In the first case no change in
the volume of investment would have been involved, but it would
have followed in the last two cases.
4. Change in competitive conditions. Reasons in this category
cover changes in investment intentions because of the endeavor of
a number of companies either to better the quality or the delivery
dates of their products, or to lower their current prices, prevent
them from rising further, or slow down any anticipated rise. The
objective was to obtain a larger share of the market, regain a position
or just hold a position vis-à-vis rivals in the trade. Of special
importance for Canada was the continuing attempt of manufac-
turers to replace imports with domestic products where this could
be done economically.
5. New products. This reason usually explains additional expendi-
tures made to produce entirely new products or expand the output
of newly introduced, articles or made because of a change in the
distribution of the current output pattern. "New" products cover
articles new to the company, as well as items not previously pro-
duced in Canada. The shift in production pattern frequently results
from changing market conditions, with some items becoming more
fashionable and others declining in In addition the ap-
pearance of new materials may make it possible to turn out cus-
tomary products in a new form which will appeal to the consuming
public, leading to the discontinuation or reduction in use of older
types of materials. For example, the increasing usage of nyion re-
quired substantial capital expenditures for new fabricating equip-
ment.
6. Technology. This category covers a variety of reasons for mak-
ing capital outlays: new processes, new techniques, more efficient
equipment replacing less efficient equipment even before it had
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reached complete obsolescence or had been fully written off, the
introduction of assembly lines, and so forth.
7. Routine under- or overestimates. By midyear many firms were
able to say whether they had made insufficient or too large allow-
ances for incidental capital expenditures which could not be esti-
mated with accuracy earlier.
8. Inadequate storage facilities. A number of companies reported
as the reason for changing their investment intentions that their
storage facilities for both end products and raw materials had proved
less adequate than they had expected. This was partly to their
need to carry larger inventories in a peacetime period, and partly
to uncertainties in transportation when shortages of boxcars at times
made it difficult to procure raw materials promptly or to move all
the finished products turned out by the plant.
9. Carryover from previous year. In some cases explanations of-
fered under this grouping referred to deliveries of equipment that
had been anticipated for late in the preceding year, usually De-
cember, but that had arrived early in the new year. In other cases
payments on machinery and equipment that had been delivered in
the preceding year had been delayed and were made in the new
year. Similar cases were reported for construction projects, because
of either a last-minute physical carryover or the postponement of
payments for work already
10. Projects. added, deferred, or canceled. Some of the companies
specifically stated that their investment intentions were up because
they had decided to embark upon a particular project, for example,
the addition of another wing to the plant, an office building, or a
garage. Others gave as reasons for scaling down their projected
capital outlay that they had either abandoned a project or deferred
it—in some cases for a year, in other cases indefinitely. Still others
reported the replacement of one project of one type or in one lo-
cality by a project of another type or in another locality. In the
Thequestionnaire (see Appendix B) specifically asks a firm to "report
construction in the year in which carried out and equipment in the year in
which acquired, irrespective of the time payment is made." Some firms con-
sider that equipment is acquired at the time payment is made. The legal or
taxation concept of "acquisition" will therefore on occasion vary from business
interpretation. For the purpose of economic analysis, information on the time
equipment is produced and subsequently acquired by the final user is pref-
erable to information on when payment for the equipment is made. But in
practice there are differences in the way business firms interpret aôquisition
and consequently in what they report as capital expenditures to be made (see
also section 8).
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latter case the projected capital outlay might change only a little
because for the firm as a whole new projects would largely offset
the cancellations or even exceed them. However, because capital
expenditure intentions are surveyed in Canada on an establishment
basis, this would have the effect of increasing the number of new
projects added or canceled, although the net increase or net decrease
in capital outlay may have been only minor. In the cases listed in
this group no further reasons were given by reporting companies
as to why this decision was taken. Many of the of deferment
or abandonment involved projects planned by small and medium-
sized companies which might have been facing difficulties in secur-
ing the necessary funds to carry out their plans. Although the com-
panies did not say so, some of the firms in this category belong to
industries that faced uncertain short-term market prospects at mid-
1950; for examplç, the food-processing and textile fields.
11. Firmer estimates. In this category were companies which were
able to make more definite estimates at midyear for a variety of
reasons. The capital budgets of a number of large companies had
been firmed and approved by the board of directors oniy after the
year-end investment intentions had been reported. Some firms were
able to revise their original, tentative estimates in the light of con-
struction contracts actually let and machinery and equipment orders
placed at a definite price. There were a number of cases in which,
as a result of actual progress made in the early part of the year,
firms were able to appraise with greater assurance the progress
that was likely to be made during the remainder of the year on
projects already under way.
12. Miscellaneous. These reasons covered, in the main, five types
of cases: new expenditures made to facilitate the sale of a business
or the cancellation of capital expenditures planìned in the case of
closing out a business or its disposition; unexpected capital ex-
penditures to make good losses resulting from natural causes such
as fire, floods, storms, and so forth; the decision to buy (or lease)
equipment instead of leasing (or buying) it; accounting decisions,
for example, to charge a specific item to capital account rather than
to operating expenses or vice versa; reporting errors due to misin-
terpretation of managerial decisions or just clerical mistakes.
We turn now to the quantitative evidence.
The largest number of companies reporting upward revisions of
their investment intentions at mid-1950 were firms that had decided
to embark on new projects. In forty-seven cases, comprising 28 per
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cent of the total, this was given as the main reason. But on the whole,
new projects developed after the program for the year had been
formulated were small. Capital outlays of this group of finns were
below the amounts which the average company in the sample in-
tended to spend (see table 16). As suggested earlier, the quanti-
tative impact of these changes, numerous as they were, on invest-
ment intentions for manufacturing as a whole was even less than
the data indicate, because in cases of multiplant finns the addition
of one project might be offset by the withdrawal of another, making
the net change in amounts considerably smaller than the gross
change. In an examination of the individual reports of establish-
ments operated by multiplant firms, it was found that a number of
companies that had made plans to expand in one community seemed
suddenly to decide to locate in another place. Municipal taxes and
local concessions, availability of labor, wage rates, closeness to
markets and sources of materials and power, or just the desire for
greater centralization or decentralization, as the case might be,
were all factors in inducing firms to alter initial decisions which
may have been tentative at the time they were first reported.
On the other end of the scale were companies, few in number
but making the largest capital expenditures, which gave competi-
tive conditions as the main reason for upward adjustment of their
plans. Although these reasons were given in only six instances, or 4
per cent of the total, the average capital outlay per establishment
involved about $2.5 million in 1950.
The group with the next largest capital outlay, although consid-
erably below the $2.5 million figure, offered new products and a
change in the production pattern as the main reasons. There were
eleven cases, or 7 per cent, in this category.
Among the twelve groups the sales outlook ranked only eighth
in importance, and capital expenditure intentions per company were
just below the average for all companies. This suggests that there
were not many opportunities manufacturing firms had overloOked
six months earlier that suddenly seemed important enough to in-
duce them to go ahead and expand their plant facilities in a hurry.
In a way this reflects the economic conditions at the time the sample
survey was undertaken, which have been described as reflecting
moderate business optimism.98
Another notable feature is that although costs were rising only
98Ayear later, by mid-1951, the situation was quite different, with changes
in the sales outlook given as a leading reason (see table 18).
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slowly in the first half of 1950, in thirteen cases, or 8 per cent, costs
were mentioned as a factor in the upward revisions in capital ex-
penditures.
Two other groups were relatively important in terms of the num-
ber of cases involved, although not in terms of the amount of capital
expenditures:' routine 'underestimate, twenty-four cases or 14 per
cent, and inadequacy of storage facilities, twenty-one cases or 18
per cent.
The remaining reasons were less frequently mentioned: firmer
estimates, 7 per cent; technology, 6 per cent; carryover from pre-
vious year, 4 per cent; and plant, and equipment supply situation
and miscellaneous, each 2 per cent. In terms of the amount of cap-
ital expenditures involved, the two leading reasons were plant and
equipment supply situation and new products.
A similar survey undertaken in the United States covering the
situation in 1949 lists as six principal forces motivating upward
revisions in capital expenditure plans by business (in order of im-
portance): plant and equipment supply situation; routine under-
estimates; miscellaneous influences, including the initiation of sub-
stantial new projects; plant and equipment costs; sales outlook;, and
competitive These reasons were mentioned by 77 per
cent of the firms reporting. In Canada the six most frequent replies
given included (again in order of importance): projects added,
routine underestimates, inadequacy of storage facilities, plant and
equipment costs, new products, and changes in technology. These
reasons were responsible for 76 per cent of all the replies received.
In both countries four of the reasons were substantially the same.
There was greater emphasis on technology and storage facilities in
Canada, while supply factors and competition. were more frequently
mentioned in the United States.10°
In a period of comparative economic stability such as prevailed
in mid-1950, the reasons given for downward revisions of invest-
ment plans were considerably fewer than those given for upward
revisions. Of the sixty-nine replies received 35 per cent mentioned
projects canceled or deferred. These cases cover, in the main, two
types: plans by small or medium-sized firms with limited financial
backing in industries with uncertain market prospects; and those
by large firms which in their continuing review of capital expendi-
Friend and Bronfenbrenner, op.cit., p. 19.
100Inpart these variations are explained by different economic conditions
in the two countries when the respective surveys were undertaken.
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ture programs attached greater priorities to certain projects and
regions, thus canceling some undertakings and substituting others.
Other significant reasons for downward adjustments of investment
plans were the sales outlook, 17 per cent; miscellaneous, 16 per cent;
plant and equipment costs, 9 per cent; and plant and equipment
supply situation, 7 per cent. These five groups were responsible for
84 per cent of the total (see table 17). The corresponding five lead-
ing reasons given in the United States accounted for 75 per cent of
the total and included the following (in order of importance): sales
outlook; net earnings; plant and equipment supply situation; mis-
cellaneous, including the cancellation of new projects; and working
capital requirements.10'
In the United States greater emphasis was placed specifically on
the sales outlook than in Canada, 84 as against 17 per cent. Again,
the fact that the surveys were taken at different times would have a
bearing on the results. Support for these conclusions is obtained
from Canadian data on intercountry comparisons; they reveal that
the reasons for changes in investment plans are governed largely by
a revision in the appraisal by the business community of the eco-
nomic situation and prospects for the future. This is illustrated by
table 18, which compares, the frequency distribution of explanatory
factors for upward and downward revisions of investment plans in
mid-1950 and mid-1951102 (see also chart 11).
7. RESPONSE ANDSTATISTICALFACrORS
Two sets of factors which bear on the reasons why realization
may differ from investment intentions as reported by business have
so far been examined. These are conditions arising out of the pres-
ent state of the economy and the economic outlook, and differences
affecting the operations or prospects of individual firms. But in ad-
dition to these macro-economic and micro-economic influences there
is a third set that may be described as covering response and sta-
tistical factors. Only the response factor contributes to the differ-
ences between businessmen's stated intentions and their realization.
The statistical factor is associated with the making of estimates of
both intentions and realization. While it contributes to variations
between total estimates of intentions and realization, the resulting
101 ibid.,P 19.
102 For a summary of possible reasons for deviation of investment intentions
from realization in the United States in 1951, see Lawrence Bridge, "Business
Investment and Sales Expectations in 1951," Survey of Current Business (U.S.
Department of Commerce), April 1951, pp. 12 and 13.
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TABLE 18
Percentage Frequency Distribution of Explanatory Factors for Upward and Downward












1.Sales outlook 5.4 17.4 8.9 18.5 6.7 14.7
2.Plant and equipment supply
situation 1.8 7.2 8.4 3.8 13.3 6.8
3.Plant and equipment costs 7.8 8.7 8.0 20.8 3.8 15.3
4.Competitive conditions 3.6 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0




















Inadequacy of storage facilities





















11.Firmer estimate 6.6 2.9 5.5 3.1 1.7 2.6
12.Miscellaneousa 2.4 16.0 6.4 1.6 50.Ob 16.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Fordescription see p. 2Z0.
bTenper cent of the 50 per cent covers the reasons corresponding to those given in the
preceding upward-revisions column and referred to in footnote a. The remaining 40 per cent
includes other reasons, as follows: 16.7 per cent, availability of labor and materials; 13.3 per
cent, the effect of government fiscal policies; 6.7 per cent, availability and cost of debt financing;
and 3.3 per cent, timing.
Source: Canadian government data.
error is to be ascribed to the statistician and not to the
In general the response by Canadian businessmen to surveys of
capital expenditure intentions has been good. In quantitative terms
the coverage for most industries is high (see Appendix A). The
quality of the 'reporting has been improving over the seven-year
period in which surveys of capital expenditure intentions have been
conducted in Canada, partly because of the generally cooperative
attitude of the business community and partly because of the con-
tinuous endeavor to spread an understanding of how important
these surveys are for improving economic analysis and contributing
to knowledge of business prospects.
Some differences in the quality of investment-intention returns
continue, and these are conditioned by the type of response which
is obtained from firms participating in the surveys. If, for example,
a firm has two estimates, one representing the maximum amount it
would be in a position to spend on capital outlay within the fol-
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Chart 11. Percentage Frequency Distribution of Explanatory Factors for Up-
ward and Downward Revisions of Investment Plans by Manufacturing Firms,
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lowing year, and the other the amount it is likely to spend, inclusion
of the former figure in the questionnaire on capital expenditure in-
tentions would be less satisfactory than inclusion of the latter figure.
Then there is the questiOn of the time at which the questionnaire
is completed. If, for example, the manager of one plant records on
the form the amount of capital expenditures he hopes to make next
year, before the board of directors of a multiplant enterprise has
given its decision, three things may happen. The board may approve
the plans of the local manager; it may reduce the amounts involved;
or it may ask him to revise his recommendations, resulting perhaps
in increased outlay. Thus in the last two cases the returns completed
by the local plant manager would not be as realistic as if he had
filled in the return after the board's decision. In many cases reports
for all plants of a company are completed at the head office. This
tends to introduce greater consistency between 'branch and head
office reporting.
The quality of the return will also depend on how well informed
the officer completing the schedule is about, the company's opera-
tions and policies. If he is a vice-president, the general manager or
his assistant, or the controller, the answer is likely to reflect serious
company thinking. On the other hand, a junior officer in the account-
ing department, filling out the questionnaire, might not be aware
of all the ramifications of the firm's investment, financial, and or-
ganizational policies which would guide operations in the coming
year (see also table 14).
Other response factors include cases where the returns do not
reflect the best judgment of the respondent because he is in a hurry,
does not care, or in principle does not believe in filling out govern-
ment questionnaires, which he regards as "red tape." In such cases
he might still complete the forms in order not to be bothered by
follow-up correspondence and calls, but the returns would be of
doubtful value.
Besides response factors there are statistical factors contributing
to differences between business investment intentions and realiza-
tion. The latter arise out of the necessity of making estimates for
the following: sectors not canvassed; firms not covered in industries
surveyed; types of capital expenditures not obtainable through in-
vestment-intentions questionnaires; and errors 'resulting from the
statistical techniques employed, particularly for regional and in-
dustrial totals.
1. Sectors not covered. It has been found uneconomical so far to
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survey a small number of industries, including individual retail
stores, and residual groups in the finance and commercial service
sectors (see table A-i, Appendix A). Further, in agriculture and
fishing, capital expenditure estimates are easier to obtain from sales
anticipations by equipment suppliers and other reports from the
field than directly from farmers and fishermen. The capital outlay
of the first group, containing industries and residual enterprises,
is estimated at 9 per cent of total business investment in 1950, and
that of agriculture and fishing at 19 per cent. For all these sectors
independent estimates are made, based on various data, including
comments from the field.
2. Firms not covered. Within the industries covered by the survey
it has been found neither practical nor economical to survey all the
establishments. In most industries firms doing a business of less than
$100,000 a year are not canvassed. In other groups, notably in the
trade sector, where there is a large number of firms of somewhat
similar size a sampling technique has been used. Among the firms
which have been canvassed there is always a certain number which
do not reply, whose replies are received too late,boa or whose replies
are not usable because of inconsistencies between them and previous
returns'04 or because of other reasons. In addition there are fre-
quently a number of new firms which are not covered. Although
the Dominion Bureau of Statistics endeavors to keep its mailing list
of industrial establishments as nearly up to date as possible, some
companies being formed may not be covered through the survey
technique in the first year of their existence, particularly if they have
not as yet commenced continuing business operations even though
they are making capital expenditures.
The allowance for companies of the first two types is made on
the basis of their gross value of production (or a corresponding
measure of their annual business operations). In the case of manu-
facturing firms having an annual production of less than $100,000,
the estimated results are compared with the results of a test 3 per
cent sample survey, and if no significant divergencies are indicated
103Thecut-off date for year-end surveys is usually the middle of January
and for midyear surveys the middle of June. These dates must be adhered to
if the final releases are not to be unduly delayed. In the case of some large
firms whose returns are essential if industrial totals are not to be seriously
distorted and whose returns are delayed, the follow-up procedure may include
personal interviews, telephone calls, or telegrams to assure a speedy reply.
104Insuch cases, if there is time between the cut-off date and the time the
completed questionnaire is received, a follow-up letter is usually dispatched
asking for clarification or a revised return.
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the estimated data are used. A separate allowance is made for cap-
ital outlay of new finns not covered, based mainly on infonnation
about the changing rate of new-company formation.
3. Capital expenditures not covered. These involve, in the main,
capital items charged to operating expenses. A special allowance is
made for this item on an industry basis in preparing the final esti-
mates of investment intentions. The allowances are shown separately
in the tables covering investment intentions by industry.'05
These independent estimates are usually less satisfactory than the
results obtained from business by direct-survey techniques, because
they are based mainly on bits and pieces of information. However,
in Canada these estimates cover a comparatively small proportion
of business investment intentions: in 1951, 27 per cent of the esti-
mated new investment of all business sectors covered by direct-
survey method and 21 per cent of' all business sectors, including in
addition to the above group agriculture, fishing, and the three small
sectors mentioned earlier under 1. (For further details see Ap-
pendixA.)
•4. Statistical technique. In a country such as Canada, where pro-
vincial governments have a fairly wide sphere of responsibility and
where the industrial structure of the economy varies greatly from
province to province, it has been found desirable to present invest-
ment statistics in as much detail as possib.le, including both a pro-
vincial and a major-city breakdown. This involves, from a statistical
viewpoint, preparing investment estimates separately for each prov-
ince, then adding them together to arrive at a national total for
each industry. The procedure requires much lengthier computa-
tions than would be necessary if only national totals were required.
In addition provincial estimates are for a number of reasons subject
to a wider margin of error than are estimates prepared on a national
basis. (a) In provinces where industry is generally on a small scale
it has not been found practical to survey more than a small propor-
tion of the firms; thus in these provinces the survey coverage is
much smaller than in the more industrialized provinces. (b) It is
difficult to ensure that an approximately correct allowance has been
made for nonrespondents. In the smaller provinces, where single
firms in a locality or industry are of considerable importance, this
may lead to a substantial margin of errbr. (c) The most desirable
data available for making estimates for those sectors of industry not
105See,for example, Department of Trade and Commerce, Private and Public
Investment in Canada, Outlook 1951, pp. 15-17.
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surveyed directly are not always on a provincial basis, and it has
been necessary to base estimates on less satisfactory data. While the
procedure used does not provide the same degree of canceling out
of over- and underestimates on an industrial basis as would be the
case if only national totals were required, it does, throughprovid-
ing a greater knowledge of industry within individual provinces,
make possible better judgment in regard to the unsurveyed sectors
of the economy. Thus the national totals computed in this way may
not differ greatly from those that would be arrived at by computa-
tion on an industry basis only.'0°
8. COMPARISON OF CANADIAN AND UNITED STATES INVESTMENT-
INTENTION SURVEYS
In the course of the preceding appraisal references have been
made to a number of similarities and dissimilarities between Cana-
dian and United States investment-intentions surveys. In this section
the quantitative evidence is assembled and the conclusions are sum-
'marized.
A number of difficulties are encountered in any attempt to com-
pare the results of surveys of investment intentions and estimated
actual capital expenditures available in the United States with those
assembled in this report for Canada. Such difficulties include the
following: (a) In the comparison of planned and actual aggregate
investment for the United States, the estimates of actual investment
are based on somewhat larger samples than the estimates of planned
investment. In Canada the comparison is made for estimates based
on identical samples, and there is the further difference that the
actual expenditure figures used are preliminary estimates made to-
ward the end of the year to which the estimates apply. (b) The
different compositions of the investment programs mar somewhat
the comparability of the relative differences between intentions and
realization. For example, machinery and equipment purchases are
of greater importance in the United States than in a
factor in investment. United States reports of planned machinery
106 For reference to the error likely to arise from the use of sampling tech-
niques at midyear, and related information, see section 2.
Ofgross private domestic investment (excluding housing and inventory
change) as per the national accounts, machinery and equipment purchases
accounted for 72 per cent of the total in the United States in 1950 as against
58 per cent in Canada. United States data are from Department of Commerce,
Survey of Current Business, National Income Supplement, 1951; Canadian data
from Dominion Bureau of Statistics, National Accounts Income and Expenditure
1926-1950 (December 1951), p. 27.
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and equipment purchases are likely to be closer to realization than
Canadian estimates, for reasons elaborated later. Thus the different
compositions of investment in the two countries havea bearing on
the comparability of the results of investment-intentionssurveys.
(c) Canadian investment-intentionssurveys on an annual basis have
been in continuing operation since 1945, United Statessurveys on
a quarterly basis since 1947. Thus by 1947 Canadian surveys had
—20
Chart 12. Percentage Difference between Business Investment Realization and
Intentions, Canada and United States, 1945-1951
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overcome a number of initial technical difficulties which every new
survey runs into and which the United States faced in 1947.
Therefore, in assessing the results of United States and Canadian
investment-intentions surveys greater emphasis should be placedon
the reasons why the overall results differ, rather thanon minor sta-
tistical variations. Such an appraisal is more rewarding, since avail-
able data allow comparisons only in approximate terms, and inany
event the results were obtained through the use of somewhat vary-
ing techniques and are a reflection of the substantial differences in
the industrial structure and economic development of the two
Countries.
With these qualifications in mind, roughly comparable data for
the years 1947 to 1951 are summarized in table 19 (see also chart
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TABLE 19
Business Investment Intentions and Realization,










Yearand Industry (millionsof dollars)States Canada
1947Manufacturing 6,170 7,460 —17.3 —5.1
Mining 610 690 —11.6 —6.0
Railroads 1,000 910 +9.9+93.4
Other transportation a a —1.2
Electric and gas utilities 1,690 1,900 —11.1 —2.4
Commercial and miscellaneousb4,420 5,220 —15.3 —5.3
Total 13,89016,180 —14.2 +3.0
1948Manufacturing 7,760 8,340 —7.0 —1.8
Mining 690 800 —13.8 —2.5
Railroads 1,530 1,320+15.9 —17.0
Other transportation 780 700 + 11.4 0.0
Electric and gas utilities 2,300 2,680 —14.2 —9.0
Commercial and miscellaneousb5,560 5,400 +3.0 —1.2
Total 18,61019,230 -'-3.2 —4.0
1949Manufacturing 7,240 7,250 —0.1 +1.4
Mining 820 740 + 10.8 —2.4
Railroads 1,450 1,350 +7.4+21.5
Other transportation 650 520+25.0 0.0
Electric and gas utilities 3,130 3,140 —0.3 —12.7
Commercial and miscellaneousb5,010 5,120 —2.1 —4.7
Total 18,31018,120 +1.0 —1.5
1950Manufacturing 6,740 8,220 —18.0 —4.4
Mining 650 680 —4.6 +6.0
Railroads 930 1,140 —18.4+24.0
Other transportation 350 440 —20.5 —17.9
Electric and gas utilities 2,940 3,170 —7.3 —11.6
Commercial and misceVaneUusb4,480 4,920 —8.9 —8.6
Total 16,09018,560 —13.3 —4.9
1951Manufacturing 11,92012,830 —7.1 —15.5
Mining 890 870 +2.3 —6.8
Railroads 1,520 1,580 —3.8+19.2
Other transportation 620 520+19.2 —10.5
Electric and gas utilities 3,540 3,680 —3.8 —4.0
Commercial and miscellaneousb5,410 5,360 +0.9 —4.6
Total 23,90024,830d _7.ld
Included in the commercial and miscellaneous group.
bCoverstrade, service, communications, construction, and finance.
CEstimatesfor the first half of 1951 are based on actual expenditures re-
ported, and for the second half of 1951 are based on anticipated capital ex-
penditures of business as reported in late July and during August. Thus this
set of data comes close in timing to the results obtained from the Canadian mid-
1951 survey.
d Midyear survey.
Sources: United States data are from Survey of Current Business (U.S. De-
partment of Commerce), December 1950 and April 1951, and Securities and
Exchange Commission Statistical Series, Release No. 998, March 27, 1951, and
Release No. 1035, September 21, 1951. Canadian data are from table 6.
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come closer to realization than is the case for Canadian business
capital expenditure plans. In 1947 and 1950 the Canadian
show a smaller margin of difference.
As to 1947, the newness of the United States survey was a con-
tributing factor to the greater margin.108 In Canada the 1947 survey
was the third of its kind. In 1950, industrial expansion in the United
States was picking up before the Korean incident, but this process
was rapidly accelerated after the middle of the year. In Canada
the speed-up in industrial expansion followed that of the United
States and it became more notable in 1951, when Canadian invest-
ment intentions appeared to have underestimated actual capital
expenditures to a cdnsiderably greater• extent than corresponding
United States intentions.
In 1948 and 1949, United States surveys are somewhat closer to
the mark than Canadian surveys, but the differences are small. The
closeness of the results for these two years must be gratifying to
those concerned with conducting the surveys in both countries. But
perhaps the most notable feature of the surveys in these two years
is that in the United States they reflected correctly a turning point
in economic conditions in that country, even though the annual de-
cline in business capital expenditures was small. Investment inten-
tions for 1949 suggested capital outlay of 5 per cent below 1948,
which in actual fact turned out to be 6 per cent below. In Canada,
where recessionary influences prevailing in the United States were
felt, but where forces of long-term expansion were strong enough to
offset' declines in some sectors, the investment-intentions survey as
a whole did not have to stand the test its American counterpart
faced successfully. Nevertheless, data on investment intentions of
some industries supported the experience in the United States (see
section 3).
In 1950, in both Canada and the United States, the margin be-
tween expectation and execution is greater than in the preceding
two years. Events following the aggression in Korea have been given
as one of the major factors in the changing investment situation.
Another was the continuation of expansion which had been inter-
rupted by recessionary influences dominating American economic
thinking for about a year, beginning in the fall of 1948. The latter
108Therewere also other reasons: "In 1947, this result may be explainable in
part by the newness of the survey and in part by an unanticipated easing of
supplies and elimination of restrictions on nonresidential construction." Friend
and Bronfenbrenner, op.cit., p. 12.
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factor was probably the more important in causing differences be-
tween investment intentions and realization in the United States to
be greater than in Canada, because in Canada capital expenditures
had not experienced a drop in 1949 and expansion continued at a
more even rate. Another explanation might be that the United States
government, once a decision had been taken to speed up armaments
considerably, could proceed reasonably quickly to place initial
orders and get the required production facilities into operation. In
Canada, where the defense production potential considerably ex-
ceeds national requirements, negotiations with thç United States,
the United Kingdom, and other NATO countries were required
before an industrial mobilization that fitted into an international
framework could go into operation. Thus industrial mobilization in
Canada would of necessity lag behind that of the United States if
both countries proceeded from the same starting point.109
A consideration of different industries reveals that Canadian man-
ufacturing firms appear to have estimated more closely their actual
capital expenditures in three out of five years, with United States
manufacturing enterprises scoring better in two years, 1949 and
1951 (see table 19). One of the reasons for the greater volatility of
capital expenditure plans of American manufacturing firms would
be that country's world leadership in technology. The implementa-
tion of new discoveries, processes, and techniques requires a con-
tinuous review of capital expenditure programs, at times in the
aggregate, at times in terms of the priority attached to specific pro-
grams. Canadian manufacturing firms have benefited greatly from
research and experimentation conducted in the United States, and
they follow United States firms closely in the adoption of new pro-
duction techniques. This time lag enables Canadian firms to esti-
mate their costs a bit more closely, for they can draw on American
experience. Interchange of industrial information, is further facili-
tated by the fact that in Canada a large number of manufacturing
companies, particularly those of an engineering type, are American
branch plants or are controlled by American interests.
The experience of United States surveys of capital expenditure
intentions as reported by the railroads seems to be similar to that
obtained in Canada. In four of the five years the differences be-
tween investment intentions by United States railroads are rather
Thesituation was different in World War xx, when Canada was engaged
in military operations from the outset, while the United States became involved
at a later date.
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large, the only exception being 1951. For Canada significant differ-
ences are indicated for all five years.
In mining—where expansion in Canada is proceeding at about
twice the rate obtaining in the United States, in relation to total
industrial surveys of capital expenditure
intentions seem to have brought somewhat closer results from 1947
to 1949 than those of the United States, with the situation reversed
in 1950 and 1951. The record of other industries varies greatly from
year to year (see table 19 and chart 13).
and
mLscellaneous
Chart 18. Percentage Difference between Business Investment
Intentions, by Industry, Canada and United States, 1950
There seems to be some evidence that in the United States antici-
pated capital outlays reflect to a considerable extent a planned physi-
cal volume of investment valued at prevailing prices. "On a quar-
terly basis, businessmen fairlyconsistently overestimated their
In1950 capital expenditures in mining comprised 7.7 per cent of total
industrial investment in Canada and 8.6 per cent in the United States. Industrial
investment is here defined as the sum total of capital outlay by the industries
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outlays during the few periods in which prices declined and gen-
erally underestimated their outlays in other periods. Itis quite
possible, therefore, that anticipated outlays to a considerable extent
reflect a planned physical volume of investment valued at prevailing
prices, and hence do not sufficiently take account of price factors."hhl
In order that we may examine this thesis further, projected capital
expenditures have been adjusted for price changes,112 assuming that
business firms reporting capital expenditures were basing their esti-
mates for the next year on prices prevailing at the end of the current
year. Table 20 therefore assembles data on the percentage differences
TABLE 20
Percentage Differences between Business Investment Realization and




1947 —1.4 —12.9 —9.6
1948 —2.0 —0.8 —1.2
1949 +4.7 —3.3 —1.1
1950 —16.7 —5.1 —8.3
a ComparableCanadian data are shown in table 4.
b Current prices are taken as the average price prevailing during the last three
months preceding the year to which intentions apply.
Source: See sources cited for table 19 and footnote 112.
between business investment intentions, adjusted for price changes
between the last quarter of the.year and the average for the subse-
quent year, and realization of investment. These percentages cor-
respond to those indicated for Canada in table 4.
In three years the percentage differences of the adjusted data were
smaller than those of the unadjusted data. In 1949 the difference of
the adjusted data was about minus 1 per cent, compared with plus 1
per cent for the unadjusted. In Canada the differences between ad-•
111 Friend and Bronfenbrenner, op.cit.,p. 13.
112 Adjustment for price changes on an annual basis was made by using the
implicit price deflators for new construction and for producers' durable equip-
ment appearing in U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business,
National Income Supplement, 1951. Adjustments on a quarterly basis were
made by using the quarterly price trend shown for construction in the com-
posite construction cost index of the Department of Commerce adjusted for a
difference in the annual index. In the .case of. machinery and equipment the
quarterly cost index was established by combining hourly earnings in the
primary metals industries with the wholesale price index of metals and metal
products and again adjusting for differences in the annual index.
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justed and unadjusted figures were greater in the first two years and
smaller in the last two years. The explanation offered earlier was that
the Canadian allowance for price increases appears to be made in
periods of significant price rises, with little or no allowance being
made in times of comparatively minor price movements. In the United
States the feeling seems to be—and in some measure the data appear
to support this—that American industry, in the past at least, has been
thinking more in terms of physical expansion and has therefore ex-
pressed its investment intentions more frequently in terms of current
than in terms of future prices. This is a'phase that would bear further
investigation.
The points which the United States and Canadian surveys of busi-
ness investment intentions seem to have in common can be sum-
marized as follows:
1. After a period of experimentation the quality of surveys of capi-
tal expenditure intentions has improved in both Canada and the
United States.
2. The American surveys have stood the test of a downturn of busi-
ness investment as a whole, the Canadian survey the test of a down-
turn in a major sector, manufacturing.
3. Business in the United States has on the whole been making
insufficient allowance for price increases of capital goods in estimat-
ing prospective investment outlay. This experience is shared by the
Canadian survey, particularly in recent years.
4. In some industries in which there are similarities in capital
expenditure planning, differences between intentions and realization
may also be of a similar order,. as, for example, in the case of rail-
roads.
5.Inboth countries large companies appeared to be in a better
position than medium-sized and small companies to estimate their
capital expenditures in advance. Wide differences between invest-
ment intentions and realization are most likely when small amounts
of capital outlay are involved, but such differences affect aggregate
data only in a minor way, with overstatements largely offset by un-
derstatements.
6. In examining the reasons why individual companies may alter
investment plans, surveys in both countries indicate that these rea-
Sons will vary as economic conditions and prospects change. While
in one year the sales outlook may be the principal factor, in another
the plant and equipment supply situation and costs may be of major
importance. There are not at present in either country sufficient
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observations to establish all the reasons which would explain differ-
ences between investment intentions and realization over the various
phases of the business cycle.
Major differences between United States and Canadian surveys
include the following:
1. The percentage variations between business investment inten-
tions and realization in the United States are smaller than corre-
sponding Canadian variations in some years, with the situation be-
ing reversed in other years. Among the reasons in part explaining
these differences might be the preponderance of large firms in the
United States. Both American and Canadian experience shows that
large firms are better equipped than small firms to anticipate capital
expenditures. Other reasons might include the fact that United
States reaction to investment opportunities will in many cases be
much quicker than that of Canadian business. Thus a hulking of
new projects in one year in the United States may possibly be ex-
perienced in Canada in a subsequent year. Still other reasons might
be the greater volatility in formulating investment decisions in the
United States, and the fact that greater reliance is placed in the
United States than in Canada on sampling techniques in undertaking
investment-intentions surveys.
2. In Canada estimates of projected construction expenditures
seem to have been more accurate than estimates of machinery and
equipment purchases. The shortness of the construction season in
Canada necessitates planning well in advance if an early start is to
be made. In the United States advance planning is not so urgent,
and construction plans may not be so firm at the time the intentions
are stated, with the result that major cancellations or additions at
a later date are more In the case of machinery and equip-
ment the intentions of Canadian businessmen may be less accurate
because of their substantial reliance on foreign sources; and the as-
sessment of the supply and price situations of the latter is a more
difficult task than the appraisal of the domestic situation.
3. Projected capital outlay as reported by business in the United
States is said to reflect largely volume estimates, expressed in cur-
rent prices. In Canada the tentative conclusion is that investment
intentions in periods of rapidly rising prices are expressed in terms
113While,on the whole, purchase intentions of machinery and equipment
come closer to realization in the United States than construction intentions, the
situation differs depending on the size of the construction project involved. See
the paper by Irwin Friend and Jean Bronfenbrenner in this volume.
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of future prices—although at times the allowance for price rises
may not fully reflect the rise that actually takes place. In times of
moderate price movement Canadian practice is more akin to United
States practice.
4. As in the aggregate, so in some of the major industries Canadian
investment-intentions surveys have come closer to actual realization
in some years, with United States surveys being closer in other years.
In the field of manufacturing the reasons for some of the variations
between the two countries might include the greater degree of
perimentation and research carried on in the United States and the
adoption of innovations in that country frequently as rapidly as these
become available and economically feasible. In Canada, with some
exceptions, manufacturing industries follow the American lead in
technology. Thus Canadian manufacturing industries can frequently
draw on United States experience in appraising the cost of new
projects and in a number of cases make use of American engineering
assistance.
5. The Canadian investment-intentions surveys are conducted on
an establishment basis; the American data are obtained on a com-
pany basis. The United States method has the advantage of making
it possible to relate profit, asset, and other corporate financial sta-
tistics to capital expenditure data. The Canadian method has the
advantage of allowing regional and local capital expenditure esti-
mates to be made and of relating plant expansion to the area where
it takes place rather than to the head office of the company. This
point is of particular importance in Canada, where head offices of
companies are largely concentrated in two major centers, Montreal
and Toronto. Further, the Canadian technique facilitates an im-
proved industrial classification, since in the case of companies con-
ducting a variety of businesses it becomes possible to classify capital
expenditures on the basis of the purpose of the plant rather than the
predominating business of the controlling company.
9. INvEsTMENT INTENTIONS AND BEALrZATION OF ROME-BUILDERS,
INSTITUTIONS, AND GOVERNMENTS
In most countries surveys of investment intentions are concerned
with the business sector. In Canada three other sectors are also
covered; home-builders, institutions, and governments. In this sec-
tion the results of the latter types of survey are briefly reviewed.
Between 1945 and 1947 the capital expenditure intentions of only
the nongovernrnent sector were surveyed. However, inthe docu-
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ments published, estimates of residential investment and of capital
expenditures by institutions were included, 'based mainly on data
and information obtained from the. field and an appraisal of the
supply situation. The improvement in the supply situation and the
large differences between the independent estimate of "intentions"
and realization as shown in table 21 led to the undertaking of direct
surveys of institutional and government investment in 1948 and of
housing in 1949.114
TABLE 21
Investment Intentions and Realization by Home-Builders, Institutions,
and Government Departments, Canada, 1947-1951
. PercentageDifference




Year and Sector dollars) (millions of dollars) Estimate Estimate
1947Housing
'447 504 540 —23.5 —28.9
Institutions J 80 89 f
Government departments 295 291 C C
Total C 879 920 C C
1948Housing 599 682 668 —12.2 —10.3
Institutions 145 128'. 145 +13.3 0.0
Government departments 318 389 393 —18.3 —19.1
Total 1,062 1,199 1,206 —11.4 —11.9
1949Housing 741 784 776 —5.5 —4.5
Institutions 200 184 190 +8.7 +5.3
'Governmentdepartments 409 420 406 .—2.6 +0.7
Total 1,350 1,388 1,372 —2.7 —1.6
1950Housing . . 785 813 845 —3.4 —7.1
Institutions 232 210 212 +10.5 +9.4
Government departments509 475 473 +7.2 +7.6
Total 1,526 1,498 1,530 +1.9 —0.3
1951Housing ' 827 827d
. 0.0 0.0
Institutions 270 267d 267d +1.1 +1.1
Government departments 598 812d 612d —2.8 —2.6
Total ' 1,693 1,706d 1,706"




Too great significance should not be attached to this small percentage. variation, because
.nformalion on the likely realization in the above three sectors is usually very incomplete at
Source: Canadian government data.
114 Fora description of techniques see seôtion B 9.
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Estimates of investment intentions by home-builders, institutions,
and governments for 1948 differed by a comparatively .wide margin
from preliminary estimates of actual capital expenditures. Since 1949
this margin has narrowed considerably. In 1949 and 1950 the differ-
ences between realization and intentions were of the order of 3 and
2 per cent respectively (see chart 14). The data for 1951are too
tentative to allow a judgment at this time.
Percent
+40
Chart 14. Percentage Difference between Investment
tentions, Business and Nonbusiness, Canada, 1945-1951
Realizationand In-
Substantial offsets occurred within some of the sectors. For
ample, a decline in the number of expected housing completions in
1950 was offset by an unanticipated increase in the number of starts
and by rising costs, which at the beginning of the year had been
expected to remain fairly stable. The housing pattern of 1950 was
also influenced by changes in housing legislation.h15
Thedata on preliminary estimates of residential investment for 1949 and
prospective expenditures for 1950 are about the same (see table 21). But the
surveys of anticipated outlay for 1950 indicated a moderate decline in the
number of new starts and a small increase in the number of completions. As a









*Covers home-builders, institutions, and governments
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In the government sector some of the differences encountered in
making estimates of capital expenditures for the year following are
due to the timing of the survey. Returns for the year-end survey are
required not later than early in January, frequently before federal
and provincial legislatures or city councils have voted the necessary
funds. The information obtained on prospective capital outlay by
government departments therefore reflects in the main the best judg-
ment of the responsible departmental head, or officer delegated by
him, of what the particular department is likely to spend in the
coming year. The appraisal is based on the expectation that the
funds will be voted by the respective legislatures or approved by
the responsible governing authority. Capital expenditures by pub-
licly owned Crown companies, utilities, and other government agen-
cies operating on a business basis are covered by business invest-
ment-intentions surveys, and those by publicly owned institutions
(hospitals, schools, and so forth), by institutional surveys, so that
information shown under government covers,a residual, mainly capi-
tal expenditures by government departments operating under a vote
system.
On the whole, one of the major reasons for the discrepancies be-
tween investment intentions and realization among the three sectors
reviewed here has been the consistent underestimate for price in-
creases that have taken place in the last few years.
10. INVESTMENT INTENTIONS AND REALIZATION OF ALL PRIVATE AND
PUBLICSECTORS
What have been the results of annual business investment-inten-
tions and similar surveys of capital expenditures in anticipating the
total investment that is made in Canada by all sectors of the econ-
omy, including private individuals and firms and public agencies?
Since the differences between investment intentions and preliminary
estimates of realization have been somewhat smaller in the home-
building, institutional, and government sectors in the last few years,
this has had the effect of reducing even 'further the margin indicated
for the business sector, as shown in table 22 (see 'also chart 15).
substantial lowering of down-payment requirements, starts rose to a larger
number than had been expected for 1950, while completions did not reach as
high a level as would have been possible if the house-building industry had
been working at full capacity. Also, a balanced supply and demand situation at
the beginning of 1950 suggested comparative price stability. But prices rose
notably in the second half of the year, subsequent to developments in Korea.
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Chart 15. Total •Private and Public
Canada, 1948-1951
and Realization,
The year 1948 is an exception because in that year investment by
the nonbusiness sector was substantially underestimated.
If one were to generalize about the experience of Canadian capi-
tal expenditure surveys of all types one might say that after a period
of experimentation which lasted three or four years the survey tech-
TABLE 22
InvestmentIntentions and Realization, Total Private and Public,

















1948 2,798 2,985 8,175 —6.4 —12.0 —3.1
1949 8,253 8,848 3,502 —2.8 —7.1 —2.9
1950 8,552 8,710 3,823 —4.3 —7.1 —8.4
1951 4,328 .4,561b 4,561b —5.1 —5.1 —7.7
S Full-coveragebasis.
bMidyearsurvey.
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niques have been sufficiently developed to be able, under foresee-
able circumstances, to come within 5 to 10 per cent of the amount
of actual capital expenditures by all sectors of the economy. The
emphasis is on the word "foreseeable," because there are major eco-
nomic, political, and natural events that should be classed as
foreseeable." Such events might include serious deterioration of in-
ternational political or economic relations without military conflict,
for example, a trade war; local wars which lead to general rearma-
ment, for example, events following the aggression in Korea; the
outbreak of a major war; natural emergencies, for example, floods,
drought, and earthquakes; political upheaval, for example, internal
strife and nonconstitutional change of government; and financial
disasters such as the closing of banks. The time has been too short
to establish whether surveys will stand the test of a major depression
such as followed 1929. There is some indication that the surveys will
be able to indicate a decline in capital expenditures that is in part
engendered by and in part augments recessionary influences de-
veloping in the economy or transmitted from abroad.
Appendix A
Coverage of Investment-Intentions Surveys
Table A-i summarizes the coverage of business finns and other
groups which has been achieved in the surveys of investment in-
tentions in Canada since 1945. The sectors listed indicate the de-
tails of the industrial classffication contained currenfly in the in-
vestment White Papers. The percentage figures represent the ratio
of capital expenditures planned, as reported by firms and other
respondents) to total investment intentions. Dots indicate that the
sector was not covered by means of a direct canvass in that year.
It will be noted that in a number of cases dots are shown for earlier
years and percentage figures for later years, indicating that surveys
of these sectors have been undertaken after the inception of the
forecasts. In only four cases are the dots continuous, denoting that
no direct surveys have been undertaken in these fields. In manu-
facturing, the Standard Industrial Classification, using seventeen in-
dustrial groups, has been employed since 1949. In earlier years an
industrial classification composed of nine groups was used. Be-
tween 1945 and 1947, manufacturing industries were surveyed on a
similar classification basis, but coverage figures are available only
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TABLE A-i
Coverage of Investment-Intentions Surveys,a Canada,
1945 1947 1948 1949 1950 195i
Agriculture and fishing
Forestry .... 26.0 64.0 60.3 57.7
Mining, quarrying, and oil wells 100.0 97.0 80.6 67.2 71.4
Manufacturing
Food and beverages 88.9 74.1 69.(
Tobacco and tobacco products 83.9 98.4 95.6 93.(
Rubber products
S 74.0 88.5
Leather products 87.4 75.5 79.(
Textiles and textile products 93.5 85.7 89.f
Clothing 84.9 77.5 68.1
Wood products
'I 66.3 68.6
Paper products 96.8 94.6 74.8 89.(
Printing, publishing, and
I
alliedindustries J 79.0 72.9
Iron and steel products 85 1
88.7 85.5 84.(
Transportation equipment 98.9 86.2
Nonferrous metal products 1 851 90.6 65.1
Electrical apparatus and suppliesJ 92.2 87.9
Nonmetallic mineral products 1 838
75.4 63.8
Products of petroleum and coal 95.6 96.7
Chemical products 66.4 88.6 80.7 84i
Miscellaneous 44.9 80.8 83.3
Total manufacturing 61.4C 79•3c 81.1 81.9 77.6 76A
Utilities
Central electric stations 97.0 80.0 87.5 86.3 79.3
Steam railways and telegraphs .... 100.0 97.9 100.0 97.9 100.(
Electric railways .... 90.0 94.3 82.0 98.1
Water transport ... 87.0 95.5 85.9 68.6
Motor carriers .... 81.0 47.8 59.3 51.2 58.'
Grain elevators ... 89.3 84.0 80.(
Telephones 99.5 98.0 86.4 95.7 95.0
Broadcasting .... 98.0 74.6 84.1 77.4
Municipal waterworks
Other utilities .... 91.8 70.3 89.4 84.1
Total utilities 29.8 92.4C 88.2C 91.3 87.9
Construction industry ... 34.0 33.6 39.9 33.5
Housing .... 63.0 65.0 77.'
Trade
Wholesale (proper) .... 48.0 18.1 51.4 43.0 37.
Chain stores .... 77.0 75.7 77.8 70.9 75.
Independent stores
Department stores .... 80.0 85.5 86.3 45.8 55.
Automotive trade ,... .... ... 57.2 67.2 88.
Total trade .... 21.6C
.33.2 83.2 27.
Finance
Banks .... 95.0 94.8 .100.0 100.0 100.
Insurance, trust, and loan companies .... 75.2 80.5 91.4 99.
Other financial
Total finance .... 41.7C 41.8 35.1 47.6 56.
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TABLE A-i(continued)
Sector 1945 1947 1943 1949 1950 1951
Commercial services
Laundries and dry cleaners .... 46.0 63.6 49.5 61.5 41.2
Theaters .... 64.0 78.6 81.0 60.8 64.7
Hotels .... .... 24.3 20.5 22.2 31.7
Other commercial services .... .... .... ..., .. .
Total commercial services .... 8.0c 11.0 13.6 13.0 11.8
Institutional services •
Churches .... .... 44.2 78.0 54.2 77,1
Universities .... .... 75.2 75.4 89.2 87.0
Schools .... .... 81.5 61.1 75.2 93.3
Hospitals .... .... 68.8 65.6 62.1 62.1
Total institutional services .... .,.. 71.2 67.2 67.8 80.0
Government departments .... .... 79.4 85.5 86.6 88.7
Coverage for business investment

























Croups covered by direct surveyd 72.6 83.5 .77.4 73.4 76.0 81.1
All groupse
Groups covered by direct survey as
23.3 41.4 51.7 60.9 64.5 70.1
percentage of all 32.1 49.9 64.8 83.0 85.0 86.5
a Coverageis calculated by expressing investment intentions of reporting firms as a percentage
of total estimated anticipated capital expenditures. This is the case in all years except 1947,
when gross value of production (or its equivalent) was used for individual groups.
bAttemptshave been made to obtain coverage data that are as consistent as possible over the
period. Some difficulties still remain. In 1947 and 1948 particularly, the figures shown are
likely to be higher than would be the case if the investment estimates had been made by the
methods used in more recent years. This is the result of several factors, principally the addition
of estimates in recent years for new firms and the improvement of sampling techniques in some
sectors by stratifying by size groups. These added smaller firms and deleted some medium-sized
firms.
Figures shown differ from those published in the annual reports since investment totals
have been increased to allow for new groups for which no estimates were made in this year.
This facilitates year to year comparisons. -
dThis states reported intentions as a percentage of total estimated intentions of all groups
covered by direct survey.
eThisstates reported intentions as a percentage of total estimated intentions of groups
covered by direct survey and groups •not covered by direct survey.
t This states total estimated intentions of groups covered by direct surveys as a percentage of
total estimated intentions of groups covered by direct surveys and groups not covered by direct
surveys. The total investment figures used in calculating these percentages include the totals
published in the annual reports and estimates made for groups which were omitted prior to
1949. Comparable data for 1946 are not available in detail. Comparable figures for "groups
covered by direct survey as percentage of all groups" would be 66.8 per cent for business in-
vestment and 44.7 per cent for all private and public investment.
Source:Canadiangovernment data.
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for the group as a whole. In housing, special surveys are undertaken
in cities and towns with populations of 5,000 or over, where usually
about three-quarters of total residential construction work is carried
out (see section B 9).
In the business sector the coverage is largest in utilities, 94 per
cent. They are followed by manufacturing, 77 per cent; mining,
quarrying, and oil wells, 70 per cent; finance, 57 per cent;' and
forestry, 40 per cent. The coverage is smallest for enterprises that
involve a large number of establishments making comparatively
small capital expenditures: trade, 27 per cent; construction, 25 per
cent; and commercial services, 12 per cent.
In the nonbusiness sector the coverage is greatest for government
departments, 89 per cent. They are followed by institutions, 80 per
cent, and housing, 77 per cent.
For the business sector as. a whole•there are three ways to express
the coverage. In table A-i the first figure, which refers to the groups
covered by direct survey, is 81 per cent. This figure reflects reported
intentions as a percentage of total estimated intentions of all groups
covered by direct survey. The second figure, which refers to all
groups, is 64 per cent. This figure reflects reported intentions as a
percentage of total estimated intentions of groups covered by direct
survey and groups not covered by direct survey. The third figure,
79 per cent, relates to groups covered by direct survey as a per-
centage of all groups. This figure reflects total estimated intentions
of groups covered by direct survey as a percentage of total estimated
intentions of groups covered by direct survey and groups not cov-
ered by direct survey. Corresponding figures for the private and
public investment sectors taken together, that is, business, institu-
tions, housing, and governments, are 81, 70, and 87 per cent re-
spectively.
Over the seven-year period, response from firms and other groups
has been continuously high. This is indicated by the. fact that the
response of all groups covered by the direct-survey technique varied
between 73 and 84 per cent and is currently over 80 per cent in
terms of the amount of capital expenditures planned.
The increasing reliance that has been placed in Canada on direct
surveys of investment intentions is indicated bythe fact that in 1945,
the first year of the survey, only 32 per cent of estimated total antici-
pated capital expenditures were accounted for by groups covered by
direct surveys. This proportion is now up to 87 per cent. The 87 per
cent figure indicates also the extent of the more reliable estimates
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based on reports from firms, individuals, institutions, and govern-
ment agencies closely associated with the making of capital ex-
penditures. The remaining 13 per cent, as indicated earlier, is based
on more indirect sources of information and is therefore likely to be
less close than estimates obtained by the direct-survey technique.
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AppendixB
Questionnaires Used in Canadian Investment-Intentions Surveys
SURVEY FORM
FORIMMEDIATE ATTENTION
Confidential Keep One Copy
Dominion BureauofStatistics
Ottawa —Canada
REVISED FORECAST OP REPAIR
CAPITALEXPENDITURES, 1951
(SecondEstimate —asofMay, 1951)
Somemonths you kindly supplieduswith a forecast of anticipated repair and Capital
oxpentiturea in connection with theabove—named establishmentfor the year 1951.Since then your p1
nay have changed, and in order to maintain an up—to—date record of the investment plans of
aacoondestimate or these expenditures.Exact data are notrequired.A review
thefigures whichyou gave us earlier anda re—Statement in the light of present conditions which wou eitherconfirm or revise your first estimates, is all that is neceBsary. It there has been any majo:
revision in yourplansfor investment in NEW CAPITAL ASSETS, you are asked to outline the reasons for
auoh ohangea.
Thi. questionnaire is being sent to only a samplogroup of busin088 establishments.The
individualreports will be kept confidential andusedonly for the purpose of arriving at group totali
Please prepare in duplicate, keep one copy for your files and return one copy immediately
the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Ottawa, using the enclosed onvolope, which is poStage free.
The definition. of the expenditures listed below are the gameasthose given on the green
1951"Schedule,a copy of which we assume you have on file.
Fe r
Departme
I. REVISED ESTIMATE OF REPAIR EXPENDITURES, 1951 (whole year) (Omit Cents) Use
(a) Repair expenditures on buildings and other structures ... .
....
2.REVISED ESTIMATE 07CAPITAL EXPENDITURES,1951(whole year)X
(a) Capital expendttures on new buildings and other structurea........., $.............
(b)Capitalexpenditureeonnewmachineryandequipment
TOTALof 1(e), 1(b), 2(a) and $
*NOTESIfthere is any change from your previous estimate with respect to either of the CAPITA
EXPENDITURES items, 2(a) and 2(b) above, please indicate in the "RemarkS" section below,
the principal reasons for such changes.
Remarks on changes in anticipated CAPITAL EXPENDITURES on
2(s) Now buildings and other structures
..... . .. . . .. ... . . .. . . .. . . •...... .. ..... .. . .. ... . . .... .. . . ... ... . . .. . .. . . S. S •• • • • • • •••
• . • . . S • • • S S• • S • • S S •• • SS •• • • S • • • • • S • • • • S SS • • • • S S S S • • S S S S S S S S S
2(b)New machinery and equipment
... . S I S S ._• • •• • . S SI •5*S • • . 55 • I •5 •• SI •• • S S I • • •I IS S I S • S I I SI S S I S S S S • • S I • • • S S• S 55 5 • S • •




Date of this report •0
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Repairand Capital Expenditures,
Preliminary Estimate for 1950 and Forecast for 1951,
Canadian Industry
(DominionBureau of Statistics)
Takeninconformity with the requiremente of the Statistics Act. Chap. 45. of Canada. 1948.
prepare in duplicate.Keep one copy for your files and return one copy immediately in the enclosed envelope
ie Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Ottawa.If no. such expenditures have been made in 1050, and if none are planned for 1951, submit a "nil"
rt to enable us to close your file for this survey.Individual reports will be treated as confidential and used only for the purpose of arriving at
p totals.
If you operate morethanone establishment, a separate report is to be made for each establishment.This statement should include your
nditures made not only on the main operations of the establishment, but also on townsitea, warehouses, employees' facilities, such as housing,
eens, company 8tores, schools and all other facilities forming a part of the establishment.
If you operate or plan to operate a plant for the production or distribution of electric power for your own use, the expenditures on itshould be
ided here.If, however, you sell or plan to sell power, a separate report should be made for the power plant.
icipal trade or business
t of business covered by this report
ne under which business is carried on (please print)
ofilce address
(Give street and number in cities and large towns)
ocation of works for Wirect end numbor)
ch this report is made.
(City. Town or Poet Office) (County) (Province)
tress to which we should mail these forms
Repair Expenditures— Forecast of
rt gross repair expenditures, including all material and labour costs.Include expenditures expenditures
value of work done by your own employees, as well as payments to persons made in 1950
de your business.Do not include under Section Cl) replacements of capital (whole year)
Cifl
s;these should be shown us Section (2).
(a) Repair expenditures on buildings and other structures .... $
(b) Repair expenditures on machinery and equipment $ $
Capital Expenditures—
rt gross expenditures on new physical assets or facilities of a capital nature
in the operation of your business, including additions, replacements, major
itions and all items of this nature, with the exception of jreviously existing
ing8 and other structures, and used machinery and equipment.Include
al expenditures met out of receipts from insurance claims for fire and other
ge.Take into account th'e value of work done by your own employees and
lie cost of installation.Do not deduct any allowance for scrap or trade-in
of your old assets.Mining companies should include preliminary develop-
and exploration costs here.Report construction in the year inwhich
ed out and equipment in the year in which acquired, irrespective of
rime payment is mode. Do not include the value of your own re-used
ml.
Jnder Part (a) show expenditures on all new construction, including buildings
types, mine shafts, tracks, roads, transmission lines, blast furnaces, docks
towers, etc.Exclude the value of land purchased but include the cost of lana
Exclude expenditures forthe purchase of previously existing
ngs and other structures.
fuder Part (b) show the installed cost of all new machinery and the delivered
movable equipment such as new motor cars, trucks, ra'tlway rolling stock,
furniture and appliances, etc., whether for your own use or for rent to others.
de expenditures on used machinery and equipment.
(a) Capital expenditures on new buildings and other
structures $
(b) expenditures on new machinery and equipment
— Total1(a), 1(b), 2(a) and 2(b
&RKS
Department use
and address I Edited
person I
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COMMENT
SERGEI P. DOBROVOLSKY, Wayne University
Mr. Firestone's paper contains a brief comment on the possibility
that making available information pn. business and government in-
vestment intentions. may prove to be a significant factor influenc-
ing the realization of these intentions, a factor that investment fore-
casters can ill afford to ignore. This point has been raised before,
and there.seems to be little doubt about its general validity. Whether
the influence of this factor can be measured with adequate accuracy
is, however, a different—rand highly debatable—question. This aspect
of investment forecasting has received little attention at the present
session, and I venture to offer a few comments on it, without at-
tempting, of course, any comprehensive treatment of the subject.
There is first the question whether the mere publication of the
data, collected through a survey, will affect individual business-
men's plans, even though the government is not expected to inter-
fere with private investment policies. It seems reasonable to assume
that individual entrepreneurs will want to compare their own in-
vestment plans with the data on aggregate investment intentions,
made available by. the survey, and that many of them will revise
their original decisions in the light of such a comparison. Just what
these revisions will do to the original plans can hardly be determined
on an a priori basis. Some entrepreneurs may wish to fall in line
with the rate of expansion (or contraction) that is forecast for
the entire industry. But there may be others who will try to do
better than their competitors in the industry appear to be çloing: in
an expansion period they will step up their own expansion programs
in order to forestall the others and get a bigger share of the growing
market; in a contraction period they will intensify their downward
adjustment in order to outdo the others in a general economy drive.
If the entrepreneurs motivated by the desire to conform are in
the majority, and those motivated by the desire to forestall are in
the minority, then the publication of the aggregate data on invest-
ment intentions will probably strengthen the chances that these in-
tentions will be realized. But if the opposite is the publication
of the data will add another factor making for a divergence of
alized investment from planned investment.
The situation becomes even more complex if the government,
upon the publication of the results of the survey, announces its own
decision to take measures affecting the investment trend as. revealed
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by the survey. The government may interfere with this trend by
taking certain restrictive measures (for example, allocating scarce
materials) or by changing the rate of its own capital expenditures.
In either case these questions arise: How will the business com-
munity respond to the announced government policy? and To what
extent can this response be forecast at the time the government de-
cision is made? There is a further complication arising from the
possibility that if the businessmen know, or at least suspect, that the
goverrnnent is likely to take strong corrective measures after it has
analyzed the survey data, they may be hesitant to reveal their com-
plete investment programs when answering, the survey questionnaire.
Assume, for instance, that the government finds the rate of in-
tended private investment "too high" and makes it known that it
will respond by reducing the rate of public investment in the im-
mediate future. What effect will such an announcement have on
private investment plans? Individual entrepreneurs will have to re-
vise their sales and investment programs in the light of the possible
effect of the intended contraction of government expenditures. Some
firms will doubtless promptly scale down their capital expenditures.
But there may be others that will see fit to expand, trying to make
use of the manpower and materials which will become available as
a result of the government contraction. If most firms contract their
expenditures, the aggregate amount of private and public invest-
ment may drop to a greater extent than the government had' antici-
pated.
In view of the above, the question may be raised whether govern-
ment forecasting and planning would not be made more effective
by keeping all relevant information confidential with those making
policy. It may be argued that such a procedure would result in less
deviation by businessmen from their original investment programs.
The government would, in effect, be saying to businessmen: "We
have surveyed your intentions and have formulated our own policy
accordingly. For the time being we are not revealing our forecasts
and intended measures, but we ask you to proceed with your pro-
grams, leaving it to us to make all the adjustments necessary for the
attainment of generally satisfactory economic conditions."
Doubtless this procedure would give the government additional
power and would provoke much criticism for this very reason. Busi-
ness would probably resent such policies on the part of the govern-
ment as being too paternalistic and undemocratic.1 In addition diffi-
1Secrecyof government financial operations has not, however, been unknown
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culties might arise in trying to prevent leakages of information from
the agencies concerned with the formulation of government fore-
casts and the resulting policy decisions. Inaccurate rumors concern-
ing the impending government action might spread and upset the
initial business investment intentions to an even greater extent than
an official government announcement would.
Everyone would agree that the ideal procedure would be fOr gov-
ernment and business freely and openly to exchange information
and adjust their respective policies so as to achieve the desirable
economic goal. The government, under such ideal conditions, could
say to business: "Our survey of your investment intentions indicates
such and such a trend. We do not find this trend entirely desirable
and we therefore recommend that you, the businessmen, make such
and such adjustments; we, the government, will alsomake such and
such revisions in our policy. It is our belief that if these adjustments
and revisions are made, satisfactory economic conditions will be
maintained." The businessmen, who under these conditions would
be expected to have full confidence in the government forecasts and
policies, would promptly follow these recommendations and adjust
their initial plans accordingly. All this, no doubt, would be very
harmonious and democratic. But how close can we expect to get to
this state of affairs in an economy divided, into different pressure
groups with conflicting economic objectives?
While complete harmony is unattainable and a certain amount
of conflictisinevitable,it seems clear that an economy based
primarily on privateenterprise cannot function smoothly and
efficientlyunlessconditionsconducive to long-rangebusiness
planning are maintained. The government cannot, of course, be
expected always to endorse business investment programs, but
when it finds that modifications are required it is preferable that it
proceed so as not to destroy the businessmen's confidence in being
able to formulate long-range programs and essentially carry them
through. Otherwise, private investment is likely to become scanty
and erratic, which will tend to upset the economy and, in fact, make
further forecasting and planning by the government much more
difficult and less effective.
It also seems clear that while efficient government forecasting de-
pends in large measure on the ability to foresee businessmen's re-
in the democratic world. The policies of the Exchange Equalization Account
in Great Britain, and of the similar agencies in other countries, during the
interwar period may be mentioned as one well-known example.
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sponses to the announced trends and policies, efficient government
planning depends largely on how much flexibility the government
is allowed in adjusting its program to the latest business responses.
The government should be able to adjust its "corrective" measures
smoothly and promptly each time a significant shift in private in-
vestment intentions is detected.
These remarks are, of course, of a very general nature. Their sole
purpose is to draw closer attention to some of the problems arising
out of the interdependence of business and government investment
planning and the continuous, process of revising and adjusting indi-
vidual business plans aécording to the anticipated general trend in
private and public policies.
ROBERT P. ULIN, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co.
I should like to comment on the Canadian experience in invest-
ment forecasting first as a record of accomplishment, for the ac-
complishment has been very great indeed.
Those responsible for the Canadian surveys have achieved a high
degree of cooperation from their business community. The complete-
ness of the Canadian sample is striking. If I interpret Firestone's
figures correctly, about 11,000 firms replied to the January 1951
survey. This amounted to about two-thirds of those to whom ques-
tionnaires were mailed and provided coverage of firms making over
80 per cent of actual capital expenditures. These are very high fig-
ures compared with the 2,100 regular respondents in the joint Se-
curities and Exchange Commission—Commerce Department survey,
or the considerably smaller number of respondents in the McGraw-
Hill survey.
A particularly striking accomplishment is the inclusion of a sig-
nificant sample of the smaller trade and service establishments, the
home-building industry—for which we have never had really satis-
factory anticipations in the United States—and institutional con-
struction. For the most part the American technique has been to
rely on economic analysis for forecasting all these constructionex-
penditures as a supplement to the data for industry obtained by
direct surveys.
I am aware that Canada is a smaller, more closely knit industrial
community than the United States and that this has facilitated sur-
veys. But I am still impressed by 11,000 individual replies.
With these preliminary comments, I want to turn to a discussion
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of some of the problems raised by both the American and the
Canadian surveys which have been particularly prominent in re-
marks of other speakers. It has been said a number of times in this
Conference that businessmen make errors in forecasts of capital
expenditures. Actually, we do not have in these surveys forecasts
nor do we have errors in forecasts; we have plans and changes in
plans.
It has been said that we do not know who fills out these question-
naires or what types of figures they are putting down. Actually, we
do in the McGraw-Hill survey—and I think this is also true of the
Canadian survey. We have found that the usual officer filling out
the questionnaire is the president, vice-president in charge of manu-
facturing, or controller. Figures that are down in the case of
small companies very often represent guesses, and there is no pre-
tense that they do more than that. However, in the case of large
companies they are usually budget figures. I think the Commerce
Department is quite right in using the word "budget" on its ques-
tionnaire. These budgets are not sacred or rigid. On the contrary,
it is usual business practice to regard them as subject to change.
For this reason the midyear check-up is èertainly a necessity when
an annual survey is taken, as is the case with the Canadian survey,
and I am in complete agreement with Firestone's stress on the possi-
bility of discovering changes in plans by such check-ups. It has
been clearly established that capital investment plans are
enough to be changed easily during the year. In the 1950 McGraw-
Hill survey 97 per cent of manufacturing firms indicated that they
regularly reviewed their plans during any given year. Two-thirds
reviewed plans monthly and almost one-third quarterly. In 40 per
cent of the companies the review was made by management officials
and in 37 per cent by both management and directors. For this
reason we, like the Canadians, recheéked a part of our sample at
midyear, in both 1950 and 1951. In each case substantial upward ré-
vision in plans was found to have occurred.
At this point I should like to say that I think capital investment
plans are considerably more volatile in relation to changes in cor-
porate profits than is indicated by the statistical evidence in the
surveys we have discussed. The 1949 decline in profits was not very
severe. if the fictitious inventory profits and losses for successive
quarters are washed out, and it did not last very long. A more sub-
stantial and prolonged decline in profits, particularly from the higher
levels recently attained, may have more drastic results.
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We have also to consider the effect on investment plans of certain
temporary phenomena, such as the need for capacity related to de-
fense production, and the granting of certificates of accelerated
amortization, which evidently make such investment relatively at-
tractive to businessmen.
My point here is that, in order to forecast the trend of capital in-
vestment, we need not only statistical answers about companies'
investment plans, but also the answers to a great many qualitative
questions. For example, on previous McGraw-Hill surveys we have
asked what part of programs is devoted to expansion and what part
to modernization. We have asked about the possible effect on in-
vestment of a 20 per cent decline in business activity. We have asked
what would promote an expansion of investment plans—higher
stock prices, lower taxes, increased sales, or accelerated amortiza-
tion. The value of such questions is illustrated by the fact that ac-
celerated amortization showed up as a favorite means of promoting
expansion and that it was, in fact, a key factor in the expansion
during 1951.
The answers to such questions can be a tremendous help in mak-
ing the general analysis necessary to supplement statistics on in-
vestment intentions. I am a little surprised that no attempt has been
made to secure this type of qualitative information in the Canadian
surveys. The high degree of business cooperation in these surveys
would indicate to me the likelihood that companies would answer
a few qualitative questions, even though these added somewhat to
the length of the questionnaire.
At this point I had better conclude my remarks, for I find myself
suggesting to Firestone that he tamper with a highly successfulop-
eration. Perhaps it is better to let success alone. However, I will say
that in the last three McGraw-Hill surveys we have asked a great
many of these qualitative questions, and I think it may have actu-
ally improved the response. When we send out the results to co-
operators—and noncooperators—they are just as interested in why
industry is investing as in how much it is investing. These why
questions have also, I know, proved helpful to our government
economists. So I hope our Canadian friends will consider using more
of them, and when they do, I feel sure the results will, like all their
work to date, merit our most careful attention.
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REPLY BY THEAUTHOR
-,Myobservations relating to Dobrovolsky's and Ulin's comments
can be brief. Both discussants have made some very appropriate
and well-considered remarks. In essence these develop further some
of the points covered in the paper on "Investment Forecasting in
Canada." In substance I am in agreement with what Dobrovoisky
and Ulin say. Perhaps I might confine my remarks to an illustration
of the applicability of the suggestions to Canadian economic con-
ditions and to policy formulation and analytical techniques in use.
With respect to Ulin's remarks, I particularly like his emphasis,
first, on the tenuousness of the information on business. capital ex-
penditure plans that investment-intentions surveys yield, and sec-
ondly, on the need for qualitative information as an aid in the in-
terpretation of the results of the surveys.
On the first point Ulin rightly states that business capital expendi-
ture plans are not forecasts of what will happen. Rather, they are
statements of what businessmen intend to do at the time the survey
is taken. Now unless there are firm commitments in existence at
that time, businessmen's investment intentions can change for many
reasons of both a macro- and a micro-economic type. Some two
dozen reasons are mentioned in the Canadian paper, and many of
these are identical with those listed by Irwin Friend and Jean
Bronfenbrenner in their paper in this volume on "Plant Equip-
ment Programs and Their Realization."
Ulin's observations raise the interesting question, How important
are commitments for capital expenditures already entered into at
the time the survey is undertaken? If, for example, we knew that a
company reporting a total anticipated capital outlay for the coming
year of $x million had made binding commitments for, say, one-half
of the contemplated expenditures (for example, work under way,
construction contracts let, or firm orders for machinery and equip-
ment placed), then any changes in investment plans would be likely
to occur in the other half, for which commitments would presumably
be made in the coming year.
In Canada we do not have such data on a company basis. But
some information is available in the aggregate for the construction
sector of capital expenditures. Ever since 1947 we have been sur-
veying on a quarterly basis a sample of large construction firms in
various parts of the country to ascertain the amount of construction
work on their books. Based on this information, an index of the
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value of work not yet completed has been developed. This index
reflects firm commitments made by business and others to contrac-
tors. In appraising the construction part of investment intentions
by business we usually check to see whether both construction inten-
tions and construction commitments follow similar trends (upward
over the last five years). If in one year there was a divergence—
say construction intentions were up but work not yet completed was
leveling off or declining—we would regard this as a danger signal.
It would suggest that a larger segment of construction intentions
was not committed at the time construction plans were stated, and
therefore a greater portion of the construction program was possibly
subject to cancellation or deferment.
Another set of data which we have found helpful in this respect
is our monthly statistics of housing starts and carryover. Comple-
tions of houses in the next year are usually a function of the carry-
over at the end of the year plus a given proportion—usually about
one-third—of starts initiated in the coming year. If, then, our field
surveys show expectations for too large, or too small a number of
housing. completions for the following year, we have a basis for
further examination of the returns to determine reasons for such
divergences. Inquiries usually follow, and frequently these lead to
some corrections of earlier estimates.
With regard to the second point, Ulin is quite right in observing
that qualitative information, including the question of why industry
is investing as much as it says it is going to, is not covered specifically
in the Canadian. survey of anticipated capital expenditures. There
is a good reason for this, namely, we are obtaining such information
in other ways. We have, for example, some thirty commodity officers
in the Department of Trade and Commerce whose job it is to keep
in touch with the development and expansion of specific industries,
their production problems, and market prospects both at home and
abroad. These commodity officers visit a number of the firms more
or less regularly. We go to these officers for explanations of why
some companies or some industries are expanding more than others,
what some of the difficulties faced by industries in seeing through
their projects are, arid why some companies decided not to go ahead
with capital expenditure plans. The task, as we see it, is not oniy to
find out why some businessmen are investing, but also why some
other businessmen are not investing.
We also discuss, at our regular government-business economists'
meetings, to which I made reference in the paper (see section B 11),
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the raison d'être behind current business investment intentions and
the factors that may either defeat or accelerate the realization' of
capital expenditure plans. Business economists who are closely in
touch with the situation as it affects particular industries and who
are aware of business sentiment and the economic climate within
which business decisions are made are eminently suited to make
qualitative observations on the motivating forces of the business
community, and on the feasibility of proceeding, with investment
programs as planned.
While I agree with Ulin that some of the qualitative information
can be obtained by means of statistical-survey methods, as demon-
strated.successfully by the McGraw-Hill surveys of business capital-
spending plans, there are some aspects of this type of information
that probably can be more effectively obtained through personal
interviews and discussions with decision-makers in business and
their advisers.
Incidentally, a number of suggestions for questions to be added
to Canadian surveys of capital expenditure intentions have been
made during the seven years of operations' of the survey. I. have
consistently counseled against the addition of any questions to this
survey, mainly on three grounds. First, we need a high rate of re-
sponse to obtain reasonable estimates of the industrial and regional
details required for economic analysis and policy formulation de-
signed to deal with potential trouble spots as close to the source
as possible. If the present simple questionnaire, which has only
four questions, were to be made more complicated, this might re-
duce the current high rate of response. Secondly, we have a fairly
strict timing schedule in order to get survey results and analysis
done as early in the year as possible so as to be of maximum use to
business and government in formulating policies for the coming
year. A more complicated questionnaire might delay returns. Third-
ly, there are other ways by which supplementary information can
be obtained, as the examples given above indicate. Why, then,
tamper with an operation which has been reasonably successful so
far? This, I gather, is a sentiment that Ulin shares.
Let us turn now to the main point of Dobrovoisky's comments:
the possible responses of the business community to the publication
of the results of investment-intentions surveys. This is a very im-
portant question, and I am glad Dobrovoisky raised it. I think his
point is well taken—that in the democratic environment of the North
American continent publication of survey results properly qualified
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and interpreted, together with whatever statement on policy the
government considers appropriate in the circumstances, is preferable
to the alternative, namely, the suppression of the information and
a refusal of government to• advise business of the economic policies
it intends to pursue.
Dobrovolsky describes as the ideal condition complete harmony
between business and government in formulating capital expendi-
ture plans. While the situation in Canada is far from this ideal, our
present arrangements have the advantage of being flexible. enough
to work—at least in the conditions we have had since the end of
the war.
In Canada as in the United States great emphasis is placed on
the opportunities of the individual and the operations of a private
enterprise economy. In fact while our indirect economic. policies
may currently be tougher, our direct controls are much less numer-
ous and perhaps more informal. Let me illustrate the formulation
of government economic. policies as they are affected by business
capital expansion plans, and in turn influence the execution of suôh
plans, by reference to the situation in 1951.
Anticipating higher capital expenditures in 1951, Canadian Cabi-
net ministers were emphasizing late in 1950 the need for restraint
on the part of the business community in view of expected compet-
ing demands from the defense sector. These warnings were heeded
by a number of firms in low-priority sectors, for example, light
manufacturing, trade, finance, real estate, and service groups. But
as the results of the 1951 investment-intentions surveys showed, not
enough projects were deferred in these fields. The government there-
fore decided on a number of policies designed to encourage the
postponement of low-priority projects, including such measures as
the deferment of depreciation for selected capital undertakings for
a period of four years, credit restrictions, and so forth. The advan-
tage of such policies was that the decision whether to proceed with
a project in the near future or not was still left to the individual
businessman, although strong financial deterrents made it necessary
for him to scrutinize carefully his capital expenditure plans. The
upshot of all this was a distinct change in the composition of the
investment program for 1951—anticipated also for 1952—with as little
direct government interference in business affairs as possible.
There is no doubt, as Dobrovoisky suggests, that flexible govern-
ment economic suited to varying business responses are one
of the ingredients of good government in democratic countries.
259